A

VIEW

OF THE

CONDUCT OF THE EXECUTIVE

IN THE

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

OF THE

UNITED STATES,

AS CONNECTED WITH THE MISSION TO THE

FRENCH REPUBLIC,

DURING THE YEARS 1794, 5, and 6.

BY JAMES MONROE,

LATE MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE SAID REPUBLIC.

ILLUSTRATED BY HIS

INSTRUCTIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE,

AND OTHER

Authentic Documents.

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PREFACE.

THE Addreſs of Robert Goodloe Harper, Eſq. of South Carolina, to his Conſtituents, having been lately republiſhed in London, which, from the opinions and declarations it contains concerning the general conduct of the French in the courſe of the preſent war, ſo much in uniſon with the opinions and declarations of the ruling powers, and thoſe who have ſupported the war here, has met with a very favourable reception; the Editor, into whoſe hands a copy of a "View of the Conduct of the Executive of the United States, &c. by James Monroe," has accidentally fallen, conſiders it a duty owing to truth and to the public to lay it before them. He conceives that the pernicious miſrepreſentations of Mr. Harper, though they may very well anſwer the purpoſe of thoſe, who wiſhing to draw the United States into a cloſer connexion with Great Britain, would plunge it into a war with its ancient ally, have miſled the public mind, not merely in what relates to France herſelf, but as to the general diſ-

poſition of the people of the United States; he truſts, then, that this fair relation of facts, this open and manly expoſition of truths, may diſſipate the errors and correct the poiſon which it is ſo evidently the purpoſe of Mr. Harper to infuſe. The reader might be here left, with this ſtatement before him, to form his impartial judgment. As Mr. Monroe' sbook, however, was not written in anſwer to Mr. Harper's, but merely in juſtification of his public conduct as miniſter to the French republic, and as there are points diſcrediting Mr. Harper's publication, which this general contradiction of the ſpirit of his performance could not advert to, it may not be improper briefly to notice them. The miſchievous parts of Mr. Harper's book are rendered ſtill more dangerous by his pleaſing ſtyle of writing and his great plauſibility: he begins with a generous confeſſion of his former ſins in advocating the French revolution, its crimes, and horrors; and hence claims the credit of a ſaint converted from a ſinner, and that extraordinary degree of belief which we always feel inclined to give to one who appears acting from conviction in oppoſition to his natural bias, or the principles inſtilled by his education. Here then he hoped the foundation was laid for an implicit reliance on all the miſrepreſentations and miſtatements that follow. We advance however but little, before we encounter his party ſpirit, before we are compelled to deny him the virtues of candour, coolneſs,

neſs, and impartiality, which on his fair outſet we were diſpoſed to grant him; we find him ruſhing into all the vehemence of a party writer; miſtating facts, aſſuming falſe grounds, going out of his way to pick up dirty abuſe to beſpatter the French cauſe. In very deciſive tones he tells us, that the French have reſolved to bend all Europe beneath their yoke, that they are the ſyſtematic deſtroyers of mankind, that they will have no peace, that they would compel all nations to war, &c. He then aſſumes a catechetical mode of reaſoning, and aſks why France endeavoured to ſtir up Ruſſia and the Turks againſt Auſtria? why ſhe bribes Pruſſia with the ſpoils of Auſtria? why ſhe attacks the commerce of Great Britain through neutral ſtates? why ſhe is determined to ruin the maritime ſtrength of England? why ſhe purſues the ſyſtem of conqueſt, after having formally renounced it? &c. In fine, why ſhe endeavours to take thoſe advantages which every power at war has always taken, to ſtrengthen herſelf by new acquiſitions, and to weaken her enemy by every means poſſible? If Mr. Harper's wiſhes had been followed, France ſhould have renounced conqueſt in the midſt of ſucceſſes; whilſt ſurrounded by enemies, ſhe ſhould have made no attack, ſhe ſhould have permitted them unmoleſted to have collected their forces on her frontiers, and their commerce to be carried on without interruption; and now ſhe ſhould not ſtrengthen herſelf by alliances, ſhe ſhould not determine for

herſelf

herſelf what kind of peace ſhe is entitled to, or rather what capacities ſhe has for continuing the war. It is no very hazardous conjecture to make, that if this ſyſtem of Mr. Harper had been acted upon, France would now have been in the ſituation of unhappy Poland; *deploratur in perpetuum libertas, nec vindex quiſquam exſtitit, aut futurus videtur.* Liv.

Mr. Harper, after this ebullition of his paſſions has ſubſided, proceeds to addreſs his "fellow-citizens" upon what it certainly more immediately belongs to them to conſider; namely, the conduct of France with reſpect to the United States: and here it is that from Mr. Monroe's book we may collect his entire refutation in all that is ſaid concerning the malicious intentions of France towards America, and her inceſſant endeavours to drive her into the war. We learn from many intereſting parts of the following papers, the affection which France nouriſhed for her ſiſter republic, her continual endeavours to evince it, her wiſh that America ſhould remain in a ſtate of perfect neutrality; the redreſſing as ſoon and as well as poſſible her complaints and grievances; the readineſs which ſhe at all times ſhowed to aſſiſt her in her negotiations; her ſincere and earneſt endeavours to preſerve a good underſtanding, even after ſhe had ſtrong grounds of complaint. As to what relates to matters of fact, there is certainly

tainly no man more deſerving of the fulleſt confidence than Mr. Monroe; and when writing in a public capacity, when his character is ſo entirely at ſtake, his accuracy is not to be doubted, of courſe not to be compared to that of a mere member of congreſs addreſſing his conſtituents "upon the motives which have guided his conduct;" and as to important opinions, the ſituation which Mr. Monroe held, his acquaintance with all public characters, his information on all ſtate tranſactions of the time both in America and France, certainly enabled him to form a more juſt eſtimate of all that paſſed, and of courſe entitles him to more attention than a delegate from South Carolina "making his conſtituents acquainted with his opinions."

Mr. Monroe's book, as publiſhed in America, makes a large octavo volume, containing, beſide the View &c. the whole of the correſpondences, and other papers relating to his miſſion, which, though all intereſting and important, do not ſo neceſſarily appertain to the purpoſe of this publication as the extracts contained in the Appendix: beſides that part of the Appendix referred to in the View, the reader will find others from No. IX. onwards, which contain much intereſting matter. It is ſcarcely neceſſary to ſpeak of the character of the author, ſo univerſally eſteemed, and on which his moſt inveterate enemies muſt agree with his warmeſt

and

and moſt ſincere friends: the reader will ſee throughout an able and honourable ſtateſman, a firm and manly patriot, a man of truth, virtue, and liberality.

Note.—Amongſt other topics of Mr. Harper's cenſure is, of courſe, the conduct of Mr. Genet the miniſter of the French republic in America; and, in declaiming againſt him, he has not been aſhamed to bring forward a declaration which Genet was ſaid to have made, viz. that in a certain caſe he would appeal from the deciſion of the preſident to the people. The reader ſhould be informed that this ſuppoſed declaration, which Mr. Harper makes ſuch great uſe of in the courſe of his book, was formally and explicitly denied ever to have been made, by the preſident's ſecretary, Mr. Dallas, in whoſe preſence it was ſaid to have been uſed. This may ſerve as a ſpecimen of the accuracy of Mr. Harper. As nearly as can be recollected, Mr. Dallas, in his letter, declared that Mr. Genet did not make uſe of ſuch words as were aſcribed to him, nor of any words that he could conſtrue into ſuch a meaning.

London, Feb. 14th, 1798.

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A VIEW,

&c.

IN the month of May 1794, I was invited by the preſident of the United States, through the ſecretary of ſtate, to accept the office of miniſter plenipotentiary to the French republic. The propoſition was plain and direct, announcing to me for the firſt time, that the executive thought of me for that office; and certain it is, I did not ſolicit, deſire, or even think of it for myſelf. The ſecretary obſerved, that Mr. Morris was to be recalled, and it being neceſſary to appoint a ſucceſſor, the preſident had requeſted him to inform me, he ſhould be glad I would take his place. I received the communication with a due degree of ſenſibility; but yet the propoſal was ſo new and unexpected, that it was, from a variety of conſiderations, impoſſible for me to give an immediate anſwer to it. I requeſted ſome days to deliberate on the ſubject, which were granted.

I was at this time a member of the ſenate of the United States, for the ſtate of Virginia, which ſtation I had held for ſeveral years before. It had been too my fortune, in the courſe of my ſervice, to differ from the adminiſtration, upon many of our moſt important public meaſures. It is not neceſſary to ſpecify here the ſeveral inſtances in which this variance in political ſentiment took place between the adminiſtration and myſelf: I think proper however to notice two examples of it, ſince they ſerve eſſentially to illuſtrate the principles upon which that variance was founded, and the light in which I was known to the adminiſtration and my country

before this propoſal was made to me. The firſt took place when Mr. Morris was nominated miniſter plenipotentiary to the French republic; which nomination I oppoſed, becauſe I was perſuaded, from Mr. Morris's known political character and principles, that his appointment, and eſpecially at a period when the French nation was in a courſe of revolution, from an arbitrary to a free government, would tend to diſcountenance the republican cauſe there and at home, and otherwiſe weaken, and greatly to our prejudice, the connexion ſubſiſting between the two countries. The ſecond took place when Mr. Jay was nominated to Great Britain; which nomination too I oppoſed, becauſe, under all the well-known circumſtances of the moment, I was of opinion we could not adopt ſuch a meaſure, conſiſtently either with propriety, or any reaſonable proſpect of adequate ſucceſs; ſince being a meaſure without *tone*, and one which ſecured to that power *time*, which of all things it wiſhed to ſecure, it ſeemed better calculated to anſwer its purpoſe than ours; moreover, becauſe I was of opinion, in the then ſtate of European affairs, it would be made by the enemies of the two republics the means of embroiling us with France, the other party to the European war; and becauſe I thought it was unconſtitutional to appoint a member of the judiciary into an executive office: and laſtly, becauſe I alſo thought, from a variety of conſiderations, it would be difficult to find within the limits of the United States, a perſon who was more likely to improve, to the greateſt poſſible extent, the miſchief to which the meaſure naturally expoſed us. This laſt example took place only a few weeks before my own appointment, which was on the 28th of May 1794.

When I conſidered theſe circumſtances, I was ſurpriſed that this propoſal ſhould be made me by the adminiſtration, and intimated the ſame to the ſecretary of ſtate, who replied, that my political principles, which were known to favour the French revolution, and to cheriſh a friendly connexion with France, were a ſtrong motive with the preſident for offering me the miſſion, ſince he wiſhed to ſatisfy the French govern-

ment what his own ſentiments were upon thoſe points. He added, that, in his opinion, the preſident was as ſincere a friend to the French revolution, and our alliance with France, as I could be, and of courſe that nothing would be required of me inconſiſtent with my own principles; on the contrary, that I ſhould be placed on a theatre where I might gratify my feelings in thoſe reſpects, and at the ſame time render a moſt uſeful and acceptable ſervice to my country; for that our affairs with France had fallen into great derangement, and required an immediate and deciſive effort to retrieve them. Thus adviſed, I ſubmitted the propoſition to my friends, who were of opinion I ought to accept it, and whereupon I did accept it.

My inſtructions were drawn in ſtrict conformity with theſe ſentiments, as will appear by a peruſal of them. They enjoined it on me, to uſe my utmoſt endeavours to inſpire the French government with perfect confidence in the ſolicitude which the preſident felt *for the ſucceſs of the French revolution; of his preference for France to all other nations as the friend and ally of the United States; of the grateful ſenſe which we ſtill retained for the important ſervices that were rendered us by France in the courſe of our revolution*; and to declare in explicit terms that although neutrality was the lot we preferred, yet in caſe we *embarked in the war, it would be on her ſide and againſt her enemies, be they who they might.* Several incidents which had occurred in the courſe of our affairs, of a nature to create in France doubts of a contrary diſpoſition in our councils, were expreſſly adverted to, for the purpoſe of enabling me to diſſipate thoſe doubts, by ſuch explanations as might be moſt ſucceſsful. The miſſion of Mr. Jay to London was particularly noticed; becauſe it was, I preſume, deemed moſt likely to produce or foſter ſuch doubts. Upon this point, my inſtructions were as follows: "It is not improbable you will be obliged to encounter on this head, ſuſpicions of various kinds. But you may declare the motives of that miſſion to be, *to obtain immediate compenſation for our plundered property, and reſtitution of the poſts.*"

Another incident was taken advantage of by the adminiſtration, with a view to ſatisfy the government of France that its profeſſions were in all reſpects ſincere. The ſenate and houſe of repreſentatives had each paſſed a reſolution, expreſſive of the intereſt they took, reſpectively, in the welfare of the French republic, with a requeſt by each to the executive, to tranſmit the ſame in its behalf to the French government. In fulfilling this duty, the executive availed itſelf of the opportunity furniſhed, to declare its own ſentiments on the ſame ſubject, which it did in terms the moſt ſtrong and emphatic that could be uſed. In communicating the reſolution of the ſenate, it was obſerved by the ſecretary of ſtate (through whoſe department the communication paſſed), "that in executing this duty, the liberal ſuccours which the United States received from the French nation, in their ſtruggle for independence, preſent themſelves warm to the recollection. On this baſis was the friendſhip between the two nations founded: on this baſis, and the continued interchange of regard ſince, has it grown; and, ſupported by theſe motives, it will remain firm and conſtant. The ſenate, therefore, tender to the committee of public ſafety their zealous wiſhes for the French republic; they learn with ſenſibility every ſucceſs which promotes the happineſs of the French nation; and the full eſtabliſhment of their peace and liberty will be ever eſteemed by the ſenate as a happineſs to the United States, and to humanity." And in communicating that of the houſe of repreſentatives, it was further added, "that in no manner could this honourable and grateful function be more properly diſcharged, than by ſeizing the occaſion of declaring to the ally of the United States, that the cauſe of liberty, in the defence of which ſo much American blood and treaſures have been laviſhed, is cheriſhed by our republic with increaſing enthuſiaſm; that under the ſtandard of liberty, whereſoever it ſhall be diſplayed, the affection of the United States will always rally; and that the ſucceſſes of thoſe who ſtand forth as her avengers will be gloried in by the United States, and will be felt as the ſucceſſes of themſelves and the other friends of hu-

manity. Yes, repreſentatives of our ally, your communication has been addreſſed to thoſe who ſhare in your fortunes, and who take a deep intereſt in the happineſs and proſperity of the French republic."

Theſe reſolutions were public, being printed and publiſhed on the journal of each houſe; whence it was reaſonable to infer, that the communication of the executive, which announced them to the French government, was likewiſe of a public nature, eſpecially when it was conſidered that the committee of public ſafety might publiſh the whole, if it thought fit. No intimation was given me by the adminiſtration that it was its wiſh they ſhould be kept ſecret; I therefore concluded that the publication thereof was a circumſtance that muſt have been contemplated by the executive.

Upon this baſis my miſſion was laid; a baſis which ſatisfied me, that, whatever might be the ſucceſs of our extraordinary miſſion to England, its objects were ſo few, and its powers ſo ſtrictly limited and well defined, that nothing could poſſibly reſult from it, that would leſſen the confidence of France in the friendſhip and affection profeſſed towards her, or call in queſtion the purity of my motives in accepting, under the adminiſtration, this miſſion to the French republic. The proſpect before me therefore every way was an eligible one. My connexion with the adminiſtration was formed upon my own principles; or rather our principles appeared to be the ſame in all the points in queſtion; and the duties it was enjoined upon me to perform, were thoſe in which of all others I wiſhed to ſucceed: for nothing could be more delightful to me, than, by labouring to inſpire the French government, upon terms ſafe and honourable to myſelf, with a confidence in the fair and friendly views of our own, to contribute to reclaim to the bonds of a cloſe amity, two countries whoſe friendſhip was contracted in the war of our revolution, and which ought to be eternal; but who were now unhappily diverging from each other, and in danger of being thrown wholly apart; and, as I preſumed, equally againſt the intereſt and inclination of both. Nor could any thing be more delightful to me, than to be able, by

means of that confidence, to recover to our citizens a full indemnity for the injuries they had already ſuſtained by the loſs of it:—and theſe were the particular duties it was enjoined upon me to perform. I embarked therefore immediately, with a view to commence and purſue them with zeal.

Upon my arrival in Paris, which was on the 2d of Auguſt 1794, I found that the work of alienation and diſunion had been carried further than I had before even ſuſpected. The haraſſment of our commerce had commenced, and gone to ſome extent; and a coolneſs and diſtruſt of our policy were marked ſtrongly in their proceedings. In ſhort, it was apparent that things were in train for an entire ſeparation of the two countries, as may be ſeen by reference to the documents which exhibit a correct view of the then ſtate of our affairs *.

I preſented my credentials to the commiſſary of foreign affairs, ſoon after my arrival; but more than a week had elapſed, and I had obtained no anſwer, when or whether I ſhould be received. A delay beyond a few days ſurpriſed me, becauſe I could diſcern no adequate or rational motive for it. The ſtate of things occaſioned by the fall of Robeſpierre, which took place juſt before my arrival, might protract it for that term, but not a longer one. Soon however intimations were given me, that it proceeded from a very different cauſe; one too which materially affected the honour of our adminiſtration as well as my own. It was intimated to me that the committee, or ſeveral at leaſt of its members, had imbibed an opinion that Mr. Jay was ſent to England with views unfriendly to France, and that my miſſion to France was adopted for the purpoſe of covering and ſupporting his to Englond; that the one was a meaſure of ſubſtantial import, contemplating on our part a cloſe union with England; and that the other was an act of policy, intended to amuſe and deceive. It was added, that this impreſſion not only cauſed the delay of my reception, but that the committee, being unwilling to become the dupes of that policy, was deviſing how to defeat

* See Extract of a Letter, Appendix, No. I.

it; and in conſequence, that it was impoſſible to ſay when I ſhould be received. I was equally diſguſted and diſquieted with this intelligence, becauſe I thought the impreſſion the committee had taken of the views of our adminiſtration was unfounded; and becauſe I foreſaw, if it influenced their councils, it would produce effects very injurious to our affairs. And on my own part I felt a degree of reſentment towards the committee, for ſuſpecting that I would become the inſtrument of a policy ſo oppoſite to my own principles; or, in other words, that I would inliſt under the adminiſtration for the purpoſe of promoting the views that were aſcribed to it, by betraying thoſe republican principles which were near to my heart, and to the advancement whereof my paſt life and ſervices had been dedicated. Upon conſideration of theſe circumſtances, and eſpecially as I conceived myſelf ſtrong in the ground upon which I ſtood, in reſpect to the views of the adminiſtration as well as my own, I was reſolved to take the ſubject from the committee, and preſent it before another tribunal. With this view I addreſſed a letter to the convention on the 14th of that month, notifying it of my late arrival, and aſking to what department of the government I ſhould preſent myſelf for recognition; and I was happy to find that this expedient produced immediately its deſired effect, for I was in conſequence thereof received and recogniſed by the convention itſelf on the day following.

When I delivered my addreſs to the convention, I thought proper likewiſe to lay before it, the reſolutions of the ſenate and houſe of repreſentatives, as communicated by the adminiſtration, as well as my own, in reſpect to France and the French revolution, upon clear, juſt, and honourable ground. I thought I perceived diſtinctly that not only the temper which had been ſhown by the committee, but the general derangement of our affairs with France, proceeded in a great meaſure, if not altogether, from the ſame cauſe—a ſuſpicion that we were unfriendly to them: hence, feeling no motive to diſcriminate between us and the other neutral powers, which were royal powers, and ſecretly hoſtile to

the revolution, they had compriſed us in their regulations with reſpect to them. *This*, therefore, appeared to me to be the moſt ſuitable time to make an effort to remove that ſuſpicion, and *that* meaſure the moſt likely to accompliſh it. Upon this principle, then, that ſtep was taken, and I was happy to find that it produced immediately in the convention, and throughout France, the favourable effect I had expected from it. With the committee, however, it did not produce an effect ſo immediate, nor ever in the ſame degree.

Being recognifed, I now applied myſelf to the ordinary duties of my office, and with all the zeal of which I was capable. The firſt object to which I turned my attention was the deranged ſtate of our commerce, and the firſt application I made to the committee of public ſafety was for a reſtoration of the ancient and legitimate order of things, with reparation to our citizens for the injuries they had ſuſtained by a departure from it. My firſt note to the committee of public ſafety on this ſubject, bears date on the 3d of September 1794; in which I diſcuſſed and combated copiouſly, and as ably as I could, the conduct of France in thus haraſſing our commerce, againſt the ſtipulations of certain articles in our treaty with her; and urged earneſtly the immediate repeal of the decrees which authorized that proceeding. I had cloſed my note with this demand, when further reflection, ſtrengthened by the apparent temper of the committee, ſuggeſted a doubt whether I had not tranſcended my inſtructions, and might not by ſuch a demand, under ſuch circumſtances, and upon my own reſponſibility, bring on my country the embarraſſment of demands on the other part, under another article of the treaty. I examined again and again my inſtructions, and was finally of opinion they did not contemplate the demand. But yet I was unwilling to ſuffer the impreſſions which the manner of my reception by the convention had made upon the community at large, to paſs off, without an effort to improve it to advantage; and was perſuaded from what I witneſſed of the general temper of the public councils, that the way to turn that impreſſion to the beſt account, was to make a liberal and

generous appeal, on our part, to like motives on theirs. Upon this principle, therefore, and upon due conſideration of the above circumſtances, the laſt clauſe in that note was drawn. By this, however, I do not wiſh to be underſtood as having been guided by political motives only in expreſſing the ſentiments contained in that clauſe; on the contrary, I admit they were ſtrictly my own; affirming, at the ſame time, that they would never have been thus expreſſed, had I not been ſatisfied they were ſuch, as it was honourable for the United States to expreſs, and were likely alſo to promote their intereſt.

The paſſage in my inſtructions applicable to this ſubject was as follows. After ſpeaking of the Bourdeaux embargo, it adds: "But you will go farther, and inſiſt upon compenſation for the captures and ſpoliations of our property, and injuries to the perſons of our citizens, by French cruiſers." There appeared to me to be a material difference between a power to demand compenſation for captures and ſpoliations already made, or which might afterwards be made, and that of calling ſpecifically on the French government to execute certain articles of the treaty between the United States and France, which it was known, before I left America, were ſet aſide, and the reaſons for ſo doing explained. I concluded, if it had been intended to demand an execution of thoſe articles of the treaty, I ſhould have been ſpecially inſtructed ſo to do, ſince the object appeared to me to be too particularly important to have eſcaped the attention of the adminiſtration; or, being attended to, to have been meant to be compriſed in the above article of inſtruction. And the circumſtance which ſuggeſted caution on my part, leſt I ſhould expoſe my country to injury and myſelf to cenſure, was the ſtipulation in our treaty of alliance with France of 1778, by which we bound ourſelves, in return for her guarantee of our independence, to guarantee to her, for ever, her poſſeſſions in the Weſt Indies. I was fearful, if we preſſed her to fulfil ſtrictly thoſe articles in our treaty of commerce which were favourable to us, it might induce her

to call upon us to fulfil the article above mentioned in our treaty of alliance.

My note was now before the committee, and my efforts to obtain an early and full compliance with its ſeveral objects, earneſt and unceaſing. Six weeks, however, elapſed, and I had made no progreſs at all. On the 18th of October I ſent in a ſecond note in ſupport of the former, and with like effect. From the committee itſelf I could obtain no anſwer; and to my informal applications to ſome of its members, I found that the difficulty of allowing our veſſels to protect the property of Engliſh ſubjects, whilſt they gave none to that of French citizens, againſt the Engliſh cruiſers, with that of diſtinguiſhing in our favour from the caſe of Denmark and Sweden, in which we were now involved, were objections of great weight with the committee. But yet I thought I could diſcern another motive, which, though withheld, or rather not avowed, was likewiſe a powerful one. I thought I perceived, ſtill remaining in the councils of that body, a ſtrong portion of that ſuſpicion of our views, in regard to our miſſion to England, ſo impreſſive upon my arrival; but which I had hoped was eradicated: and the more earneſtly I preſſed an accommodation with my demands, the more obviouſly did this motive preſent itſelf to my view. Thus our affairs were at a ſtand, and the proſpect of making any progreſs in them, at beſt, a gloomy one. In the interim, too, our commerce was haraſſed, and the ſame ſyſtem continued in other reſpects, which I was labouring to change. Poſſeſſing then, as I thought I did, the ſpecific remedy, I was reſolved to apply it to the diſeaſe; for this purpoſe, therefore, I ſought and obtained an interview with the diplomatic members of the committee, commencing a converſation with deſign to lead them to that point, that I might explain in a ſuitable manner the objects of Mr. Jay's miſſion to England, and in which I eaſily ſucceeded*. The gazettes had teemed with reports for ſome time before this, that Mr. Jay was about to paſs over to France, to propoſe a mediation of peace, on

* Memorandum of a converſation that paſſed ſome time in November, in an interview between Mr. Monroe and two diplo-

the part of America, at the inſtance of England; which reports had, as I underſtood (impreſſed as the committee was with his political character), contributed to keep alive, if not increaſe, the ſuſpicion above referred to. I began, therefore, by making a kind of offer of our ſervices to the republic to promote peace, by way of mediation, according to an article in my inſtructions;

matic members of the committee of *Salut Public*; at which, by his deſire, I was preſent.

"The ſubject was introduced by Mr. Monroe's obſerving on the neceſſity that all powers at war muſt feel to bring their diſputes to a cloſe—That this was often effected by the interpoſition or mediation of a third power—That, on the preſent occaſion, the United States, actuated by the warmeſt wiſhes for the tranquillity and happineſs of the republic, would cheerfully contribute their good offices towards bringing about a pacification with the allied powers, if their *entremiſe* would prove acceptable or uſeful to the republic; at the ſame time declaring explicitly, they were by no means diſpoſed to liſten to any overtures that might be made them by the other powers at war, for conciliating their mediation.

"To this it was replied, that the government received thoſe offers as a diſtinguiſhed mark of the friendly diſpoſition of the United States towards the republic, and would not loſe ſight of them:—but that her enemies, if they felt a neceſſity for peace, muſt make direct application for it; and, that the dignity of the republic, ſupported as it was by the ſucceſsful progreſs of its arms, rendered this mode of treating only admiſſible.

"It was aſked, if Mr. Monroe was in correſpondence with Mr. Jay? To which he replied, he was not.—And it was then further aſked, if Mr. Jay was expected ſoon in Paris?

"Some converſation led to Mr. Monroe's obſerving, that the object of Mr. Jay's miſſion to England was confined ſolely to the procuring compenſation for the depredations committed on our trade, and obtaining the ſurrender of the weſtern poſts.

"By the diplomatic members it was mentioned, that it was underſtood, the United States had declined acceding to ſome propoſals made them by Sweden and Denmark, for joining their armed neutrality—to which Mr. Monroe obſerved, that he was unacquainted with ſuch propoſals; but admitting they were made, the reſult could not be known, until after the opening of the ſeſſion of congreſs.

"The offer of the mediation of the United States, made by Mr. Monroe, appeared to me to be received with coolneſs, though the expreſſions acknowledging their ſenſe of it were perfectly polite; and in the queſtions relative to Mr. Jay, above cited, with others of more indifferent nature, there appeared to be couched a degree of jealouſy and ſuſpicion of the object of his miſſion.

"JOHN H. PURVIANCE."

Paris, January 16th, 1795.

but in a manner to create a belief that we neither wiſhed nor would undertake that office unleſs by ſolicitation; nor then, except at the inſtance of our ally; adding, that I wanted no immediate anſwer to this communication, having made it only to inform them of the amicable views of our adminiſtration towards France.

So far my chief object was to diſcredit that report without noticing it. The members, however, adverted directly to it, aſking me whether it was true; and to which I replied, that it could not be true, ſince Mr. Jay was ſent to England upon ſpecial buſineſs only, "to demand compenſation for the depredations on our trade, and the ſurrender of the weſtern poſts*," to which his authority was ſtrictly limited. The members acknowledged, in terms ſufficiently polite, the attention which was ſhown upon that occaſion, by the adminiſtration, to the intereſt of France, as well in the offer of ſervice to the French republic by the United States, as in the confidential communication I had made upon the ſubject of our own affairs; and thus the conference ended.

About this time I was applied to by Mr. Gardoqui, miniſter of finance in Spain, to obtain for him of the French government permiſſion to enter France, oſtenſibly to attend certain baths on account of ill health; but, as I ſuppoſed, to open a negotiation for peace with the French republic. At firſt I was averſe to comply with his demand; becauſe I was perſuaded, from what I ſaw of the jealous temper of the committee towards us, that an agency in the affairs of the enemies of France, however friendly the motive for it in regard to France might be, was more likely to increaſe than diminiſh

* See Mr. Purviance's note of the conference, which may be relied on as accurate; becauſe he interpreted between the members and myſelf, upon that occaſion; ſince at that time I could not ſo much rely on my knowledge of the French language as to depend on myſelf in that reſpect. By his note I am alſo reminded, that other topics were touched on by theſe members, and, in particular, that I was aſked, whether I correſponded with Mr. Jay? and replied, that I did not (as was the fact at the time) on political topics, which was doubtleſs the object of the inquiry. I recollect too, that when the queſtion was propounded, it was done in a manner to impreſs me with a belief it was ſuſpected I made the propoſition at the inſtance of Mr. Jay, and in harmony with the Britiſh government.

their diſtruſt, and by means thereof injure our own affairs; and becauſe I did not like to repeat overtures of friendly offices, when it was poſſible the motive for ſo doing might be miſinterpreted. The demand, however, being reiterated, and paſſing by trumpet through the Spaniſh and French armies, I could not well avoid preſenting it to the view of the French government. I reſolved, however, in ſo doing, to expreſs myſelf in ſuch terms as to ſhow my independence equally of Spain and France; upon which principle my note to the committee of public ſafety of the 13th of November 1794, incloſing copies of Mr. Gardoqui's letters to me, was drawn; for, by the manner in which I delivered my ſentiments of Mr. Gardoqui's views in writing theſe letters to me, it muſt have been obvious, that there was no political concert between him and me; and by the manner in which I addreſſed the committee upon that occaſion, it muſt have been equally ſo, that although I wiſhed ſucceſs to the French republic, yet I had too high a reſpect for the United States, and knew too well what was due to myſelf, to weary that body with profeſſions or overtures of friendly offices, which were not ſolicited. This incident I am ſatisfied produced a good effect in our favour, by drawing towards me the confidence of the French government, and of courſe to the communications which I made it on the part of our own.

Juſt after this, I was aſked by the diplomatic members of the committee of public ſafety, whether I thought they could obtain by loan, of the United States, or within the United States, ſome money to aid the French government in its operations. I underſtood, about four or five millions of dollars were wanted, to be laid out in the purchaſe of proviſions and other ſupplies in the United States. The inquiry was rather an embarraſſing one, for many reaſons. Upon a full view, however, of all circumſtances, I thought it beſt to refer the committee for an anſwer to the adminiſtration; availing myſelf of the occaſion it furniſhed, to unfold more fully the then ſubſiſting relations of the United States with Britain and Spain reſpectively, with a view not only to diſſipate all remaining doubt on thoſe points,

but to engage France to aſſiſt us in our claims upon thoſe powers in caſe it ſhould eventually be neceſſary ſo to do. Shortly after this I was informed by the diplomatic members of the committee of public ſafety, that their miniſter, then about to depart for the United States, would be inſtructed to propoſe to our government an arrangement, whereby France ſhould engage to ſecure the attainment of all our claims upon thoſe powers, when ſhe made her own treaties with them, as likewiſe to protect our commerce againſt the Algerines*.

By theſe ſeveral communications and explanations, on my part, which were much aided by the movements of General Wayne on the frontiers, ſhowing, that if we were not in a ſtate of actual war with Great Britain, ſo neither were we in that of actual peace; as likewiſe by ſome changes in the committee itſelf; it was ſoon to be ſeen, that the doubts which that body had heretofore entertained of the ſincerity of our profeſſions, and rectitude of our views, began to wear away: for from this period may be dated a change in its policy towards the United States; a change which ſoon became ſo viſible afterwards.

About this time, it is important to be remarked, that I received a letter from the ſecretary of ſtate, of the 25th September 1794, which aſſured me, that in his judgment our negotiation with England was likely to fail in all its objects, and that *that* with Spain was at a ſtand; the courts of Madrid and London being cordial in their hatred of the United States, and a determination to haraſs them through the Indians. By this letter, too, I was adviſed of the efforts made by the French miniſter, Mr. Fauchet, through his ſecretary, Mr. Le Blanc, to inſpire the French government with a belief, that *certain members in our own had a Britiſh tendency*; and admoniſhed of the means I had to confront that idea, *ſince I knew how Mr. Jay was reſtricted*; an object to which my attention was now particularly called, ſince, under exiſting circumſtances, it was deemed *indiſpenſable for us to ſtand well with the French republic* †. Thus

* Vide latter part of Appendix, No. I.
† Appendix, No. II.

adviſed, I not only felt myſelf fortified in the meaſures I had already taken to cultivate a good underſtanding with the French government, as above ſtated; but ſtimulated to purſue the ſame object by like means, with new zeal.

By this time I had become perſonally acquainted with many of the members of the committee, the reſerve heretofore ſhown me being in a great meaſure thrown off; nor did I ever fail to avail myſelf of the opportunities thereby furniſhed, to urge as a *man*, what I had ſo often before preſſed as a public miniſter; nor can it be doubted, that the effect thereby produced, in regard to the objects in view, was a ſalutary one.

On the 18th of November 1794, the committees of public ſafety, commerce, and ſupplies, united, paſſed an arrêté, by which the commiſſary of marine was ordered to adjuſt the amount due to our citizens on account of the Bourdeaux embargo; as likewiſe for ſupplies rendered to the government of St. Domingo. By it, too, the embarraſſments which impeded our direct commerce with France, as alſo thoſe which impeded it with other countries, by the arbitrary rule of contraband, in reſpect to proviſions deſtined for thoſe countries, were done away. Free paſſage, in our veſſels, was likewiſe allowed to the ſubjects of the powers at war with France, other than ſoldiers and ſailors in the actual ſervice of ſuch powers. In ſhort, all the objects to which my note of the 3d of September extended, were yielded; except that of allowing our veſſels to protect enemies' goods, which point was declared to be withheld, until ſuch powers ſhould agree, that the merchandiſe of French citizens, in neutral veſſels, ſhould likewiſe be free.

Thus the buſineſs of reform in our affairs with the French republic was happily commenced. By the above arrêté an important change was actually produced in the general temper and conduct towards us; for by it many practices, very injurious to us, and heretofore legal and even commendable, were now prohibited and made criminal. And much likewiſe was done by the mitigation, which this change in the public councils, now become general in our favour, produced in the execution of that which was yet tolerated; for after this I do not recollect an inſtance, eſpecially in France, where a

veſſel of ours was brought in upon the ſuſpicion of having enemies' goods on board.

But the buſineſs of reform did not end here; on the contrary, it was only commenced; for not long after this it was propoſed by the above-named committees, united with that of legiſlation, in a report to the convention, as the part of a general ſyſtem, to put in execution likewiſe that article of our treaty, which ſtipulates, that free ſhips ſhall make free goods; which propoſition was adopted on the 3d of January 1795, and announced to me by the committee of public ſafety immediately afterwards. Thus the ancient harmony between the two countries was completely reſtored by a repeal of the ſeveral decrees and arrêtés which had diſturbed it.

It is a circumſtance worthy of attention, that as, upon a former occaſion, the United States followed the fortune of the other neutral powers, ſuch as Denmark, Sweden, &c. when the decrees reſtrictive of their commerce paſſed, ſo upon the preſent one, thoſe powers followed the fortune of the United States, by participating with them in the benefit of the repeal of thoſe decrees. In the former ſtage, the United States had not ſufficient weight to ſeparate themſelves from the condition of thoſe powers, which were royal powers, and unfriendly to the French revolution; in the latter, they had acquired ſufficient weight to recover the ground they had loſt, and even to impart the advantages of it to thoſe powers alſo; for having been heretofore connected, it was now difficult for the French government to diſtinguiſh, in that reſpect, between thoſe ſtates and thoſe other powers.

Our affairs with France were now in a proſperous ſtate. By the repeal of the decrees under which our trade was haraſſed, there was an end put to complaints from that cauſe; and, as orders were iſſued for the adjuſtment of the accounts of ſuch of our citizens as had claims upon the French republic, with a view to their payment, the proſpect of retribution for paſt loſſes was likewiſe a good one. Soon too our commerce flouriſhed beyond what was ever known before; for by virtue of our treaty with France of 1778, whoſe ſtipulations were now reſpected,

in every article, we were becoming, and actually became, not only the carriers of our own bulky and valuable materials to England and her allies (with the exception, in their caſe, of the ſtrict contraband of war only), and of courſe to every port of the ſea, which gave us a friendly welcome; but were likewiſe, on account of the protection which our veſſels gave to the property of the enemies of France, becoming alſo the carriers of England and her allies in the war. Such, too, was the friendly bias of the people of France towards us, that notwithſtanding our veſſels gave no protection to French property againſt Engliſh cruiſers, nor in certain caſes to the productions of the French iſlands become American property, yet we were become likewiſe the principal carriers of France. Even the privilege of American citizenſhip was an object of great value to the owner (I mean in a mercantile view); for an American citizen could neutralize veſſels, funds, &c. and thus profit, in many ways, by the condition of his country. Nor did France invite us to the war, or manifeſt a wiſh that we ſhould engage in it; whilſt ſhe was diſpoſed to aſſiſt us in ſecuring our claims upon thoſe powers, againſt whom we complained of injuries. In ſhort, ſuch was our ſituation with the French republic, and with other powers, ſo far as depended on the French republic, that there was but one point upon which we had cauſe to feel or expreſs any ſolicitude, which was, that it might not vary.

But unhappily this ſtate of things, ſo correſpondent with our ancient relations with that country, ſo congenial with the public ſentiment, and neceſſary to the public welfare, was not doomed to be a permanent one; for even whilſt the propoſition laſt above mentioned, was depending before the convention, accounts were received from England, that Mr. Jay had concluded a treaty with that power, of very different import from what I had been taught by my inſtructions to expect, and had likewiſe taught the French government to expect, would reſult from his miſſion. Hitherto I had underſtood, and had ſo ſtated, that his powers were limited to the adjuſtment of the particular points in controverſy between the

two countries; but by theſe accounts it appeared, that a treaty was formed, upon very different principles, whereby our connexion with France was eſſentially weakened, by a new and very cloſe one with England. Here then began a new era in our affairs, which will be, perhaps, for ever memorable in the annals of our country, the incidents attending which I will proceed to relate.

It will readily occur to every diſpaſſionate mind, that this report, though merely a report, muſt have ſubjected me to ſome embarraſſment, which would continue till I was enabled completely to diſprove it. But I will not dwell on this circumſtance. I will proceed to narrate facts which ſhow how we loſt the ground we had gained as above, and ultimately reached the point where we now are.

As ſoon as this report reached Paris, it was obvious that it produced in the committee a very diſagreeable ſenſation in regard to us; for immediately afterwards, I was applied to by that body in a letter, which ſtated what they had heard of the contents of that treaty, and aſking in what light they were to conſider it. It happened, that I had received on the ſame day a letter from Mr. Jay, of the 25th of November, informing me, that he had concluded on the 19th of the ſame month, a treaty with Great Britain, which contained a declaration, "that it ſhould not be conſtrued, or operate, contrary to our exiſting treaties;" but, "as it was not ratified, it would be improper to *publiſh* it." I therefore made his letter the baſis of my reply to the committee, inſerting verbatim ſo much of it as applied; adding, that although I was ignorant of the particular ſtipulations of the treaty (which, however, for the removal of all poſſible anxiety on that ſubject, I would communicate as ſoon as I knew them), yet I took it for granted, the report was altogether without foundation. My anſwer was ſo far ſatisfactory to the committee as to prevent, at the time, any change in the policy recently adopted towards us; for the decree, which propoſed to put into full execution our treaty of commerce with France, then depending, as already obſerved, before the convention, was paſſed without oppoſition.

In promiſing to communicate to the committee the contents of this treaty as ſoon as I knew them, I did ſo, in the expectation of fulfilling my promiſe, when I received a copy of the treaty from the department of ſtate, and not before; for I expected no further information upon that ſubject from Mr. Jay. I concluded, as he had already communicated to me a part of the treaty, and withheld the reſidue, that he had done ſo upon mature deliberation, and meant to communicate to me no more of it; and in this opinion I was the more confirmed, from that paſſage in his letter, which ſtated, that, as the treaty was not ratified, it would be improper to *publiſh* it; ſince I could not underſtand that paſſage, otherwiſe than as an intimation, he ſhould withhold from me the other parts of the treaty. And in making that promiſe to the committee, I did it with a view to preſerve the ſame ſpirit of candour in my communications with that body, *now that the treaty was concluded*, that I had done whilſt the *negotiation was depending*, a departure from which would doubtleſs have been immediately noticed. To the department of ſtate, therefore, alone, I now looked for ſuch information reſpecting that tranſaction, as the public intereſt required I ſhould poſſeſs; always preſuming it would place the reſult upon a footing correſpondent with its previous communications to me, and mine to the French government, with which they were ſufficiently acquainted.

On the 16th January 1795, I received another letter from Mr. Jay of the 28th of November preceding, informing me that he propoſed ſoon to communicate to me, in cipher, the *principal heads* of the treaty *confidentially*. This information ſurpriſed and embarraſſed me. It ſurpriſed me, becauſe it promiſed a reſult different from what I had expected from his preceding letters; and it embarraſſed me, becauſe, although it was for many reaſons an object of great importance with me to poſſeſs the treaty, in caſe it were of the kind I had underſtood it would be, yet I was now very averſe to receive it, in caſe it were otherwiſe, on account of the promiſe I had already made to the committee, to communicate to it the

contents, as ſoon as I knew them, as above ſtated. Thus circumſtanced, I reſolved to write to Mr. Jay, by a confidential perſon, and inform him of my engagement with the committee, requeſting a copy of the treaty to enable me to comply with it; urging as a motive for his ſending one, and truly, the good effect it would produce upon our affairs there; in the expectation of obtaining one, only in caſe the treaty was of a particular import, in which caſe I could ſee no motive why he ſhould refuſe that mark of confidence to the committee; and of preventing its being ſent, in caſe it was otherwiſe, or in caſe Mr. Jay did not wiſh its contents to be known to the French government; for in either of thoſe caſes, and eſpecially if clogged with any condition whatever, I did not wiſh to poſſeſs it. I committed this letter to the care of Mr. Purviance, a very reſpectable and deſerving citizen of Baltimore, who departed with it a few days after the receipt of Mr. Jay's letter above mentioned, and returned with his anſwer, bearing date on the 5th of February, ſome time early in March following. In his reply, he refuſed to ſend me a copy of the treaty, as I had requeſted; urging as a motive for his refuſal, that we were an *independent* nation, &c. *had a right to form treaties*, &c. with other ſound maxims which were never queſtioned.

Here again I concluded and hoped that the buſineſs between Mr. Jay and myſelf was at an end, and of courſe, that I ſhould hear nothing further from him upon the ſubject of his treaty. But here again I was diſappointed; for ſome time in March I received another letter from him of the 19th of February, by Colonel Trumbull; in which he informed me, he had authorized that gentleman to communicate to me the contents of that treaty, in *perfect confidence*, to be imparted to no other perſon. This laſt letter was ſtill more extraordinary than any which preceded it: for as he had refuſed to ſend me a copy of the treaty, according to my requeſt, by Mr. Purviance, and omitted, not to ſay refuſed (though, indeed, I underſtood his omiſſion in the light of a refuſal), otherwiſe to inform me of its contents, by that very ſafe opportunity, I did not ſee how the correſpondence could be continued on that ſubject, on his part. Nor was my

ſurpriſe otherwiſe than greatly increaſed (after having informed him, that the only acceptable mode by which the contents of the treaty could be conveyed was by the tranſmiſſion of a copy of the inſtrument itſelf) at the propoſition which he now made, to communicate them to me *verbally*, upon a preſumption that it would be *more ſatisfactory* to me to receive them *thus*, than by written *extracts from the treaty*, and upon condition that I would communicate them to *no other perſon whatever*. This propoſition being altogether inadmiſſible, was of courſe rejected.

Soon after this, Colonel Trumbull made a communication, upon the ſubject of this treaty, to Mr. Hichborn of Boſton, with deſign that he ſhould communicate the ſame to me unconditionally; and, of courſe, in the expectation I would communicate it to the French government. In conſequence, I received this communication in *writing* from Mr. Hichborn, with the attention which was due to thoſe two gentlemen, whom I perſonally reſpected; and made of it, afterwards, all the uſe which a paper ſo informal would admit of. And thus was executed Mr. Jay's promiſe to communicate to me the contents of his treaty with the Engliſh government; upon which topic I will now make a few obſervations only, and then diſmiſs it.

My promiſe to communicate to the committee the contents of Mr. Jay's treaty, as ſoon as I knew them, ſufficiently explains the motive of that intimation to him; but why demand a copy of the inſtrument for that purpoſe? Why not make my repreſentations to that body, upon the faith of Mr. Jay's to me, without further proof? Ought this to be expected under like circumſtances by any one? Or, ought any perſon who refuſes to repoſe confidence in another, as was the caſe in the preſent inſtance, by withholding the document in queſtion, to expect that *that other* would confide in him? Is not the very circumſtance of withholding a document, whilſt the party poſſeſſing it labours to impreſs you with a belief that *ſuch* are its contents, calculated to create at leaſt a ſuſpicion that the fact is otherwiſe; and that the ſolicitude ſhown proceeds from a deſire to deceive? And if ſuch

would be the effect of ſuch conduct on the part of a man indifferent or unknown to you, what ought to be expected from it when practiſed by one in whoſe political morality you had no confidence, and of whoſe obnoxious political principles and views you were already forewarned, by a long acquaintance with them? Theſe conſiderations will, I preſume, likewiſe ſufficiently explain why I would make no repreſentation to the French government of the contents of that treaty, for which I became perſonally reſponſible, upon the mere authority of Mr. Jay, or otherwiſe than upon a copy of the inſtrument itſelf.

But I had another reaſon of great weight in my mind for requiring a copy of the treaty from Mr. Jay, or preventing further communication with him on that ſubject, in caſe he would not ſend one. My object, as already ſtated, was, by fair and honeſt means, to remove the ſuſpicions which the French government entertained upon that ſubject; and with a view to promote the intereſt of my country. If, then, Mr. Jay enabled me to accompliſh the object, by a copy of the treaty, he ſeconded my views: but if he did not, every communication from him ſhort of that, only tended to weaken the ground upon which I ſtood; whilſt it perſonally embarraſſed me. It will be remembered, that by my inſtructions I ſtood upon ſtrong ground; ſince by their authority I could declare what I believed the treaty was, as I had before done what I believed it would be. But this I could not do in the caſe of a difference of the treaty from my inſtructions, unleſs I remained abſolutely ignorant of its contents: nor would the French government believe in caſe I did, unleſs the declaration was ſupported by circumſtances, the moſt ſatisfactory of which would be a belief, that there was no confidential underſtanding between Mr. Jay and myſelf; for knowing, as was to be preſumed, the footing upon which we ſtood before we left America, as well as the adminiſtration knew it, or even we ourſelves, and ſuſpecting (as the committee always did) the object of his miſſion to England, which ſuſpicion was now revived, perhaps much increaſed,—it would not fail to conſtrue ſuch intimacy into a proof of my apoſ-

tacy, and his and my miſſion, on the part of the adminiſtration, into an act of political intrigue, directed againſt the cauſe of liberty, of which France was to be alike the dupe and the victim; an imputation I not only did not merit, but to which I was reſolved to give no countenance or ſanction whatever, by any part of my conduct. This conſideration, therefore, likewiſe fortified me in the reſolution I had already taken, to requeſt a copy of the treaty as the only document that could be uſeful to me, and neither to accept from him that or any other, otherwiſe than unconditionally.

Such was my conduct upon the above occaſion, and ſuch the motives of it. Such was, likewiſe, Mr. Jay's conduct upon that occaſion, on whoſe motives I ſhall forbear to comment. What they were throughout, it is ſubmitted to others to determine, upon a view of the facts and circumſtances preſented; which cannot otherwiſe than furniſh to the impartial a ſatisfactory guide. Henceforward, therefore, I looked to the department of ſtate, for all further information reſpecting the contents of that treaty; and in the interim, upon the faith of my inſtructions, and the clauſe ſent me by Mr. Jay, continued to aſſure the committee, that, in my opinion, it contained nothing which ought to give them juſt cauſe of uneaſineſs; but if it did, that it would be diſapproved in America: which aſſurance was, moſt certainly, not without effect; ſince, by means thereof, the committee was preſerved, if not in a ſtate of perfect confidence, yet in one of perfect tranquillity.

Heretofore, the few letters I had received from the ſecretary of ſtate, were written before he was apprized of my arrival in France; and, of courſe, referred to a ſtate of things which preceded that event: but about this period, being the beginning of February 1795, I received a letter from him of the 2d of December 1794; which was written after he knew of my arrival, and upon the receipt of my third letter (of the 15th of September, of the ſame year), the two preceding letters having not yet reached him. In this he notices my addreſs to the convention; as alſo my letter to the committee of public ſafety of the 3d of September following; both of which

acts he cenſures in the moſt unreſerved and harſh manner. In the firſt he charges me with having expreſſed a ſolicitude for the welfare of the French republic, in a ſtyle too warm and affectionate; much more ſo than my inſtructions warranted; which too he deemed the more reprehenſible, from the conſideration, that it was preſented to the convention *in public and before the world*, and not to *a committee in a private chamber*; ſince thereby, he adds, we were likely to give offence to other countries, *particularly England, with whom we were in treaty*; and ſince, alſo, the dictates *of ſincerity do not require that we ſhould publiſh to the world all our feelings in favour of France*. For the future he inſtructs me, to cultivate the French republic with *zeal*, but without any unneceſſary *eclat*; and by my letter to the committee, demanding an indemnity for ſpoliations, and a repeal of the decrees ſuſpending the execution of certain articles of our treaty of commerce with France, he objects that I had yielded an intereſt it was my duty to ſecure. To ſupport this charge, he ſelects out the laſt clauſe in that letter, and without entering into the ſpirit of the paper, or its probable effect upon the committee, reaſons upon it as if it ſtood alone, and contained an abſolute and formal ſurrender of the right in queſtion; for which act of indiſcretion, or rather miſconduct, he intimates in pretty ſtrong terms, that the adminiſtration think a mere reprimand inadequate.

To this letter I replied immediately, in one of the 12th of February, in which I anſwered, explicitly, his ſeveral charges, and, I preſume, proved they were unfounded in every inſtance. Upon this occaſion I thought proper in reply to his firſt charge, to lay open more fully than I had before done, ſome truths, at which, indeed, I had before only glanced; particularly the light in which our adminiſtration was viewed by the committee upon my arrival*; a circumſtance which had ſubjected

* To convey an idea of the riſe and progreſs of the diſcontent and diſtruſt of the French government, it would be neceſſary to go back to a period antecedent to my miſſion—to the appointment of a man of the political principles and character which were known to belong to Mr. Morris, my predeceſſor; to his conduct during the early

me to ſo many and painful embarraſſments at that period, and for ſome conſiderable time afterwards, and ſo much to the injury of our affairs; details I would never have given, had I not thus been called on to do it in my own defence: for in truth, as I thought, after thoſe embarraſſments were ſurmounted, that complete harmony was perpetually re-eſtabliſhed between the two countries, it was my wiſh, as well from public conſiderations, as from motives of perſonal delicacy towards the parties intereſted, to bury them in oblivion. And in reply to his ſecond charge, I anſwered by informing him, that ſome time before the receipt of his letter I had tranſmitted him a copy of a decree which carried into full execution the violated articles of our treaty of commerce with France; whereby the very object was obtained (as in my judgment it had been much forwarded by the mode in which it was preſſed), the abandonment whereof he had laid to my charge.

I likewiſe thought proper, upon this occaſion, to explain fully the light in which I had underſtood my miſſion, as ſtated in my inſtructions; with the relation it bore to that of Mr. Jay; all doubts reſpecting which, in the French government, I was inſtructed to remove, by making explanations the moſt explicit, and upon thoſe points upon which ſuch doubts were moſt likely to ariſe. In diſcuſſing this ſubject, and ſtating how I had acted, I plainly told our adminiſtration within what limits I expected the reſult of that miſſion would be found;

ſtage of the French revolution, and whilſt in office; which by conſtantly favouring the royal party, in oppoſition to the republican courſe of things, rendered him odious to the French government; to his being continued in place, notwithſtanding all this, till his recall was abſolutely demanded by the French government; and laſtly, to the diſcovery made by that government, that ours was not diſſatisfied with his conduct; ſince to its demand, and not to a diſapprobation of any part of Mr. Morris's conduct, was his recall owing; which diſcovery was made by an intercepted letter from the ſecretary of ſtate to Mr. Morris, expreſſly aſſuring him that ſuch was the caſe. It would be painful to go into details on this ſubject; but the circumſtances here hinted will make it eaſy to conceive the unfavourable inferences that muſt have been drawn reſpecting the temper and views of our adminiſtration.

intimating, that I had a character not to be ſacrificed. To this view, I was led by the general tone of the ſecretary's letter, which created a doubt, whether the ground upon which I was placed by the adminiſtration was a ſolid one; for I could not conceive, if Mr. Jay's miſſion was limited to the objects ſpecified in my inſtructions, and was otherwiſe of the character I was taught to believe it was, why ſuch ſenſibility, or rather ſuch diſſatisfaction, ſhould be ſhown on account of my preſenting to the convention, publicly, thoſe documents which tended to prove how ſtrong the feelings of the adminiſtration were *in favour of the French nation*. To expreſs ſentiments in private, which it was wiſhed ſhould not become public, appeared to me a ſtrange doctrine to be avowed by the adminiſtration of a free people; eſpecially as it was known that the ſentiments, thus expreſſed, were in harmony with thoſe of the people, and with thoſe publicly and formally expreſſed by the repreſentatives of the people. Nor could I reconcile ſuch a ſolicitude for privacy, to any idea of conſiſtent or rational policy, in regard to the object of the miſſion to England: for if the object of that miſſion was to preſs that government into a compliance with our juſt demands, as I underſtood it to be, I could not conceive how that preſſure could be weakened by a knowledge that we were upon a good footing with the French republic. On the contrary, I did ſuppoſe, that a knowledge of that fact would produce the oppoſite effect, by giving us a more advantageous attitude in the negotiation. Theſe conſiderations, therefore, ſuggeſted a train of reflection, which gave me much diſquietude, from a fear that the adminiſtration had dealt uncandidly with me from the commencement.

Scarcely, however, had I diſpatched this letter, when I received another from the adminiſtration, of the 5th December 1794 (three days later only than the former one), but of a very different import from the former one. In this laſt letter, my two firſt of the 11th and 25th of Auguſt 1794, were acknowledged and approved, and a kind of apology made for the harſh language uſed in the preceding one. In this alſo was

renewed, in general but very ſtrong terms, the injunction formerly laid on me, "to cultivate with the utmoſt zeal the friendſhip of the French republic; taking care to remove every ſuſpicion of our preferring a connexion with Great Britain, or weakening our old attachment to France." To this letter I likewiſe gave an immediate anſwer, in which I aſſured the ſecretary, that it had removed the diſquietude his former one had occaſioned; and that, thus inſtructed, I ſhould continue to uſe my utmoſt efforts to forward the objects of my miſſion, as I had done before.

It will be remembered that before the accounts of Mr. Jay's treaty arrived, I had availed myſelf of ſome incidents that occurred, to explain to the committee the actual ſituation of the United States in regard to Britain and Spain; with a view, among other objects, to obtain the aid of France in our depending negotiations with each, in caſe it were deemed neceſſary by our executive; and that the French government propoſed inſtructing its miniſter, then about to depart for America, to make ſome propoſition to our adminiſtration upon that ſubject. But as ſoon as thoſe accounts were received, that project was of courſe abandoned; for it was entertained only at a time when it was ſuppoſed the miſſion to England would fail. Still, however, I wiſhed moſt earneſtly to embark the committee in ſupport of our claims upon Spain; ſince *they* formed a diſtinct intereſt, as yet unprovided for, and now much expoſed to danger by the appearance of an approaching peace between France and Spain; for I thought it probable, if they were not then adjuſted, much time might elapſe before they would be. Nor did I doubt it would be eaſy to accompliſh the object, eſpecially if I could ſatisfy the committee, beyond all controverſy, that the intereſt of France was not injured by our treaty with England, without which, indeed, I felt a reluctance to aſk that aid; and in order to enable me to do which, by an act of confidence and candour (in caſe I found it neceſſary), and not to ſatisfy any unwarrantable demands of the French government (for none ſuch were made),

was a ſtrong motive why I had requeſted of Mr. Jay a copy of his treaty, as above related.

Upon due conſideration therefore of theſe circumſtances (although Mr. Purviance, to whom I entruſted my letter for Mr. Jay, had not yet returned), I addreſſed the committee upon that ſubject, in a letter of the 25th of January 1795, in which I explained, more fully than I had before done, the nature of our claims upon Spain; and likewiſe endeavoured to prove, that, independent of the motive of rendering an uſeful and acceptable ſervice to the United States, which I preſumed was a ſtrong one, ſince it would always draw after it its own reward from a juſt and a generous people—there were other conſiderations of intereſt, growing out of the relation which the territory to be benefited by the ſecurity of thoſe rights, had with the French iſlands, which in themſelves were ſufficient to prompt the French government to yield us that aid. To this letter I received an anſwer from the committee, of the 8th of February following, addreſſed in very polite terms, promiſing to examine with profound attention the obſervations I had ſubmitted to it, and to give me the reſult without delay.

Thus this affair reſted till ſome time in the beginning of March following, when I was informed by Mr. Pelet, of the diplomatic ſection of the committee of public ſafety, and afterwards by Mr. Cambaceres, likewiſe of that ſection, that in reliance our treaty with England contained nothing injurious to France, they had expreſsly inſtructed their agent, then negotiating with Spain, to uſe his utmoſt endeavours to ſecure for the United States the points in controverſy with that power. And ſhortly afterwards, as their negotiation advanced, I was aſked, as well as I remember by thoſe members, as likewiſe by Boiſſy d'Anglas, whether we wiſhed to poſſeſs the Floridas, ſince it was intimated it would be eaſy for France to obtain them; but which ſhe would not do otherwiſe than with a view to cede them to the United States. I replied, I had no power to anſwer ſuch an interrogatory; but was well perſuaded we did not wiſh an extenſion of our territory. Well ſatisfied I am, that France declined taking them in her treaty with

Spain, which ſoon followed, from a fear it might weaken her connexion with the United States.

It merits attention, that the part which the French government now took, with a view to ſecure the claims of the United States againſt Spain, in its own treaty with that power, was taken merely from motives of friendſhip for thoſe ſtates, without any claim to, or demand of, retribution of any kind whatever. It equally merits attention, that it was taken at a time when the contents of the Engliſh treaty were unknown to the French government, and not unſuſpected by many to be of a nature injurious to France. Had that treaty then never paſſed, and had we alſo otherwiſe preſerved the ground upon which we ſtood with that nation in the commencement of its revolution, what might we not have expected from its friendſhip?

About the middle of May I received a letter from Mr. Short, at Madrid, written by the deſire of the duke of Alcudia, chief miniſter of Spain, to requeſt that I would, as miniſter of the United States, endeavour to open a new and more active negotiation between that power and France, he having previouſly aſſured Mr. Short, that the claims of the United States ſhould be adjuſted to their ſatisfaction. The proſpect therefore of ſucceſs in that important concern, was now as fair as it could be.

Shortly after this, Mr. Pinckney, who was commiſſioned to negotiate and adjuſt our interfering claims with Spain, arrived in Paris on his way to Madrid. I informed him of what had paſſed between the committee of public ſafety and myſelf upon that ſubject; aſſuring him I was of opinion, if he would explain the object of his miſſion to the committee, and aſk its friendly co-operation, ſatisfying it at the ſame time, that the intereſts of France were not injured by our treaty with England, that ſuch aid would be granted. Mr. Pinckney was aware of the benefit which would be derived from ſuch aid; but yet did not conſider himſelf at liberty to obtain it, by ſhowing a copy of Mr. Jay's treaty, which I intimated might be neceſſary completely to remove the doubts that were entertained in that re-

ſpect, and therefore deemed it moſt ſuitable to ſay nothing to the committee upon the ſubject of his miſſion. I obtained for him, however, an interview with the diplomatic members of the committee, by whom he was received with reſpectful attention; after which he proceeded on his route to Spain. From this period I never mentioned to the committee the ſubject of our diſpute with Spain; becauſe all agency in that buſineſs ſeemed now to be completely withdrawn from it, and becauſe I could not well do it, under exiſting circumſtances, without violating equally the rules of decorum to both governments. By the committee, indeed, a further preſſure on my part for its aid, would moſt probably have been deemed an act of extreme impropriety; and by our adminiſtration it might have been deemed an indelicate and ill-timed interference with its meaſures. Had the committee, however, ſecured for us thoſe objects in its own treaty, without regarding our miſſion to Spain, it would have exhibited a novel ſpectacle to the world—that of one government purſuing another with good offices, apparently againſt its wiſhes; nor would the ſurpriſe which that ſpectacle muſt have occaſioned, have been diminiſhed by a knowledge of the anterior details which produced it. It would at leaſt have greatly embarraſſed the adminiſtration to explain the cauſe of ſuch a phenomenon to its credit, notwithſtanding the advantage thereby gained to the public.

Such was the ſtate of things when Mr. Pinckney arrived in Spain; who very wiſely and very fortunately puſhed his negotiation to a cloſe, whilſt that ſtate laſted.

Some time in the beginning of May 1795, I received a letter of the 8th March, from the ſecretary of ſtate, and ſhortly afterwards two others; one of the 15th February, and the other of the 7th of April following. In that of the 15th February, the ſecretary informed me he had not then received Mr. Jay's treaty, but obſerves, "It is probable our commercial intercourſe has alſo been regulated: ſay, if you pleaſe, that a treaty has been concluded for commerce alſo, &c." He adds, "that in the principal heads of the negotiation, the ſurrender of the poſts, the vexations and ſpoliations of

our commerce, and the payment of the Britiſh debts, France can have no poſſible concern;" that by our treaty with her, ſhe enjoys all the advantages of the moſt favoured nation, &c. And by that of the 8th of March, he acknowledged the receipt of the Britiſh treaty on the 7th, but ſays it will remain undivulged by the executive till the 8th of June, when the ſenate would convene to deliberate on it. In this he notices the uneaſineſs of the French miniſter on account of that treaty, upon which point he makes ſome general obſervations declaratory of our right to regulate, by treaty, our affairs with England, in regard to the poſts, ſpoliations, and commerce, as we pleaſed; adding, that, "ſo far as a curſory peruſal of the treaty enabled him to ſpeak, he diſcovered no reaſonable ground for diſſatisfaction in the French republic." And in that of the 7th of April, the ſame ſentiments in general were expreſſed, with a remark, "that the confining of the contents of the treaty to the preſident and ſecretary of ſtate, was not from any thing ſiniſter towards France, but from the uſages in ſuch caſes; not from an unwillingneſs that the executive conduct ſhould be canvaſſed, but from a certain fitneſs and expectation ariſing from ſuch a diplomatic act." He adds alſo, "that the invariable policy of the preſident is, to be as independent as poſſible of every nation upon earth, &c."

By theſe letters it appeared that Mr. Jay had concluded a treaty upon other principles than thoſe to which his powers were reſtricted, as inferred from my inſtructions; and of courſe, that the nature and object of his miſſion to England had been miſrepreſented, through me, to the French government. This circumſtance ſubjected me to a degree of embarraſſment which may be eaſily conceived; nor was it leſſened by the intimation of the ſecretary, that he ſaw no *reaſonable* ground for diſſatisfaction in the French republic, eſpecially as he admitted the uneaſineſs of its miniſter, and likewiſe withheld from me the contents of the treaty; a reſerve I could not account for upon any conſiſtent principle on the part of the adminiſtration; nor otherwiſe, but upon its belief that the treaty would be deemed injurious to France by the French government. The more, there-

fore, I reflected upon this ſubject, the more uneaſineſs it gave me. I was aware of the reproach to which I was perſonally expoſed, let the commercial part of the treaty be what it might. But this was not the only conſideration which gave me pain: I was alſo fearful that this tranſaction would bring on a criſis in our affairs, which might be productive, in many reſpects, of much harm. Soon, however, I reſolved upon the line of conduct, which, in the then juncture of affairs, it became me to purſue. That the adminiſtration had injured me, was a point upon which I had no doubt; that it had likewiſe compromiſed its own credit, and with it that of the United States, was alſo a truth equally obvious to my mind. But the regard due to theſe conſiderations was the point to be determined. What did the honour and intereſt of my country require from me in the actual ſtate of affairs? What was my object in accepting the miſſion to the French republic; and how, under exiſting circumſtances, could that object be beſt promoted? Theſe were conſiderations of primary importance, which preſented themſelves, and claimed a more early and diſpaſſionate deciſion. Upon mature reflection, therefore, it appeared that I had but one alternative, which was, to remain where I was, and proceed in the functions of my office, notwithſtanding the embarraſſments to which I might be perſonally ſubjected; or to retire, and, in retiring, to do it tranquilly, without explaining my motives for it; or, by explaining them, denounce the adminiſtration to the public. But by withdrawing tranquilly, I ſhould not only have admitted the miſconduct of the adminiſtration, which I did not then wiſh to admit, but likewiſe my own; ſince it would have expoſed me to the ſuſpicion of having accepted the truſt to ſerve a particular purpoſe, and withdrawing after that was accompliſhed. Beſides, it ſeemed probable that my retreat at that moment, in either mode, might have ſome influence in inducing the French government to adopt a ſyſtem of policy towards us, which it was equally my duty and my wiſh to prevent. I reſolved, therefore, to ſtand firm at my poſt, and, let occurrences be what they might, to continue, as I had done before, to uſe

my utmoſt endeavours to preſerve harmony between the two countries; ſince that being an object invariable in my mind, I did not ſee how I could abandon it at a moment when it was menaced by a new danger, from whatever cauſe or quarter proceeding. To this reſolution too I was the more inclined, from the conſideration, that it was now probable, in caſe the treaty with England was in other reſpects of a different import from what I had been taught to expect it would be, and ſhould likewiſe be ratified—that I ſhould be recalled by the adminiſtration; which compulſory mode of retreat I preferred to a voluntary one, upon the principle, if the adminiſtration took that meaſure without ſhowing a ſufficient cauſe for it, conſiſtent too with its previous declarations, that it would not only furniſh to the world a new datum, whereby the better to eſtimate its general policy; but likewiſe leave me completely at liberty to explain, in every particular, the motives of my own conduct.

Having then reſolved to ſtand at my poſt, or rather not deſert it by a voluntary retreat, the path before me, though likely to be difficult, was nevertheleſs a direct one. On the one hand it was my duty, let the treaty be what it might, to endeavour by all ſuitable means to reconcile the French government to it; and on the other, to ſtate faithfully to our own ſuch facts and circumſtances as occurred, tending to ſhow the impreſſion which the treaty made on the French government; ſo that the adminiſtration, being correctly adviſed, might act accordingly. Upon this principle, therefore, I replied to the ſecretary, in anſwer to his letters above mentioned, that I regretted the deciſion of the adminiſtration to keep the treaty ſecret for the term ſpecified; ſince, as I had explained to the French government the object of Mr. Jay's miſſion whilſt its iſſue was uncertain, it was thought ſtrange the reſult ſhould be now withheld; a circumſtance too, I added, which, by keeping alive the ſuſpicions that were at firſt imbibed of its contents, would not fail to prove hurtful to our affairs in the interim. I aſſured him, however, that I ſhould

continue to endeavour to inſpire the French government with a confidence, either that the treaty contained nothing improper, or would not be ratified in caſe it did *.

About the laſt of June or beginning of July 1795, Colonel Humphreys, then reſident miniſter of the United States at Liſbon, arrived at Paris, with a view to obtain of the French government its aid in ſupport of our negotiations with the Barbary powers. He brought no letter from the adminiſtration to the French government, to authorize his treating with it in perſon, and of courſe it became my duty to apply in his behalf for the aid that was deſired. Accordingly I addreſſed a letter to the committee of public ſafety on the 5th of July 1795, opening the ſubject to its view generally, and requeſting its aid in ſuch mode as ſhould be agreed between us. I own I made this application with reluctance, becauſe, under exiſting circumſtances, I did not think it could be made without compromitting in ſome degree the credit of the United States; for between governments as between individuals I deem it undignified, however friendly their antecedent relation may have been, to ſolicit good offices, at a time when the friendſhip of the ſoliciting party is doubted, as was the caſe in the preſent inſtance. But I own alſo that my reluctance was diminiſhed by the knowledge that the adminiſtration poſſeſſed the treaty with England whilſt Colonel Humphreys was in America, and the preſumption thence ariſing, that this objection was weighed and over-ruled before his departure. Having however made the application, I was reſolved to purſue the object of it with the utmoſt poſſible zeal. In conſequence, I ſought and had many conferences with the members of the diplomatic ſection of the committee of public ſafety, and the commiſſary of foreign affairs, upon the ſubject; in which I was aſſured the aid deſired ſhould be given in the moſt efficacious manner that it could be. After ſome delays too, attributable at one time to us, on account of the ſituation of our funds, and at another, to

* See Appendix, No. III.

the committee, then much occupied with their own affairs, arrangements were taken for purſuing thoſe negotiations under the care of Joel Barlow, and with the full aid of France. At the moment however when Mr. Barlow was upon the point of embarking with our preſents, &c. intelligence was received that a Mr. Donaldſon, whom Colonel Humphreys had left at Alicante with a conditional power, but in the expectation that he would not proceed in the buſineſs till he heard further from him, had paſſed over to Algiers, and concluded a treaty with that regency, and of courſe without the aid of France:—and thus ended our application to the French government for its aid in ſupport of our negotiations with thoſe powers, and nearly in the ſame manner as that did, which I made for its aid in ſupport of our negotiation with Spain. But as Mr. Barlow was likewiſe empowered by Colonel Humphreys to treat with Tunis and Tripoli, and the real ſtate of the buſineſs with Algiers was unknown; it was ſtill thought adviſable that he ſhould proceed thither, in the hope, by concentring in his hands our general concerns with thoſe regencies, that not only any error which had been committed, if ſuch were the caſe, might be corrected, but that by his obſervations upon the character and circumſtances of thoſe powers, ſuch light might alſo be obtained, as would prove uſeful in the guidance of our affairs with them for the future. Accordingly Mr. Barlow departed ſoon after this in the diſcharge of the duties of the truſt repoſed in him, and to whoſe very important and extraordinary ſervices to his country, in the courſe of his miſſion, I with pleaſure add here my teſtimony to that of all thoſe who are acquainted with his conduct in it.

From this period I had but one object to attend to —the preſervation of our actual footing with France, which was, as already ſhown, as favourable as we could wiſh it to be. Nor was there any cauſe to apprehend a change for the worſe, unleſs it was produced by the Engliſh treaty. But the contents of that treaty were unknown; and of courſe there could be no fair ground for a

change of policy towards us on the part of France. And upon the ſubject of it, but little was now ſaid, either by the committee or myſelf, in our occaſional interviews. By the committee indeed it was never mentioned even informally, except when ſome occurrence brought to view the ſubſiſting relations between the United States and France; ſuch, for example, as the arrival of Colonel Trumbull, Mr. Jay's ſecretary, of Mr. Pinckney on his route to Spain, and of Colonel Humphreys, as above ſtated; or upon ſome preſſure for the ſettlement of the claims of individuals; upon which occaſions it was eaſy to perceive it was a ſubject not loſt ſight of. And by me it was never introduced; for as I had no new communication to make to the committee upon it, whereby to remove the ſuſpicions that were entertained of its contents, and any alluſion to it in that ſtate could of courſe only ſerve to revive unpleaſant ſenſations to our diſadvantage, I thought it moſt eligible to keep it out of view. I continued however to look with anxious expectation to the adminiſtration, in the hope of receiving from it ſoon ſuch information reſpecting that treaty, and of the future views of our government towards France, as might at leaſt preſerve the ſubſiſting harmony between the two nations.

Early in June 1795 accounts were received in Paris that the Britiſh government had revived its order for the ſeizure of proviſion-veſſels deſtined for France. At that period Paris, and many other parts of France, were in the greateſt diſtreſs for proviſions; in conſequence whereof, the attention of the government was directed with great ſolicitude to thoſe quarters whence ſupplies were expected, particularly to the United States of America, where great ſums had been expended in the purchaſe of them. Unfortunately however, but few of thoſe veſſels reached their deſtination; for in general they were taken into port by the Britiſh cruiſers. It was ſoon obvious that this aggreſſion of Great Britain upon the rights of neutral nations, being made with the intent to increaſe the diſtreſs of famine which was then raging at Paris, and thereby promote the diſorders which were in part attributable to that cauſe, excited a ferment in the

French councils, which was not pointed againſt Great Britain alone. The neutral powers were likewiſe animadverted upon, particularly the United States, to whom the attention of the committee was, as I had reaſon to believe, in a more eſpecial manner drawn, by the report of one of its ſecret agents from England, who ſtated that he was adviſed there, through a channel to be relied on, that the Engliſh adminiſtration had intimated, the meaſure would not be offenſive to our government, ſince it was a caſe provided for between the two governments. I was however happy to find that this report, which I treated with contempt, was at the time not much attended to by the committee; for it was deemed impoſſible that our government ſhould give a ſanction to the ſyſtem of kings for ſtarving France. Nevertheleſs, after the treaty appeared, I thought it my duty to communicate the purport of that report to the adminiſtration, with the comments that were made on that part of the treaty which was ſuppoſed to authorize the Britiſh ſeizures; in the hope that ſuch a conduct would be obſerved in regard to that proceeding of the Engliſh government, as would exempt us from the imputation of countenancing it *.

About the middle of Auguſt 1795, American gazettes were received at Paris, containing copies of the Engliſh treaty, whereby its contents were made known to the committee of public ſafety without my aid. From this period therefore all myſtery upon that ſubject was at an end. The poſſeſſion of the treaty enabled the French government to judge for itſelf upon all the points which it involved. Nor was the effect which it produced an equivocal one; for there did not appear to me to be a deſcription of perſons, not in the intereſt of the coaleſced powers, who did not openly and ſeverely cenſure it. True it is, it made its appearance at a time when it was likely to produce the worſt effect, being when Paris and many other parts of France were, as above mentioned, in the utmoſt diſtreſs for proviſions,

* See Appendix, No. IV.

and when the Britiſh were likewiſe ſeizing our proviſion-veſſels deſtined for their relief.

It will readily occur, from a variety of conſiderations, that my ſituation was now truly an embarraſſing one. I had, however, long before this ſettled in my mind, the part it became me to act during this criſis of our affairs; which was, to do every thing in my power, conſiſtent with propriety, to reconcile the French government to that treaty. I had therefore *now* no new deciſion to make, but ſimply to purſue *that* which I had already made. But as yet, it was not known that the treaty was ratified, nor certain that it would be; for the ſpontaneous and almoſt univerſal diſapprobation that was beſtowed upon it throughout the United States, as ſoon as it was ſeen, was ſufficient at leaſt to inſpire a doubt on that point: nor had I any letter from the department of ſtate of a late date, to intimate the courſe our adminiſtration was likely to take. At this period, therefore, comprehending the months of Auguſt and September 1795, I did not know how to act; for admitting that neither my previous well-known political principles, nor the communications I had made to the French government, which were in oppoſition to the reſult now before it, impoſed upon me any reſtraint, though, doubtleſs, in ſtrict propriety they ought ſo to have done, yet until our government took a part, it was impoſſible for me to take one. Had I, for example, turned out in that ſtage as a partiſan of the treaty, and provoked a diſcuſſion of its merits with the French government, and a month afterwards received advice from the adminiſtration, that it was rejected, I ſhould not only have expoſed myſelf to contempt, but likewiſe have deprived the United States of the merit which the rejection would have entitled them to with the French nation. Beſides, what advantage was to be gained by ſuch a courſe of proceeding in any ſtage? Was it not always in time to diſcuſs the merits of that treaty, when the French government reſolved to do it? and was it not my duty, ſeeking to preſerve harmony between the two countries, to labour rather to prevent a diſcuſſion throughout, than to promote one? A certain portion of

reſerve, therefore, on my part, was now particularly neceſſary; and ſuch was the conduct which I obſerved. At the ſame time, I affirm, that it was my invariable practice to avail myſelf of every opportunity that occurred, to inculcate by all the means in my power, as well by obviating ſuch objections as were made to the treaty, in the beſt way I could, as by urging conſiderations of a more general nature, the propriety and policy of preſerving the ſubſiſting harmony between the two countries, and with what effect will be ſeen by the documents which follow.

At this period I witneſſed a very extraordinary political phenomenon. The appearance of the treaty excited the general diſguſt of France againſt the American government, which was now diminiſhed by the oppoſition which the American people made to the treaty; for as ſoon as France ſaw that the Americans took up the cauſe as their own, and were indignant at a meaſure which they thought arranged them on the ſide of Britain and of kings, againſt France, and public liberty; from that moment did a friendly ſentiment diſcover itſelf in her councils, and throughout the community, towards us, which, by moderating the temper of the French government, promoted of courſe the views of the adminiſtration. The contrary effect was charged upon that diſplay of the public ſentiment in America; but the charge was dictated more in the ſpirit of party than of true philoſophy; for it was not warranted at the time by the principles of the human heart, nor did it correſpond with the fact.

But near the middle of September had now arrived, and I had heard nothing from the adminiſtration of its deciſion on the Britiſh treaty, or its views in that reſpect, and in the interim had the mortification to ſee that we daily loſt ground, which it would not be eaſy to recover. In ſhort, it was obvious not only that the French government no longer confided in the amicable profeſſions of our own, but that this treaty had otherwiſe produced an effect ſo unfavourable in the public councils towards us, as to give cauſe to apprehend, in caſe it were ratified, conſequences of a very ſerious nature.

By my original inſtruction it appeared, that in caſe our negotiation with England failed, and meaſures of ſome tone were in conſequence taken towards her, that much reliance would be put on France. It was, in fact, the plain import of thoſe inſtructions, that if war was reſorted to, which in that caſe ſeemed to be contemplated by the adminiſtration, that we ſhould be arranged again on the ſame ſide with France, *our firſt and natural ally* (to uſe the words of the adminiſtration), ſince I was expreſsly inſtructed to *let that be ſeen by the French government.* And by ſubſequent letters, particularly that of the 25th of September 1794, this idea was reiterated and enforced. It was upon this principle that I touched upon that topic, in my communications with the committee of public ſafety, at a certain period, the reſult whereof was always made known to the adminiſtration immediately afterwards. Nor can it be doubted, in caſe that negotiation had failed, or the treaty been rejected, that ſuch would have been the policy of our adminiſtration. Having then at that period intimated the reliance which in that caſe might be placed on France, it became my duty, now that it appeared probable the treaty would be rejected, and myſelf in conſequence called on to verify the intimations I had given of the diſpoſition of France, to ſupport our claims againſt that power, to ſtate the arrangements it would be neceſſary for us to adopt, to ſecure that ſupport. Accordingly I informed the adminiſtration explicitly, that if the treaty was rejected, and it was wiſhed to command with effect the fortunes of France, in any further negotiation with England, we, *remaining at peace, and relying on France for the ſupport of thoſe claims againſt that power, without any effort of our own, that under exiſting circumſtances* it would not only be neceſſary for the adminiſtration to avail itſelf of ſome well-known pronounced character, in regard to the great queſtion which now agitates the world, to whoſe care the negotiation ſhould be committed, but that, in other reſpects, extraordinary circumſpection ſhould be uſed in the proſecution of the negotiation itſelf:—for otherwiſe, it would not command the confidence of France, nor could her ſupport

without it, be counted on as ſure or effectual. If this was done, I repeated to the adminiſtration my aſſurance that I was ſatisfied the full aid of France might be obtained, to ſupport our claims upon that power, and upon terms fair and honourable to us: nor have I a doubt, that ſuch ſupport, wiſely managed in negotiation, would have been effectual.

About the laſt of September, or firſt of October, 1795, I received ſeveral letters from the ſecretary of ſtate, of which thoſe of June 1ſt, July 2d, 14th, and 21ſt, alone merit attention: all of which came to hand at or about the ſame time, and generally by the route of England; the veſſels by which they were ſent being taken into port there, under the order of the Britiſh government, which iſſued in the ſpring, for ſeizing all veſſels laden with proviſions deſtined for France.

The letter of June 1ſt, contained a juſtification of the conduct of the adminiſtration, in forming a commercial treaty with Great Britain at that period; and likewiſe a vindication of the adminiſtration againſt the charge of a want of candour (which ſeemed to be apprehended) in the explanations that were given by it, of the motives of that miſſion; in which the idea of a commercial power was always withheld. The letter of July 2d, contained advice, that the treaty was not ratified, and that the preſident was undecided upon the point of ratification; which uncertainty too, as to the ratification, was increaſed by thoſe of the 14th and 21ſt. A copy of the treaty accompanied the letter of July 2d; and a copy of the correſpondence with Mr. Adet, upon the ſubject of the treaty, that of July 14th.

It was inferred from theſe letters, that, when that of June 1ſt was written, the executive had reſolved to ratify the treaty, in caſe the ſenate approved it, and that the heſitation which afterwards took place, proceeded more from the ſhock which the general diſapprobation of the treaty by the people gave the adminiſtration, than from any diſinclination on its own part to the ratification. It was likewiſe inferred, that that *letter* was written with a view to lay the foundation for ſuch

an event, in the expectation, the ratification would probably embroil us with France. In one particular the contents of this letter affected me perſonally, by affirming that my inſtructions had not warranted the conſtruction I had given them, in explaining as I had done the motives of Mr. Jay's miſſion to London. In this was opened a ſubject for diſcuſſion between the executive and myſelf, of a very delicate nature. It was however ſtill my hope that our affairs with the French republic would be ſo managed, as to prevent any controverſy whatever, or even diſcuſſion of an unfriendly kind, between the two governments, and, in any event, my firm reſolution to engage in none of a perſonal nature, with either of them, if to be avoided. Upon this principle I anſwered the above letters of the ſecretary, ſimply by an acknowledgment of their receipt; repeating to him at the ſame time my aſſurance, that I had done, and ſhould continue to do, every thing in my power, not only by a proper uſe of the documents and lights derived from him, but of ſuch others as my own imperfect experience and erring judgment had ſupplied, to preſerve harmony between the two countries.

It happened that a few days after the receipt of the correſpondence between the ſecretary of ſtate and Mr. Adet, which accompanied the letter of the 14th of July above noticed, I had occaſion to uſe, and accordingly did uſe it. I had called upon Mr. Jean Debry, the member of the committee of public ſafety, who was charged with American affairs, to procure the paſſports, diſpatches, &c. which were promiſed by the French government for Mr. Barlow, who was upon the point of departing for Algiers, to purſue the negotiation of our treaties with the Barbary powers. Scarcely however was this topic cloſed, when my attention was drawn by this member to another, that of our treaty with England, which he ſaid was conſidered by the committee as injurious to France. He added, that he was then preparing a letter in behalf of the committee, and by its order, to me upon that ſubject. We diſcuſſed this point ſome time, till at length I aſked him if the committee had received the

correſpondence of our ſecretary of ſtate, and Mr. Adet's upon it; to which he replied in the negative.—I then aſked permiſſion to put into his hands a copy of that correſpondence; requeſting further, that the letter ſpoken of might be deferred until the committee had examined and weighed it; to which he readily aſſented: a copy of the correſpondence was in conſequence ſent him on the next day, or very ſoon afterwards *. It was upon this

* *See Mr. Purviance's note—*

About the end of September, or perhaps the beginning of October laſt, 1795, I accompanied Mr. Monroe at a conference he had with the repreſentative Jean Debry, then a member of the committee of Salut Public, and charged with the department of American affairs.

This conference was for the purpoſe of engaging the good offices of the French government in aid of our negotiations then pending with Algiers, &c. Applications on the ſame ſubject had ſome time before been made to the committee, and aſſurances returned, that meaſures would be taken to promote our wiſhes.

The converſation digreſſing from the above topic to others, turned on that of the treaty concluded between the United States and England, a copy of which, with the news of its ratification by the ſenate, accompanied by certain comments or ſtrictures thereon by a French citizen, Jean Debry ſaid had been juſt received by the committee; and, if I recollect right, he immediately after hinted at the diſſatisfaction excited by this treaty in the mind of the government.

Being aſked by Mr. Monroe if they had received the correſpondence which had paſſed between their miniſter Mr. Adet, and our government, on the ſubject, he replied, they had not;—whereupon he was promiſed by Mr. Monroe a copy of that correſpondence; and it was accordingly delivered to him the next day, or in a very few days after.

Upon his intimating to Mr. Monroe the intention of the committee to addreſs him a letter upon the ſubject of the treaty, it was requeſted this letter might be deferred until the correſpondence juſt ſpoken of had been examined and weighed by the committee.—In this propoſition he acquieſced, and preſumed they would likewiſe.—The topic being purſued, Mr. Monroe took occaſion to repreſent the great importance of cool and diſpaſſionate meaſures on the part of the French government in their relation with the United States, aſſuring J. Debry, that the purſuit of ſuch meaſures could not fail to produce the happieſt effects, while from a different policy might flow conſequences highly gratifying to the enemies of both republics.

Some particular expreſſion uſed by Mr. Monroe, in urging this point, provoked on the part of J. Debry a reply, in which he dwelt at ſome length, and with ſome warmth too, upon the perfect competency of the French government to diſcern and decide upon what meaſures were proper to be taken by it under particular circum-

ground that I intimated, in my letter of the 20th of October, my opinion, that, if the treaty was ratified, I ſhould hear from the French government upon the ſubject of it: of the ſymptoms of diſcontent which I witneſſed, I had before given frequent intimations.

On the 27th of October 1795, the convention cloſed its career, by transferring its powers to the preſent government of France, founded in a conſtitution which had been regularly ſubmitted to the people, and adopted by them. To this new government were likewiſe transferred the ſubſiſting relations between France and other powers, comprehending, of courſe, thoſe with the United States of America.

Juſt before this change of government in France, Mr. Fauchet arrived from the United States with an account that the treaty was ratified; of whoſe arrival, diſſatisfaction with the treaty, and apparent favourable reception by the committee of public ſafety, I informed our adminiſtration in my letter of the 5th of November, which immediately followed.

In the beginning of December 1795, I received two letters from Mr. Pickering, who had been called by the preſident proviſionally to the department of ſtate, upon the reſignation of Mr. Randolph; the firſt of which bore date on the 12th, and the ſecond on the 14th of September of the ſame year. By that of the 12th, I was informed officially, and for the firſt time, that the treaty was ratified, although near a month had elapſed ſince the ratification. And by that of the 14th, I was adviſed of an attempt made by the captain of a Britiſh frigate to ſeize Mr. Fauchet, the late French miniſter, within the limits of the United States, on his

ſtances; upon its uniform friendly diſpoſition towards the United States; and upon the evil effects that muſt reſult from a final adoption of the treaty with Britain.

Some hints too were given by J. Debry of a project which had been ſketched, for either extending or ſtrengthening the exiſting connexions between the two republics, which, from its not being ſufficiently matured, and owing to the other great labours of the committee, had not been hitherto intimated to Mr. Monroe.

J. H. PURVIANCE.

Paris, Auguſt 1796.

return home, as likewiſe of the meaſures taken by our adminiſtration to obtain of the Britiſh government adequate ſatisfaction to the United States for that violation of their rights.

The letter of the 12th of September, firſt above mentioned, which announced the ratification of the treaty, was written expreſsly for the purpoſe of deſignating to me the conduct I was to obſerve for the future, and in conſequence of the ratification, in my deportment towards the French republic. It will, therefore, be proper to preſent here conciſely the ſubſtance of that letter.

Mr. Pickering begins by obſerving, that as the treaty with Great Britain was ratified, and likely to become a compact between the two nations, it was proper I ſhould become poſſeſſed of the opinions of our government, eſpecially as it *appeared probable, from my letters and the movements of diſaffected perſons in the United States*, that unfavourable impreſſions upon the government and people of France were to be apprehended. He adds, that from motives of friendſhip, and with a view to produce tranquillity and ſatisfaction, the adminiſtration had acted with the utmoſt candour towards the French government in every ſtage of the negotiation; of which he gives the explanations that were made it of the motives of Mr. Jay's miſſion to London, whilſt the negotiation was depending, and the communication of the treaty to Mr. Adet, after the advice of the ſenate, and before the ratification by the preſident, as diſtinguiſhed examples: affirming, that by the treaty itſelf the rights of France, whether founded in the laws of nations or treaties with the United States, remained unviolated and unimpaired. He then adverts to the late ſeizures by order of the Britiſh government, of proviſion-veſſels deſtined to France, as a circumſtance likely to create inquietude, with a view to explain the 18th article; which he ſays had been miſrepreſented in America as being unfriendly to France. The firſt paragraph of that article, he admits, had departed from the ſpirit of modern treaties, in allowing certain articles of merchandiſe, made free by ſuch treaties, to be deemed contraband of war; but

yet, he ſays, we have not departed from the ſpirit of the old law of nations, by admitting any article to be contraband which by that law was not. Britain, he ſaid, would not relax; and therefore the beſt that could be done in that caſe, was to recite in the treaty the liſt of contraband deſignated by the old law, *by way of advertiſement to our maritime and commercial people, to admoniſh them of a riſk which exiſted.* And by the ſecond paragraph of that article, which refers to the doctrine inſiſted on by England, that proviſions may be contraband when deſtined to places not blockaded or inveſted, he ſays, that, without acknowledging her doctrine, we have guarded againſt its ill effects, by ſtipulating that when proviſions, and other articles not generally contraband, ſhall become ſuch, and for that reaſon be ſeized, they ſhall not be confiſcated, but paid for: a ſtipulation, he adds, it was evidently expedient for the United States to obtain, ſince by it our commerce is no longer left a prey *to future ſpoliations, without any definite means of liquidation or redreſs:* that, *whether it was beſt to oppoſe this pretenſion of England by force, was a queſtion which pertained to the proper authorities of the United States to decide,* who alone had a right to determine in what manner it was beſt to obviate *an evil,* and when it was proper *to repel an injury:* that, as an independent nation, we were the excluſive judges and competent guardians of whatever concerned our intereſt, policy, and honour; upon which ſubjects we would never aſk the advice, or be governed by the councils, of any foreign nation whatever. He then proceeds to animadvert upon the impolicy of going to war with England; ſince thereby, he ſays, our commerce would be ruined, and thouſands of our citizens be ſhut up or die in jails and priſon-ſhips; our landed intereſt would ſuffer; agriculture decline; the ſources of revenue fail, and other thouſands of our citizens dependant on it, be involved in ruin; whence would follow the calamity of a direct tax to ſupport the war: and happy ſhould we be if our misfortunes ended there, or if we could contemplate only a foreign war, in which all hands and hearts might unite. He adds, that by going to war we ſhould even

hurt France, ſince our ports would be blocked up, and our commerce at an end: that *a fruitleſs diverſion* on the ſide of Canada would nearly bound our efforts: whereas, whilſt we remained neutral, the aid we give her was immenſe; for as, by the clauſe in queſtion, payment was ſtipulated for our proviſions deſtined to France, when taken, being contraband, it was preſumed our merchants would find therein a new ſtimulus for puſhing their enterpriſes to that country. He affirms, however, that the late order for ſeizing did not proceed from that clauſe in the treaty; becauſe the Britiſh had ſeized before the treaty, and becauſe alſo the order applied to other neutral powers with whom there was no ſimilar ſtipulation. Finally, he proceeds to lay down certain poſitions, to which, he ſays, I may give the ſolemnity of truths; ſuch as, that the late negotiation did not proceed from any predilection in our government towards England: that the remembrance of the laſt war, from which we juſt began to recover, made us deprecate whatever even ſeemed to look like a renewal of it: that there were many cauſes of difference between the United States and Great Britain, the adjuſtment whereof could not longer be delayed: that the commercial part of the treaty, though important, was a ſubordinate one, and not a new meaſure: that the government of the United States was ſincerely friendly to the French nation.

My wiſh was to conciliate the French government towards the treaty, which was now ratified; and moſt anxiouſly had I looked to the adminiſtration for the means of doing it: but no perſon will, I am perſuaded, be able to point out any trait in the above letter that was likely to produce that effect. The eulogium beſtowed by it, in the beginning, upon the candour of the adminiſtration, which it ſays was ſhown towards the French government in every ſtage of the negotiation, and whilſt the treaty was depending, if admitted by that government, was not a thing for me to dwell on. Acts of candour when performed, if acknowledged by the party to whom they are ſaid to be rendered, ought not to be boaſted of by thoſe who perform them. But if they are not acknowledged, and eſpecially if the act upon

which the pretenſion is founded is viewed in a different light, as there was reaſon to preſume was the caſe in the preſent inſtance, then the pretenſion, if urged, is likely to produce an ill effect. This, therefore, was not a topic for me to open to the French government; nor did the commentary on the treaty, which the letter contained, furniſh one better adapted to the purpoſe. Indeed, it profeſſes to notice, and in fact notices only one article, the 18th, and in ſo doing admits in effect all the objections that were urged againſt it: for it agrees that we had thereby not only yielded the modern rule of contraband, with reſpect to general kinds of merchandiſe, which by ſpecial treaties were made articles of free trade; but that we had alſo made an arrangement with England, whereby ſhe was permitted to ſeize our proviſion-veſſels deſtined to France, whenever a criſis arrived which made it eligible for her ſo to do, upon the condition of paying us for the proviſions thus ſeized a reaſonable mercantile profit, including freight and the expenſes incident to detention. The explanation given of the ſecond clauſe, which reſpects proviſions, is, it is true, at firſt view, ſomewhat ambiguous; yet the true import of that explanation is as above. Indeed, the diſguiſe is ſo thin, as to make it doubtful whether it was intended as a diſguiſe; or rather, whether the explanation was not given with a view to let it be ſeen that ſuch was the real object of that ſtipulation. An *evil*, it ſays, was thereby *remedied*, which it was deemed better *thus to adjuſt than to repel by force*. Of what nature then was that evil? Did it conſiſt in the ſeizure of proviſion-veſſels deſtined to a blockaded port? Did any one ever complain of ſuch a ſeizure as an injury? Or did the adminiſtration contemplate war in caſe that point was not yielded to us? Beſides, a mode was adopted, whereby the means of *liquidation* and *redreſs* were provided againſt future *ſpoliations*. What ſpoliations? Such ſeizures as were made of proviſions deſtined to a blockaded port? Are ſuch to be called ſpoliations? What was the point in controverſy between the two countries, which it is ſaid was thus adjuſted? Was it not ſimply, whether the pretenſions of England, who claimed a

right to ſeize proviſions, as contraband, at pleaſure, with a view to ſtarve France, ſhould be allowed? And were not thoſe the *ſpoliations*, for whoſe *liquidation* and *redreſs definite means* were ſaid to be provided? Or would the adminiſtration, in a demand of payment for thoſe ſeizures which took place after the treaty was concluded, diſtinguiſh the caſes, and confine that demand to ſuch veſſels as were taken in their route to a blockaded port, ſaying, For theſe only will we be paid, but for the others, comprehending, perhaps, 99 out of 100, we will not—and thus revive the controverſy which, it was ſaid, was thus amicably cloſed? This, it is preſumed, would not be done. This, therefore, was not a ground to conciliate upon, nor did the other parts of the letter furniſh one that was more ſo; for the picture of the horrors of war which it preſented, a picture common to all wars, was either altogether inapplicable, or, if applicable, was ſo only by furniſhing a reply to objections, which, it was apprehended, would be raiſed againſt the conduct of the adminiſtration; as was the declaration which the letter contained, that the late ſeizures were not made in conſequence of that treaty; and as was likewiſe the argument it furniſhed, that the ſtipulation in the 18th article, which ſecured payment in caſe of ſeizure, would, by encouraging the enterpriſes of our merchants to France, be for her benefit.

Theſe two latter topics were, indeed, delicate ones for me to touch on, eſpecially as it was known that the other neutral powers complained that we had ſlighted, if not injured them; and as it was likewiſe known by the example of the ſeizures in the ſpring, which enſued after the treaty was concluded, that if the practice was permitted, let the encouragement be what it might, Britain, preponderating at ſea, might take almoſt every veſſel that attempted to enter the French ports. And with reſpect to the declaration, that we were an *independent people*, and had a *right to decide for ourſelves*, &c. ſo often repeated, I did not perceive how it applied at the time: there had been no queſtion on that point that I knew of. France had attempted to impoſe on us no conditions;

had aſked of us no favours; on the contrary, had ſhown a diſpoſition to render us many: under which circumſtances we had made a treaty with Britain, which it was expected by the adminiſtration would produce an ill effect in France, but of which ſhe had not yet complained: to prevent which, and reconcile her to that treaty, was the object, and to accompliſh which required, on our part, wiſe and temperate counſels. It became us, with that view, to convince her judgment, and to avail ourſelves of her ancient and friendly diſpoſition towards us, not to provoke and irritate her paſſions. So that, upon the whole, I did not perceive a ſingle trait in this letter, which was written after long delay, and, doubtleſs, with mature deliberation, to deſignate the courſe I was to purſue in conſequence of the ratification of the treaty, which breathed a ſpirit of conciliation; not even in that part which contained what was called poſitions to which I was inſtructed to give the ſolemnity of truths; for they alſo were calculated only to meet objections, and were otherwiſe expreſſed in ſuch a tone of moderation, in point of friendly regard, as to have been well adapted to a communication in a like caſe to Ruſſia, Turkey, or any other power with whom we had no political connexion. On the contrary, that letter appeared to me, in its general tenour, to be dictated in a ſpirit of hoſtility, and more with a view to promote a rupture than prevent one.

To reconcile France to that treaty, I expected to have been authorized to explain to her government how long the commercial part was to remain in force; to ſtate to it formally, that we were ready to enter into a new commercial treaty with her, and upon what principles, to be commenced either in Paris or Philadelphia: in which expectation, and with a view to the event of a ratification, I had told the adminiſtration, when I adviſed it of the ill effect the treaty, whoſe contents were then known, had produced, that I ſhould await its orders without any the ſlighteſt compromitment either of it or myſelf. But nothing of this kind was to be found in that letter, nor in any which preceded or followed it. For all that the letters contained or attempted, which touched that ſub-

ject, was *a juſtification of the adminiſtration againſt the charge which was either raiſed or expected, of having evaded the overtures of France to treat on commerce, at a time when it was admitted that an advance was made by the adminiſtration to treat on that ſubject, and a commercial treaty actually concluded by it with Great Britain.* Still, however, my object was the ſame, which was, to conciliate and prevent, if poſſible, a rupture between the two countries; and I was reſolved, if I could derive no aid from the adminiſtration to promote that end, at leaſt not to become its inſtrument in defeating it, if ſuch was its view, which now ſeemed probable.

But it was my duty to anſwer this letter, which I did without a comment; for it was improper for me to cenſure, and uſeleſs to adviſe. I ſimply acknowledged its receipt, with an aſſurance that due attention ſhould be paid to it, as occaſion required; to which I likewiſe added the fact, that ſymptoms of diſcontent were ſtill ſeen, but whether they would aſſume an aſpect more unfavourable I knew not: if they did, I would immediately communicate it.

There was, however, one trait in that letter to which a more explicit anſwer became neceſſary. It had been intimated to me in that of June the 1ſt, that my inſtructions had not warranted the explanation I had given of the object of Mr. Jay's miſſion to London; which intimation was here repeated, in a manner, it is true, not ſo direct, but yet in a tone not leſs poſitive. I had avoided anſwering that paſſage in the former letter, from the conſideration that, in the then ſtate of our affairs, the intereſt of our country required cool and united counſels, to extricate us from the difficult ſituation into which we were thrown. But by reviving and preſſing this point upon me, it ſeemed as if the adminiſtration expected an anſwer, with deſign to ground on it ſome meaſure it was much bent on, in which view it was my duty to give one. I therefore anſwered that paſſage by obſerving, that my former communications had ſhown that I had underſtood and acted on that part of my inſtructions differently from what it appeared, by theſe let-

ters, it was intended I ſhould underſtand and act on it; whereby I was placed, by the courſe of events, in a very delicate and embarraſſing dilemma, from which indeed I was not then perhaps relieved, though I hoped and thought I was. In my anſwer I ſtated the fact correctly, and left it to adminiſtration to purſue its policy.

The tone of the new government was cool and reſerved towards me. But my conduct was the ſame, becauſe my object was the ſame. I ſhowed, it is true, no mark of undue condeſcenſion to that government; but yet I certainly omitted no opportunity that occurred to conciliate its good will towards us. Unhappily, however, a very different ſpirit now diſplayed itſelf in our adminiſtration, whoſe meaſures obviouſly tended to promote a rupture.

Soon after the new government was organized I received a letter from the miniſter of foreign affairs, complaining of the miſconduct of Mr. Pariſh, American conſul at Hamburgh, in granting paſſports to Engliſh ſubjects as American citizens, and in being the agent of England for the equipment of the emigrants; deſiring that I would communicate his note to our government, with a requeſt that Mr. Pariſh be removed. Some conſiderable time before this I had earneſtly recommended this meaſure to our adminiſtration, urging many conſiderations, ſuggeſted as well by ſome particulars of his own conduct, as by the circumſtance of his being a Britiſh ſubject, why it was of importance to our intereſt and character as a ſeparate and neutral people, that his commiſſion ſhould be revoked, and committed to an American citizen. Thoſe conſiderations appeared to me to be ſo ſtrong and preſſing, that I concluded, as ſoon as they were brought to the view of the adminiſtration, he would be removed, and, of courſe, that the meaſure was already taken: in which expectation I anſwered the miniſter politely, intimating that I ſhould communicate to our government the requeſt of his in that reſpect, not doubting that it would be readily complied with. I ſhould have ſtated, that I had anticipated the demand ſome time before, and recommended the meaſure of my own accord; but I wiſhed, now that it was aſked by the French government, that it might appear to be granted

at its requeſt; an accommodation which I was perſuaded would produce a good effect at the time. But I was ſoon adviſed by Mr. Pickering that this Britiſh ſubject ſhould not be compelled to yield his poſt to an American citizen, at my requeſt, ſupported as it was by ſuch weighty reaſons. And the ſubſequent management of the affair, upon the application of the French government, ſhowed that the incident became rather a cauſe of irritation than of conciliation with that government; notwithſtanding the evident impolicy of ſuch a procedure at the time, on account of the criſis to which we were brought: for although the adminiſtration (not being able to reſiſt the objections to his continuance) did remove him, yet it was done in a manner ſo as to ſhow the French government it was not done in compliance with its requeſt.

In January 1796, Mr. Randolph's pamphlet was received in Paris, which contained ſeveral of the preſident's letters, in ſome of which the French republic was ſpoken of in terms by no means reſpectful, and the friends of the French revolution in the United States reproached with being the friends "of war and confuſion." And ſhortly after this, was received alſo, the preſident's addreſs to congreſs, upon the opening of the ſeſſion, which, in treating of the flouriſhing condition of the United States, contraſted *it* with the miſerable, famiſhed, and diſorganized ſtate of other powers. Much, too, was ſaid in that addreſs of the advantage of our accommodation with Britain, as likewiſe of the favourable diſpoſition of that power towards as, without the ſlighteſt attention being ſhown to the French republic; unleſs indeed it was referred to in the picture of diſtreſs above noticed, as was inferred by the French government, as I underſtood from good authority, at the time.

In the courſe of the year 1795, the French government had repealed, as already ſhown, all the decrees which were paſſed during the miſſion of Mr. Morris, under which our trade had been haraſſed, and had alſo, notwithſtanding its ſuſpicion of the contents of the Britiſh treaty, ſhown a diſpoſition to aſſiſt us in other caſes, and had actually taken meaſures to aſſiſt us in thoſe of Spain and the Barbary powers; yet none of thoſe acts,

or of the diſpoſition which produced them, were even glanced at in the preſident's addreſs to congreſs, although it was to be inferred, ſuch notice would have produced a good effect, and although it was then as juſt as it was politic to notice them. This conduct in the adminiſtration was the more extraordinary, from the conſideration that thoſe decrees, by whoſe authority our trade was haraſſed, with the haraſſment itſelf, had been announced in former communications to the congreſs, when the Britiſh depredations were announced. It ſeemed natural therefore, now that ſo much was ſaid upon the ſubject of our accommodation with England, that ſomething ſhould alſo be ſaid of the repeal of thoſe decrees by the French government, as well as of the proofs of friendſhip it had ſhown us in other reſpects. But this was not done.

Under ſuch circumſtances it was impoſſible for me to ſucceed in conciliating the French government towards the Britiſh treaty, ſince my efforts were not only not ſeconded in that reſpect by our adminiſtration, but abſolutely counteracted by it. Nevertheleſs I continued to purſue the ſame line of conduct that I had done before, being reſolved not to relax in my efforts, however unſucceſsful I might be.

The ſequel of my miſſion exhibits an intereſting but painful ſpectacle, the diſtinguiſhing characteriſtics whereof are, the avowed deciſion of the French government to take ſome meaſure towards us in conſequence of our treaty with England, as illuſtrated by many examples; with my efforts to prevent any ſuch meaſure taking effect; and the attack made on me by our adminiſtration, upon pretexts equally unjuſt, frivolous, and abſurd. This part, therefore, I ſhall reduce to as ſmall a compaſs as poſſible.

On the 15th of February 1796, I called on the miniſter of foreign affairs, to ſtate to him the diſtreſs of many of our citizens, merchants at Paris, on account of their claims upon the French government, with a view to engage his aid for their relief; but was immediately diverted from that object by information which he gave me, that the directory had at length made up its mind how to act in regard to our treaty with England; which it con-

ſidered as having annulled our treaty of alliance with France, from the period of its ratification; and had appointed, or intended to appoint, an envoy extraordinary, to repair to Philadelphia to remonſtrate againſt it; adding, that he was ordered to ſend me an official note upon the ſubject, which he ſhould accordingly do. I expreſſed to him my great ſurpriſe and concern at the communication, and was diſpoſed to enter immediately fully upon the ſubject, but was prevented, by obſerving that he was upon the point of going out; whereupon I left him for the time*.

I attended him again on the day following, and remonſtrated moſt earneſtly againſt the meaſure, urging every argument that I could avail myſelf of, to divert the government from it; offering to enter with him, whenever he thought fit, into a diſcuſſion of his objections to our treaty, or any other act of our government; aſſuring him that I ſhould not only be always ready to enter with him into ſuch explanations, but, in the preſent inſtance, ſhould do it with pleaſure; ſince, by being poſſeſſed of our view of the ſubject, they would be better able to decide whether the complaint was well or ill founded, and, of courſe, how far it merited to be conſidered in that light. Upon this occaſion, as upon the preceding one, the miniſter declined ſtating any ſpecific objections to the treaty, or any other act of our government; and therefore I could make no ſpecific defence. He admitted, however, that the objections I had urged to the meaſure had weight, and promiſed to communicate them to the directory, from whom, he doubted not, they would receive the attention they merited.

Thus I continued, without intermiſſion, my efforts to break this meaſure, repeating, in my conferences with the miniſter of foreign affairs, who always heard me with attention, all the objections that I could urge againſt it; aſſuring him that it was not admitted by our government, that any deviation was made by our treaty with England, from thoſe with France; and renewing my propoſition to enter with him into a diſcuſſion of that

* See Appendix, No. V.

point. Finally, upon hearing from him that the ſubject was ſtill before the directory, and fearing the communication promiſed me might be deferred, till it would be too late for me to produce an effect upon the meaſure itſelf (if indeed it were poſſible in any caſe), I aſked and obtained an audience of the directory on the 8th of March, with a view, at leaſt, to attempt it. The reſult of this audience was a promiſe by the directory, that the order for ſending an envoy extraordinary to the United States ſhould be reſcinded, and the miniſter of foreign affairs be inſtructed to furniſh me a copy, and diſcuſs with me its ſeveral complaints againſt the conduct of our government, and that no meaſure ſhould be taken upon the ſubject of thoſe complaints, till after my anſwer was received and fully weighed.

Accordingly a ſummary of thoſe complaints was preſented me by the miniſter of foreign affairs in a paper bearing date on the 9th of March 1796* (19th of Ventoſe by the French calendar), to which I replied in one of the 15th of the ſame month. Copies of theſe communications were tranſmitted to the department of ſtate in my letter of the 2d of May following.

About the 20th of April I received, from the department of ſtate, a letter of the 7th of January, tranſmitting the correſpondence which took place between the preſident and the miniſter of France, when the flag of the French republic was preſented by the former to the government of the United States. I received, at the ſame time, from the ſecretary of ſtate, a letter to the directory of France, from the preſident of the United States, upon the ſame ſubject, which I was inſtructed to take the earlieſt opportunity to deliver. Accordingly I delivered that letter to the miniſter of foreign affairs on the next day, with a requeſt that he would preſent the ſame to the directory, as ſoon as poſſible. A few days after this, I received from the miniſter a ſhort note, informing me that he had ſubmitted to the directory the diſpatch which was addreſſed to it by the preſident of the United States, in the name of the congreſs; and that the

* See Appendix, No. VI.

French government could not but receive with ſatiſfaction whatever tended to confirm the bonds of friendſhip between the two nations.

From the period of my audience by the directory, and more eſpecially after my communication with the miniſter of foreign affairs was handed in, I had frequent conferences with ſeveral of the members of the directory, in which I laboured to promote the ſame object, and at one time, as I thought, with complete ſucceſs; being informed by a member, upon one of thoſe occaſions, that the directory had done nothing towards us in regard to its complaints, and, he preſumed, would not. The purport of this communication was immediately made known to the department of ſtate in my next letter of the 12th of June 1796.

But this proſpect was ſoon changed; for, on the 25th of the ſame month, I received a letter from the miniſter of foreign affairs, requeſting information, whether the intelligence which the gazettes announced, of the houſe of repreſentatives having agreed to carry the treaty into effect, was to be relied on; and in caſe it was, aſking further in what light they were to view that event, before he called the attention of the directory to thoſe conſequences reſulting from it, which ſpecially intereſted the French republic. I replied to the miniſter, that with reſpect to his firſt interrogatory, whether the houſe of repreſentatives had paſſed a law to carry the treaty into effect, I could give him no authentic information, having no official advice upon it; and with reſpect to the ſecond, that as I had already anſwered, and, as I ſuppoſed, to his ſatisfaction, his ſeveral objections to that treaty, to which I had received no reply, it was impoſſible for me to enter again, under ſuch circumſtances, into that ſubject: but if there were any points in the communication I had made him, upon which he thought I had not been ſufficiently explicit, and he would be pleaſed to ſtate them to me, that I would immediately notice them more particularly than I had done, and I hoped ſatisfactorily.

On the 7th of July following, I received another note from the miniſter, ſtating certain objections to the Britiſh treaty; to which I made a reply on the 14th of the ſame month*.

In the beginning of Auguſt 1796, the directory recalled Mr. Adet, and appointed a gentleman to take his place, with the grade of chargé des affaires; who, I concluded, from particular conſiderations, could not be well received by our government. As ſoon, therefore, as I heard of this appointment, I remonſtrated ſtrenuouſly againſt it, with the French government, and with ſucceſs; for it was revoked.

In the beginning of Auguſt, I ſaw in the gazettes a communication from the miniſter of foreign affairs to Mr. Barthelemy, the ambaſſador of France to the Swiſs cantons, announcing an arrêté of the directory, by which it was determined to act towards the commerce of neutral powers in the ſame manner as thoſe powers permitted the Engliſh government to act towards them. In conſequence, I applied alſo to the miniſter for information relative to that arrêté; from whom I received a general anſwer only, correſponding in ſentiment with his letter above mentioned, to the ambaſſador of the republic at Baſle.

About the laſt of Auguſt, I heard that Mr. Adet (who had heretofore been reinſtated when the arrêtés for appointing an envoy extraordinary and chargé des affaires were reſpectively revoked) was now recalled, and no ſucceſſor appointed to him. I was adviſed, at the ſame time, that any further application from me to the French government would be improper; ſince it would not only prove fruitleſs, but moſt probably produce an ill effect.

Near ſeven months had now elapſed ſince the miniſter of foreign affairs communicated to me the diſcontent of the directory, on account of our treaty with England, and its deciſion to make the ſame known to our government, by an envoy extraordinary, to be diſpatched to the United States; in the courſe of which time I had

* See Appendix, No. VII.

not received a ſingle line from the department of ſtate (a letter of the 7th of January excepted, which applied to another ſubject), although I had regularly informed it of every incident that occurred; and although the criſis was a very important one, requiring the profound attention of the adminiſtration. In the courſe of this time, therefore, I was left alone by the adminiſtration, to oppoſe the diſcontent of France, not only unaided, but likewiſe under circumſtances otherwiſe the moſt unfavourable. At this period, however, which was in the beginning of September 1796, I received a letter from the ſecretary of ſtate of the 13th of June preceding, communicating to me the high diſſatisfaction of the preſident on account of my conduct reſpecting the Britiſh treaty. To that letter I returned an anſwer of the 10th of the ſame month, September *.

On the 12th of October following I received a letter from the miniſter of foreign affairs, announcing the recall of Mr. Adet, with the motive of it. To that letter I replied in one of the 12th of October.

In the beginning of November 1796, I received a letter from the ſecretary of ſtate of the 22d of Auguſt, announcing my recall by the preſident of the United States. In this letter the ſecretary refers me for the motives of that meaſure, to his former letter of the 13th of June. He adds, however, in *this*, that the preſident was further confirmed in the propriety of that meaſure by other concurring circumſtances, but of which he gave no detail. To this letter I made no reply until after my return to Philadelphia, in July 1797.

About the 10th of November 1796, general Pinckney arrived in Paris with my letters of recall, by which my miſſion to the French republic was terminated. I preſented him immediately to the miniſter of foreign affairs for recognition, and at the ſame time delivered to the miniſter a copy of my letters of recall, requeſting that I might have a day aſſigned me for taking leave of the French government as ſoon as convenient.

It gives me pleaſure to remark here, that the conduct

* See Appendix, Nos. VIII. and IX.

of general Pinckney upon that occaſion, which was one of peculiar delicacy to me, was in every reſpect candid, manly, and honourable.

On the 1ſt of January 1797, I took leave of the executive directory of France, in an audience ſpecially aſſigned me for the purpoſe, and ſailed with my family for the United States, as ſoon as the ſeaſon would permit.

Upon leaving France, I committed my letter-book and other public documents to the care of Mr. Prevoſt, who had acted with me in the character of ſecretary of legation—a young man of merit and talents, well qualified to ſerve his country in a more important truſt.

The above is a plain narrative of the facts and incidents attending my miſſion, from its commencement to the cloſe; upon which I will make a few comments.

The preſent ſituation of America is underſtood by every one, becauſe almoſt every one is in ſome way or other affected by it. And what it has been in every preceding ſtage of this European war, is equally well known, for the ſame reaſon. The picture ſhe has exhibited is an uniform one. Its characters are ſtrong, but yet not diverſified. In her foreign relations nothing is to be ſeen but the waſte and pillage of her commerce, ſometimes by ſeveral powers, always by ſome one power; and little leſs than anarchy at home; for the ſeeds of diſcontent, jealouſy, and diſunion, have been ſcattered throughout theſe ſtates, in the courſe of a few years paſt, with a waſteful hand. By what means, then, was this ſtate of things produced, and why was it produced?

It is well known, that the executive adminiſtration has heretofore guided all our meaſures; purſuing, in many inſtances, a courſe of policy equally contrary to the public feeling and the public judgment: and it was natural to expect that that adminiſtration ſhould now be held highly reſponſible for the embarraſſments it has thus brought upon our country. But by this attack on me, a new topic has been raiſed for diſcuſſion, which has drawn the public attention from the conduct of the adminiſtration itſelf; for, in conſequence, the only queſtion now before the public ſeems to be, whether I have me-

rited the cenſure thus pronounced upon me, by the adminiſtration, or have been dealt hardly by. But this was a mere political manœuvre, intended doubtleſs to produce that effect.

Whether I have performed my duty to my country as I ought to have done, in the various, contradictory, and embarraſſing ſituations in which I was placed by the adminiſtration, is a point upon which my country will determine, by the facts and documents ſubmitted to it. Upon this point I fear not the reſult, becauſe I have the utmoſt confidence in the wiſdom and rectitude of a public deciſion, when facts are before the public; and becauſe, knowing what my conduct was, I can always find a conſolation in my own breaſt, if the contrary ſhould be the caſe. But whether the adminiſtration has performed its duty to the public, by a proper diſcharge of the great truſt repoſed in it, during this awful criſis of human affairs, is a queſtion of much greater importance, which ought to be well underſtood. I am happy, however, in reflecting, that theſe two points are altogether unconnected with, and independent of each other; ſince the eſtabliſhment of miſconduct on *its* or *my part*, is no proof of the good conduct of the other party. To each a ſeparate duty was allotted; and the queſtion is entirely a diſtinct one, how each performed that duty, in its appropriate ſphere.

Nor ſhould I, in reſpect to myſelf, add a word to the light which thoſe documents contain, being willing, ſo far as the propriety of my own conduct is involved, to ſubmit the point to the judgment of my countrymen, upon the documents alone. But the adminiſtration has attempted, by this attack on me, to ſhield itſelf from the cenſure it juſtly apprehended, in the hope of throwing the blame on others; a fineſſe which ought not to ſucceed. It is proper therefore to ſtrip the adminiſtration of a mantle thus artfully drawn over it: with which view I propoſe to examine briefly the charge alleged againſt me by the adminiſtration, with the evidence by which it ſupports it: not for the ſake of ſhowing, I repeat again, that my conduct did not merit the attack, but that the adminiſtration knew it at the time it made the attack.

The charge which the adminiſtration alleged againſt me is to be found in a letter from the ſecretary of ſtate, referred to above, of the 13th of June 1796; the purport of which is, that I withheld certain documents from the knowledge of the French government, illuſtrative of the views of ours reſpecting the Britiſh treaty, although I knew the French government was diſſatisfied with that treaty, and had likewiſe acknowledged the receipt of thoſe documents: and the teſtimony adduced to ſupport this charge conſiſts of the three following circumſtances:—Firſt, The importance of the documents themſelves, which were deemed concluſive, and ſufficient to have ſilenced the French government, had they been thus applied:—the ſecond, The delay of that government to expreſs its diſcontent, for ſome time after I was poſſeſſed of thoſe documents; notwithſtanding ſuch diſcontent was known to exiſt on account of the Britiſh treaty, and was likewiſe much aggravated by other cauſes:—and the third, The ſucceſs which attended my efforts to remove that diſcontent, after the 15th of February 1796, when *it* was announced to me by the miniſter of foreign affairs, as heretofore ſhown; whence it was inferred, that, had I begun in time, the affair would have been ſmothered in embryo.

This is the charge, and this the teſtimony by which it is ſupported. The ſecretary adds, it is true, in his letter of the 22d of Auguſt following, that there were other concurring circumſtances, which confirmed the preſident in the propriety of the meaſure he had taken towards me; but theſe he did not *then* communicate, nor has he *ſince*, though called on to do it; nor has he communicated other teſtimony to ſupport the charge already raiſed. To that charge therefore, with the teſtimony adduced, I ſhall confine my comments.

It is proper to obſerve here, that the documents, the withholding which the ſecretary lays to my charge, were two letters, one from Mr. Randolph of the 14th of July 1795, communicating his correſpondence with Mr. Adet, upon the ſubject of the treaty, received about the beginning of October following, and one from Mr. Pickering of the 12th of September, received ſome time about the

laſt of November, or beginning of December, of the ſame year; for theſe were the only letters which I received from the department of ſtate on that ſubject, after the treaty was ſubmitted to the ſenate, or indeed before, except ſuch as ſhowed the fluctuating ſtate of the executive mind reſpecting the ratification; which letters could not be referred to as explaining the views of the executive, ſince then it had none. To theſe two letters, therefore, the charge ſolely applied.

It is alſo proper to obſerve here, that the firſt of theſe letters was (as heretofore ſtated) put into the hands of the committee of public ſafety, as ſoon as it was received, a ſuitable occaſion permitting it; that the ſecond was not then received, and of courſe could not be thus applied; though indeed, had it been then received, I do not think I ſhould have thus applied it, for reaſons heretofore given. It will, however, be ſeen, by a peruſal of my diſcuſſion with the miniſter of foreign affairs, that I omitted nothing which either of thoſe papers contained, which could be turned to any account. The firſt of theſe facts, it is true, was not then known to the ſecretary; for as the object, at that time contemplated by the committee, was not purſued, on account, I preſume, of the change of government which took place immediately afterwards in France, and might poſſibly never be revived, I declined mentioning it to our adminiſtration, from motives of delicacy to both governments; wiſhing, if to be avoided, that no ſuch evidence of the diſcontent of France ſhould appear in my correſpondence. The omiſſion, however, to communicate it to the adminiſtration, was no ground whereon to charge me with a contrary line of conduct, againſt the force of ſo many other facts and circumſtances as were at the time in its poſſeſſion. The other fact could not then be known, becauſe the deciſion reſpecting me was hurried, before a copy of that diſcuſſion was received. The cauſe of ſuch precipitation, at that preciſe time, and under the then exiſting circumſtances, the adminiſtration ought to explain.

But I will proceed to examine the ſecretary's charge, with the teſtimony by which he ſupports it; the firſt item of which is, the importance of the documents in

queſtion; which he ſays were ſufficient to have ſilenced the French government, had they been thus applied; whence he infers that they were not thus applied. In noticing this piece of teſtimony, I do not wiſh to be underſtood as derogating from the merit of thoſe documents: I will admit, at leaſt for argument ſake, that the letters referred to, are well written. But I deny that the concluſion drawn from that circumſtance is a juſt one; or, in other words, that the continuance of the diſcontent of the French government, after I received thoſe documents, is a proof that the light they contained was withheld. It is well known, that every free government *is the proper guardian of whatever concerns its intereſt, policy, or honour; upon which ſubjects it takes its own counſel, and purſues its own meaſures*; nor does it often happen, that ſuch government regards the counſel of any foreign nation whatever. I believe no inſtance can be adduced by the adminiſtration, of any counſel being aſked, or attention ſhown on its part, to the counſels of the French nation, from the commencement of the adminiſtration to the preſent day, nor to the counſels of a miniſter of that nation; one inſtance only excepted, in which his counſel was aſked, but immediately rejected. Why it was aſked it will be eaſy to explain, as it likewiſe will be to ſhow, that it was determined to reject it before it was aſked. This ſentiment then, which is a juſt one, ought to be admitted as reciprocal; but although the ſecretary is firm and peremptory, when he applies it in our favour, yet he denies its exiſtence as applicable to the French republic. He ſuppoſes, after thoſe letters were written, that the affair with France was ſettled; that we were to hear no more of her diſcontent about the Britiſh treaty, or, if we did, that I was to be reſponſible for it. In ſhort, he ſeems to have concluded, from the moment thoſe letters were forwarded to me, that he had put that nation under my care, and if I did not keep *it* in order, that I merited cenſure. This indeed were an eaſy way to ſettle our controverſies with foreign powers, and fortunate ſhould we be if we could thus adjuſt them. But how happens it, that none of our controverſies have been thus adjuſted? Many letters have been written;

much labour beſtowed in that line by the ſecretary himſelf, and ſtill we are involved in many controverſies; none of which, even of the old ones, ſeem yet to be finally ſettled, though the opportunity for it was a moſt favourable one; whilſt others are accumulated. I think therefore it muſt be admitted, that the continuance of the diſcontent of the French government, after thoſe documents were received, however important they might be, was no proof that any light they contained was withheld by me.

And with reſpect to the ſecond circumſtance relied on—the delay of the French government to bring forward its complaints, for ſome time after I received the documents in queſtion, notwithſtanding its diſcontents, &c. I cannot conceive how that can be urged in ſupport of the charge. If that argument was ſound, it would follow, that if that government had brought forward its complaints ſooner, my conduct would have been correct; whilſt on the other hand, if it had never complained, there would have been a complete demonſtration of the charge. It is impoſſible to reaſon on an argument ſo abſurd. I ſhall only obſerve upon it, that, had I been called on for a proof of my activity and zeal to preſerve tranquillity between the two countries, I ſhould have urged the delay of the French government to complain, diſcontented as it was, as a moſt ſatisfactory one. Indeed I do not know, before the government did complain, how I could produce any other.

And the third circumſtance relied on, to prove miſconduct in me, ſeems to be equally abſurd. I believe it is the firſt time that the ſucceſs of exertions was ever urged as a proof that none were made, or that they were not made in due time. Such ſucceſs, where the object was a deſirable one, is generally received by the party for whom, or under whoſe auſpices, it is rendered, with pleaſure; and obtains for the party rendering it, ſome degree of acknowledgment. But that it ſhould be adduced as a proof of previous miſconduct, and treated as ſuch, is an act of which I think there is no example. Ardent muſt have been the purſuit of ſome political

object thereby counteracted, or keen and violent the paſſions which otherwiſe hurried the adminiſtration on, or ſurely it would not have uſed ſuch an argument. I will aſk (and the queſtion ought to be attended to), whether thoſe efforts, whoſe details were then before the adminiſtration, contained the evidence of a mind indifferent to the object in view? whether the ſucceſs which attended them, whereby the courſe of the French government was actually checked and ſuſpended for about ſeven months, was a proof that that government thought me inſincere, or that the counſel I gave was unworthy its attention?

I might obſerve, that, for this argument to have weight, my ſucceſs ought to have been complete. But unfortunately this was not the caſe, as is too well known. My efforts produced an effect for a certain term only: a ſufficient one however, to have permitted the adminiſtration to interpoſe, and aſſiſt me. It did interpoſe, it is true, but it was not for that purpoſe. Had my ſucceſs been complete, we ſhould have witneſſed an extraordinary political phenomenon, that of a public miniſter furniſhing, by ſucceſsful ſervices to his country, teſtimony to an adminiſtration hoſtile to him, to prove that he had rendered none, and was a delinquent. Such an argument is too abſurd to be dwelt on. It requires only to be underſtood, to be deſpiſed.

Whether I purſued the wiſeſt courſe that could have been purſued, to prevent the complaints of that government, and to reconcile it to our treaty with England, I will not pretend to ſay. The courſe which I purſued was a plain one: it was to prevent, by informal explanations, &c. the neceſſity of an official diſcuſſion; a practice I had been long in the habit of, as was well known to the adminiſtration. As ſoon however as the French government took up the ſubject officially, I was likewiſe prepared in that line to oppoſe, and did oppoſe, its meaſures; nor did I relax in my efforts, till they were evidently fruitleſs.

From the period when the treaty was concluded in November 1794, till February 1796, when the French government firſt took up the ſubject as above

ſtated, fourteen months had elapſed; and from that period to the time when the firſt act reſpecting the commerce of the neutral powers was paſſed, near ſeven months more had elapſed; forming in the whole about twenty-one months, before any ſtep was taken: nor did it take a ſingle ſtep until after the treaty was ratified by the preſident and ſenate, and the houſe of repreſentatives had likewiſe given its ſanction, by the paſſage of a law to carry it into effect. Yet it was known that the French government was jealous of the object of the miſſion which produced that treaty from the period of its nomination; that it ſuſpected the treaty was founded upon principles injurious to France before its contents were ſeen; and that thoſe ſuſpicions were confirmed when they were ſeen.

Whether I contributed in any degree to divert the French government from oppoſing the ratification of that treaty, or taking its meaſures after the treaty was ratified, I will not pretend to ſay. This is ſubmitted for others to determine. If I did, I am not boaſtful of it; ſince, as our adminiſtration did not take advantage of that delay to heal the breach in time, it was of no real ſervice to my country. Well however do I know, after the French government had rejected my counſel, and taken a different courſe, that I was viewed by that government for ſome time in a queſtionable light: nor were the motives of my conduct juſtly appreciated by it, until after I was cenſured by our own.

Such were the facts and documents in poſſeſſion of the adminiſtration, when it pronounced a cenſure on my conduct. Can any one then believe, that the motive aſſigned for it was the true one? and, if it was not, what was the true one?

To determine this latter point, ſome attention is due to the conduct of the adminiſtration through every ſtage of this European controverſy; for the whole of its conduct forms a ſyſtem, which ought to be taken together, to judge correctly of its motives in any particular caſe. To do juſtice to the ſubject in this view, would require more time and attention than I am now able to beſtow

on it. I will however notice ſome facts and circumſtances, which being duly appreciated, cannot otherwiſe than facilitate the labours of others, in making a more accurate reſearch.

The firſt is, the appointment of a perſon as miniſter plenipotentiary to France, in the commencement of the French revolution, who was known to be an enemy to that revolution, and a partiſan of royalty; whereby the name and weight of America (no inconſiderable thing at that time in that reſpect) was thrown into the ſcale of kings, againſt that of the people, and of liberty.

Second, the continuance of that perſon in office, till every misfortune predicted of his miſſion, by thoſe who oppoſed it in the ſenate, and diſapproved it throughout the community at large (which latter deſcription was a very numerous one), was nearly verified; the connexion between the two countries having gradually diminiſhed, as the French revolution advanced, till, at the time of his recall, it was reduced to a ſlight bond indeed: in the courſe of which time the embargo at Bourdeaux was impoſed, and continued, till removed upon the application of Mr. Fenwick, conſul at that port; for our miniſter was not attended to: ſundry articles of our treaty of commerce were likewiſe ſet aſide by formal decrees, and many ſpoliations in conſequence made upon it.

Third, the final removal of that perſon, not from a regard to the public intereſt, which was known thus to ſuffer, but becauſe it was demanded by the French government. Upon which occaſion it was intimated to him, that his removal was attributable to that cauſe only; which intimation became known to the French government.

Fourth, my appointment to the French republic, with the circumſtances attending it: it being known that, with other members of the ſenate, I had oppoſed in many inſtances the meaſures of the adminiſtration, particularly in that of the miſſion of Mr. Morris to France, and of Mr. Jay to London; from the apprehenſion thoſe miſſions would produce, in our foreign relations, preciſely the ill effect they did produce.

Fifth, the inſtructions that were given me to explain to the French government the motives of Mr. Jay's miſſion to London, not as an act of condeſcenſion on our part, at the demand of the French government, but of policy, *to produce tranquillity, and give ſatisfaction*, whilſt the negotiation was depending; by which inſtructions, if the exiſtence of a power to form a commercial treaty was not poſitively denied, yet *it* was withheld, and the contrary evidently implied *.

Sixth, the ſtrong documents that were put in my poſſeſſion at that period, by the adminiſtration, of its attachment to France and the French revolution; ſo different from any thing before expreſſed.

Seventh, the reſentment ſhown by the adminiſtration on account of the publication of thoſe documents; it having been intended they ſhould *produce* their effect, *at the ſame time*, and yet be kept *ſecret*.

Eighth, the approbation beſtowed on me by the adminiſtration, when I made vehement preſſures on the French government for a repeal of its decrees, under which our commerce was haraſſed, exhibiting a picture of its ſpoliations, &c. and the profound ſilence and inattention of the adminiſtration, when thoſe decrees were repealed, and a diſpoſition ſhown by that government to aſſiſt us in other caſes.

Ninth, the power given to Mr. Jay to form a commercial treaty with England, in the midſt of a war, by a ſpecial miſſion, at a time when no ſuch advance was made to treat on that ſubject with France, and her advances at beſt coolly received.

Tenth, the withholding from me the contents of that treaty until after the meeting of the ſenate; notwithſtanding the embarraſſment to which I was, in the interim, perſonally expoſed, in conſequence of the explanations I had before given to the French government, by order of the adminiſtration, of the motives of the miſſion which produced it; which deportment proves clearly that the adminiſtration did not deal fairly with me from the commencement.

* See Inſtructions, at the end.

Eleventh, the ſubmiſſion of the treaty to Mr. Adet after the advice of the ſenate, before the ratification of the preſident; at a time when, as it appears by ſatisfactory documents, it was reſolved to ratify it; which ſubmiſſion therefore was probably not made to obtain the aid of Mr. Adet's counſel, in which light it would have been improper, eſpecially as it had been withheld from his government; but to repel an objection to the candour of the adminiſtration, in its conduct in preceding ſtages.

Twelfth, the character of the treaty itſelf, by which (according to the adminiſtration) we have departed from the modern rule of contraband, with reſpect to many articles made free by modern treaties; have alſo made an arrangement, by which, whilſt it profeſſes not to have ſacrificed the right, it has actually and avowedly ſanctioned the doctrine and practice of England, in ſeizing proviſions at pleaſure, as contraband of war; and have likewiſe yielded the principle, ſo important to America, that free ſhips ſhall make free goods.

Thirteenth, the conduct of the adminiſtration after the ratification of the treaty, being in all caſes irritable towards France; although it was apprehended, the ratification would embroil us with that power; and although at a moment when it was propoſed to decline the ratification, a moſt ſoothing and humiliating apology was drawn, to be preſented to the Engliſh government, for declining ſo to do.

Fourteenth, I ſhould not notice my recall, being in itſelf a circumſtance too *trivial* to merit attention, if it were not for the ſtate in which our affairs were in my hands, when my recall was decided; being at a period when it appeared I had ſucceeded in quieting the French government for the time, and was likely to do it effectually. To be left there to that preciſe time, and then withdrawn and cenſured, ſeems to authorize a preſumption, that I was left there, in the firſt inſtance, in the expectation I would not defend that treaty, and in conſequence whereof a rupture would enſue, and recalled afterwards, when it was known I had done my duty, and was likely to prevent a rupture.

Due attention to the above facts, and circumſtances in connexion with others that will readily occur, will, I am perſuaded, contribute eſſentially to explain the views and policy of the adminiſtration, through the whole of this European war; the effects whereof have been ſo injurious to our national character, as likewiſe to the agricultural and commercial intereſts of theſe ſtates.

I have omitted to comprize in the above enumeration, the nature of this great criſis itſelf, becauſe *that* being a general topic, will be embraced in the mind of every one, who examines with care the incidents attending it, in its relation to every country. It is known to have been produced by a war, undertaken on the part of all the kings of Europe againſt France, with a view to prevent the ſucceſs of a revolution in that country in favour of liberty. Whether the nature of this criſis contributed in any degree to influeuce our meaſures, by repelling us from France, and attracting us towards England, is ſubmitted for others to determine. That it ought to have done ſo, will, I preſume, not be avowed *publicly* by any one.

Whether the motives which governed the adminiſtration in its policy through this criſis, are juſtifiable, is a point upon which the public and poſterity will decide. I am happy, however, to obſerve, that no imputation can be raiſed againſt the adminiſtration, againſt which it may not vindicate itſelf, if its conduct admits of vindication.

Be this, however, as it may, it is nevertheleſs obvious, that the policy itſelf was, at beſt, ſhort-ſighted and bad. To ſtand well with France through the whole of this European war, was the true intereſt of America; ſince great advantage was to be derived from it in many views, and no injury in any. What would have been the condition of theſe ſtates, had France been conquered, and the coaleſced powers triumphed, it is eaſy to perceive. Had the duke of Brunſwick, for example, reached Paris, and the kings of Europe, after diſtributing among themſelves ſuch portions of that flouriſhing country as ſuited each, dictated to the reſidue ſuch

form of government as they pleaſed (if, indeed, they had not annihilated the name of France, as they have done that of Poland), was it to be preſumed, that America, who, as the parent of liberty, was likewiſe the parent of the French revolution, would have eſcaped their notice? Or was it likely, that by a variance with France, preſerving as we do, and, I truſt, always ſhall preſerve, our free elective government, that we ſhould have ſtood well with them, hated, as we know we are, by one of the parties, who cannot view us in any other light than that of rebels? Fortunately, the ſucceſſes of France permitted us to have only a glimpſe of the danger which menaced us. But the exiſtence of ſuch a danger, or even the probability that it exiſted, was a ſufficient motive why we ſhould preſerve a good underſtanding with the power by whoſe ſucceſſes it was ſure to be averted.

In many other views, too, it was of importance for us to ſtand well with France. We had claims to adjuſt with other powers, the favourable adjuſtment whereof depended much on her ſucceſs: for if ſhe was conquered, it did not ſeem likely that we ſhould accompliſh any of our objects with thoſe powers; nor could we profit of her ſucceſs, otherwiſe than by preſerving a good underſtanding with her.

Beſides, our footing with France was, in itſelf, highly advantageous to us. By our treaty of 1778, we enjoyed the privilege of the modern law of nations, in our intercourſe with her enemies. By it, our ſhips gave protection to the goods of her enemies, and to all kind of merchandiſe in our trade with her enemies, ſtrict contraband of war only excepted. The beneficial effects, too, of this ſtipulation, which was reſpected by France at the time that treaty paſſed, was moſt ſenſibly felt upon our navigation and commerce; for, in conſequence of it, we were then become the principal carriers of the enemies of France. It was, therefore, of importance to us, to continue this ſtipulation in force; and the obligation upon the adminiſtration, to be attentive to the means of preſerving it, was the ſtronger, from the conſideration, that, by the miſconduct of the adminiſtration, it had

been already once loſt in the courſe of the preſent war; as from the further one, that, as Britain did not recogniſe the ſame principle, the obſervance of it by France could not otherwiſe than be hurtful to her.

And in contemplation of future and more beneficial commercial arrangements, it was of great importance for us to ſtand well with France. The fertility and extent of her colonial poſſeſſions, with the amount and value of their productions, ſurpaſſing by far thoſe of any other European power (to ſay nothing of the importance of the commerce of France herſelf), are facts well underſtood by our commercial people. It was highly for the intereſt of America to improve our footing in that commerce, and eaſy was it to have done ſo, had due attention been paid to the neceſſary means of improving it.

Theſe were conſiderations which ought to have been attended to, and would have been attended to by the adminiſtration, if ſome more powerful motive had not interpoſed to prevent it.

Nor was it difficult to ſtand well with France through the whole of this criſis, and profit of her fortunes, without the ſmalleſt poſſible loſs, or even hazard. The demonſtration of this poſition is complete; for we know, that although our ground was once loſt by the adminiſtration, in the courſe of the preſent war, it was, nevertheleſs, afterwards recovered; although it is much eaſier to preſerve a friendſhip, whilſt at the height, than to recover it after it is gone. And how was it recovered? Not by any addreſs on my part, for I pretend to none: but ſimply by preſenting to the French government the documents that were committed to my care for that purpoſe; illuſtrative of the good wiſhes of our adminiſtration for the French nation, and its revolution; and likewiſe by ſupporting thoſe documents by my own conduct; by which, however, I was known as a ſpectator only, not as a partiſan in their affairs; for I do not recollect, that I gave an opinion upon a ſingle point, with which I had no concern, whilſt I was there; nor did I ever aſſociate with their parties, or with any de-

ſcription of perſons, as a party. All Frenchmen were kindly received at my houſe: in ſhort, I did nothing but mind my own buſineſs in a plain and ſimple way; which thouſands of my countrymen might have done equally well, perhaps much better. And of her diſpoſition to extend to us the aid of her fortunes, in every line where they could aid us, ſufficient proof was likewiſe given.

Nor did we hazard any thing, in any view, by ſtanding well with France, whilſt much was to be gained. The adminiſtration admits, ſhe did not wiſh us to embark in the war. Perhaps, this was admitted to preclude the claim of merit for not wiſhing it. But the fact, in my opinion, was ſo. I ſpeak with confidence of the views of the French government in that reſpect, after I got there; eſpecially whilſt our footing was moſt cordial. Of the motive I ſay nothing; but I think it not only due to candour, but ſound policy, to admit in all caſes the motive to be good, when the effect was ſalutary.

Such was the ſituation of America, in the commencement of this war; ſuch our ſtanding with the French nation, ſo advantageous in itſelf, ſo eaſy to preſerve! And yet all theſe advantages have been thrown away; and inſtead of that ſecure and tranquil ſtate, which we might have enjoyed throughout, we have been likewiſe plunged, ſo far as the adminiſtration could plunge us, into a war with our ancient ally, and on the ſide of the kings of Europe contending againſt her for the ſubverſion of liberty!

Had France been conquered, to what objects that adminiſtration would have aſpired, has fortunately, by her victories, been left a ſubject for conjecture only. Of its zeal to puſh things to a dangerous extremity, we have many proofs: of its moderation, none.

We have heard much of intrigues between the people of theſe ſtates, and the government of France. But free people ſeldom intrigue together; becauſe there is no motive for it. Between the leaders, however, of a free people, and the neighbouring monarchs, ſuch intrigues have often taken place, and always will take place, whilſt liberty is odious to monarchs, and men

can be found baſe enough to betray her. If we read the hiſtory of the ancient Grecian republics, we ſhall ſee many examples of intrigues between the kings of Perſia and the leaders of thoſe republics; whilſt none are to be ſeen of combinations between the people of any of thoſe republics, and the free governments of another, except of the purpoſe of overthrowing their tyrants. But, in America, we have no tyrant except that of prejudice, which time and information alone will overthrow.

The contraſt between the ſituation we might have held through the whole of this war, and that which we have held, is a ſtriking one. We might have ſtood well with France, avoiding all the loſſes we have ſuſtained from her; enjoying the benefit of the principles of free trade, and even appeared as an advocate for thoſe principles, and without going to any extremity: we might have preſerved our ancient renown, bought at a great expenſe of blood and treaſure, in a long war, in a conteſt for liberty; and even appeared as a defender of liberty, and without fighting for her: we might too, in my opinion, have commanded a better fortune in our negotiation with Britain, and only by availing ourſelves, in a ſuitable manner, of the fortunes of France. And inſtead of a ſituation ſo advantageous, ſo honourable, ſo ſatisfactory to our country, what is that into which our government has conducted us? Our navigation deſtroyed, commerce laid waſte, and a general bankruptcy threatening thoſe engaged in it; the friendſhip of a nation loſt, the moſt powerful on earth, who had deſerved better things from us, and had offered to place us, our veſſels, and commodities, on the footing of its native citizens, in all its dominions; war hanging over us, and that not on the ſide of liberty, and the juſt affections of our people, but of monarchy, and our late moſt deadly foe; and we are made faſt, by treaty, and by the ſpirit of thoſe at the helm, to a nation - - - - - - *.

* As the only object in republiſhing this pamphlet, is that of affording the Engliſh reader the fulleſt information on the ſituation of America with reſpect to France, and opening his eyes to the miſrepreſentations of Mr. Harper; the editor omits Mr. Monroe's opinion on the political and financial ſtate of Great Britain.

Nor is this all. Our national honour is in the duſt; we have been kicked, cuffed, and plundered all over the ocean; our reputation for faith ſcouted; our government and people branded as cowards, incapable of being provoked to reſiſt, and ready to receive again thoſe chains we had taught others to burſt. Long will it be before we ſhall be able to forget what we are, nor will centuries ſuffice to raiſe us to the high ground from which we have fallen.

APPENDIX.

No. I.

Extract from Mr. Monroe's Letter to the Secretary of State.

Paris, Feb. 12, 1795.

UPON my arrival here, I found our affairs, as it was known they were before I ſailed, in the worſt poſſible ſituation. The treaty between the two republics was violated: our commerce was haraſſed in every quarter, and in every article, even that of tobacco not excepted: our ſeamen taken on board our veſſels were often abuſed, generally impriſoned, and treated in other reſpects like the ſubjects of the powers at war with them: our former miniſter was not only without the confidence of the government, but an object of particular jealouſy and diſtruſt: in addition to which it was ſuſpected, that we were about to abandon them for a connexion with England, and for which purpoſe *principally*, it was believed that Mr. Jay had been ſent there. The popular prepoſſeſſion too in our favour had abated, and was in ſome meaſure at a ſtand; for the officers of the fleets from America had brought unfavourable accounts of our diſpoſition towards them. Thus the connexion between the two countries hung, as it were, by a thread; and I am convinced, that if ſome perſon poſſeſſing their confidence had not been ſent, it would have been broken.

My firſt reception was marked with circumſtances which fully demonſtrated theſe facts, and ſhowed how critical the ground was on which we ſtood; for it is unqueſtionably true, that, notwithſtanding my political principles were ſubſcribed to, the committee, or the governing party in it, were diſpoſed to delay my reception, throw me entirely out of view, and deſtroy altogether the effect of my miſſion. It was ſaid, that, as my principles were with them, I ought on that account to be the more dreaded, for, if they confided in me, I ſhould only lull them aſleep as to their true intereſt, in regard to the movements on foot; and under this impreſſion, I was viewed with a jealous eye, and kept at the moſt awful diſtance. This deportment towards me was ſo obſervable, that it attracted the attention of the repreſentatives of other powers here, and was moſt probably communicated elſewhere.

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Into what conſequences this policy, which was hoſtile to us, might lead, I could not readily perceive: but I was alarmed on that head; for I well knew that an avowed enmity by this government, againſt our executive adminiſtration, and in which ſhape it threatened to break out, purſued with paſſion, as I had reaſon to apprehend it would be, would not only injure our national character, but likewiſe diſturb our internal tranquillity, and perhaps involve us in war. The interval between ſuch a ſtep and the exiſting ſtate of things, was ſmall; and in the tide of their fortunes, which were proſperous, I was fearful it would be taken. Thus circumſtanced, what courſe did policy dictate that I ſhould purſue? Did it become me to look on as a tranquil ſpectator of machinations that portended ſo much miſchief to my country; or was it more wiſe, more conſiſtent with the obligations of the truſt I had accepted, to make a deciſive effort to defeat them? And, adopting the latter counſel, in what line ſhould that effort be directed, or by what means enabled to ſucceed? The doors of the committee, as already mentioned, were cloſed againſt me: and had it been otherwiſe, knowing as I did the diſpoſition of that body towards us, would it have been prudent to have depoſited thoſe documents under its care, ſince they furniſhed the only means by which I could counteract its views? Or was it to be preſumed, that the declarations of friendſhip which they contained, would produce in the councils of that body any change of ſentiment, adviſed as it had been, and armed as it was, with a ſeries of contrary evidence, and in which it would place a greater confidence? I can aſſure you, and with great ſincerity, that after taking in my mind, ſo far as I was able, and with perfect calmneſs (for the imputations againſt me were not of a nature to inſpire zeal), that range of our affairs in their general relation to thoſe of other powers, and in which you deem my conduct defective; that the meaſure I adopted appeared to me not only the moſt eligible one; but that, in the then juncture of affairs, I thought it my indiſpenſable duty to adopt it. Nor was I diſappointed in any of the conſequences upon which I had calculated; for by this public demonſtration of our regard for this nation and its *revolution* (though indeed the word was not uſed) the people at large were ſettled on the right ſide: the abettors of a contrary doctrine were in a great meaſure confounded; and as ſoon as the impreſſion upon the public mind had time to react back upon the public councils, aided by the little incidents I caught at to inſpire confidence, together with a change of the members of the committee, was

the object, even in that body, though ſlowly, yet finally, completely accompliſhed.

But you intimate that I ought to have ſhunned this publicity, from the fear it might injure our depending negotiations with Britain and Spain. Had I ſeen cauſe to apprehend that conſequence, I ſhould certainly have been more averſe to the meaſure: but that there was none; on the contrary, that it would produce the oppoſite effect, was in my opinion certain. In demonſtrating this, permit me to develope, according to my idea of it, the object of Mr. Jay's miſſion, and the contingencies upon which his ſucceſs depended. This will ſhow the relation which mine had to his, and more ſatisfactorily than I can otherwiſe do, the motives in that reſpect of my conduct.

I underſtood that the ſole object of Mr. Jay's miſſion was to demand the ſurrender of the poſts, and compenſation for injuries, and was perſuaded that his ſucceſs would depend upon two primary conſiderations; the ſucceſs of the French armies, and the continuance of a moſt perfect good underſtanding between the two republics. If we were diſappointed in either of theſe events, I concluded that his miſſion would fail; for we knew that a long and able negotiation for the firſt object had already proved abortive, and we ſaw in the preceding year, when Toulon was taken, and fortune ſeemed to frown upon the arms of this republic, that an order was iſſued for thoſe ſpoliations of which we ſo juſtly complain. We likewiſe ſaw afterwards, when the ſpirit of this nation was rouſed, and victory attended its efforts, that that order was reſcinded, and ſome reſpect ſhown to the United States. Thus it appeared, that our fortune, at leaſt ſo far as depended upon Britain, and of courſe the ſucceſs of Mr. Jay's miſſion, depended upon that of France.

But the ſucceſs of France could not redound to our advantage, and eſpecially in the negotiation with Britain, without a good underſtanding and concert with the French government; for without which, we could neither count upon ſucceſs in negotiation, nor, in caſe it failed, upon the fortunate iſſue of arms, if war ſhould be appealed to. By negotiation we could not hope for ſucceſs, otherwiſe than from the apprehenſion in the Britiſh cabinet, that if we were not accommodated, we would join in the war againſt them. We could not accept it at the price of an equivalent, and thus pay again for what was already our due: nor could we expect it from the affection, the juſtice, or the liberality of that court; for we well knew that if it had poſſeſſed thoſe virtues, we ſhould have had no cauſe of complaint. But we could not join in the war, nor even

avail ourſelves of that argument in negotiation, without a concert with France; for without ſuch concert, we might commence at the moment ſhe was about to conclude; whereby we ſhould be left alone to contend with that power, who would probably be ſupported by Spain. If then our good underſtanding with France was broken, or the neceſſary concert between us incomplete, Britain would only have to amuſe us till the criſis had paſſed, and then defy us.

If this doctrine is true, and it is admitted that the ſucceſs of Mr. Jay's miſſion depended upon a good underſtanding with the French republic, it follows, that the more cordial it was, and the more generally known, the happier the effect would be; and of courſe that, by exhibiting this public proof of it, inſtead of retarding, I forwarded eſſentially the object of that negotiation: and ſuch, indeed, was my idea at the time; for I knew that the movement would be ſo underſtood on the other ſide of the channel; and in conſequence, believed it would produce a good effect, and in which I was the more confirmed by the information of ſeveral of my countrymen, who were in England when the embargo was impoſed, and who aſſured me that if it had been continued, Mr. Jay's ſucceſs would have been immediate.

That the Engliſh adminiſtration would complain of this movement, and of me, was what I expected; but I knew that I was ſent here not to ſubſerve the views of that adminiſtration, and truſted that whilſt I reſted on my inſtructions, and performed my duty with integrity, although my judgment might occaſionally err, as thoſe of moſt men ſometimes do, that no conceſſion would be made to my diſcredit, in favour of that adminiſtration; on the contrary, that I ſhould be firmly ſupported againſt its attacks, by thoſe who ſent me here. I truſt that this has been the caſe in the preſent inſtance, and upon which point I am more anxious, upon public than private conſiderations; becauſe I well know, that if any ſuch conceſſion has been made, it was immediately communicated by its inſtruments here, and for the purpoſe of weakening the confidence of this government in our own; a practice ſyſtematically purſued heretofore, and with the hope of ſeparating, or at leaſt of preventing any kind of concert between the two countries.

Had the fortunes of France been unproſperous upon my arrival here, the motive for greater caution would have been ſtronger. But the caſe was in every reſpect otherwiſe. Her fortunes were at the height of proſperity, and thoſe of her enemies deciſively on the decline. It was obvious that nothing was wanting to preſerve tranquillity at home, and to enſure

ſucceſs in our foreign negotiations, but the good wiſhes and the good offices of this republic towards us. By the meaſure, therefore, I thought that every thing was to be gained, and nothing to be loſt.

Upon the third point, but little need be ſaid. I have ſome time ſince tranſmitted to you a decree, which carried the treaty into effect, and yielded the point in queſtion. Satisfied I am, too, it was greatly forwarded, if not abſolutely obtained, by the manner in which it was urged: for a generous policy is better calculated to produce a good effect here, than a ſtrict one: and other than in this light my declaration cannot be conſidered. Surely I did not concede the point, nor intimate an indifference upon it. On the contrary, I laboured, with the greateſt force of which I was capable, to demonſtrate the intereſt we had in it, as well as themſelves: nor did I condeſcend in that, or any other tranſaction. In general, I know I am more apt to err on the other ſide; and I am perſuaded, that in the preſent inſtance you will find, upon a peruſal of the paper in queſtion, that, although it contains expreſſions of friendſhip, it certainly betrays none of condeſcenſion.

You have already ſeen by the courſe of my correſpondence, that however difficult it was to ſucceed, yet at certain times we were completely poſſeſſed of the confidence of this government; and that at theſe times I had the good fortune to accompliſh ſome object of importance to us. But it is likewiſe my duty to inform you, that I was at the ſame time enabled to penetrate more accurately into what would moſt probably be its policy towards us, in caſe we continued to poſſeſs that confidence unimpaired: and I now declare, that I am of opinion, if we ſtood firmly upon that ground, there is no ſervice within the power of this republic to render, that it would not render to us, and upon the ſlighteſt intimation. In the interval between the period of thoſe communications which were made by me to the committee, explanatory of our ſituation with Britain, Spain, &c. and the arrival of the intelligence of Mr. Jay's treaty, the indications of this diſpoſition were extremely ſtrong: for at that time I had reaſon to believe, that it contemplated to take under its care, and to provide for our protection againſt Algiers; for the expulſion of the Britiſh from the weſtern poſts, and the eſtabliſhment of our right with Spain to the free navigation of the Miſſiſippi, to be executed in the mode we ſhould prefer, and upon terms perfectly eaſy to us; terms, in ſhort, which ſought only the aid of our credit to obtain a loan from our own banks for an inconſiderable ſum, to be laid out in the purchaſe of

proviſions within our own country, and to be reimburſed, if poſſible, by themſelves. But by *that* intelligence, this diſpoſition was checked, but not changed; for it is with the courſe of opinions as with that of bodies, and which are not eaſily to be forced in an oppoſite direction, after they have deciſively taken a particular one. I mention this for your information, not indeed in relation to the paſt, but future meaſures of the executive; for I am ſtill inclined to believe, that if the arrangement with England, or the negotiation with Spain ſhould fail, it is poſſible, provided a ſuitable attempt be made here, before a peace is cloſed with thoſe powers reſpectively, to accompliſh the whole through the means of this government, and upon terms which would perhaps require no offenſive movement, or other act which would rightfully ſubject us to the imputation of a breach of neutrality. Well ſatisfied I am, that the full weight of its fortunes might be thrown with deciſion into our ſcale, and in a manner that would enable us to turn thoſe fortunes to the beſt account in negotiation.

No. II.

Extract of a Letter from the Secretary of the United States, to Mr. Monroe.

Philadelphia, Sept. 25, 1794.

MY anxiety to hear from you is multiplied tenfold by my knowledge, that all the ſentiments of Mr. Fauchet were depoſited in the memory of Mr. Le Blanc, and not committed to writing. That which could not be hazarded upon the poſſibility of detection, muſt be of an important caſt. One thing only is certain, that he ſuppoſes a Britiſh tendency to prevail in ſome members of our government, and that the ſuppoſition is a copious theme with him. You are poſſeſſed of all the means of confronting this idea. *You know how Mr. Jay is reſtricted*; and I muſt acknowledge to you, that notwithſtanding all the pompous expectations, announced in the gazettes, of compenſation to the merchants, the proſpect of it is, in my judgment, illuſory; and I do not entertain the moſt diſtant hope of the ſurrender of the weſtern poſts. Thus the old exaſperations continue, and new ones are daily added. Judge then, how indiſpenſable it is, that you ſhould keep the French republic in good humour with us.

Spain has, by a conduct ſimilar to that of Great Britain towards us, impoſed the neceſſity of ſending an envoy extraordinary thither alſo: for the negotiation is at a ſtand, on the moſt unaccountable pretexts. My conviction is firm, that the courts

of Madrid and London are cordial in nothing but a hatred againſt the United States, and a determination to haraſs them through the Indians.

If, however, a report, which has come many ways, be true, that general Wayne, on the 20th Auguſt, left between one hundred and fifty and three hundred Indians dead on the field, near the Rapids of the Miami, their exultation might have fallen, and they will ſoon be ſick of war.

I am, &c.

EDM. RANDOLPH,
Secretary of State.

No. III.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Paris, May 17th, 1795.

I OBSERVE by this letter, that the treaty concluded by Mr. Jay with Great Britain, did not arrive before the 5th of March, and in conſequence would not be ſubmitted to the ſenate before the 8th of June, and in the interim would be kept ſecret. I regret equally this delay and ſecrecy; the *delay*, becauſe, if it is not approved, it may become more difficult in the probable courſe of events on this ſide of the Atlantic, to obtain a remodification of it; and the *ſecrecy*, becauſe the jealouſy that was at firſt imbibed by this government of its contents, will of courſe remain for the ſame ſpace of time, and which cannot otherwiſe than be ſomewhat hurtful in the interim to our affairs depending here. Having too explained the object of that miſſion, whilſt its iſſue was uncertain, they think it ſtrange that the reſult ſhould be now withheld. Upon this point, however, I have nothing new to add. I have already communicated to you whatever I had to communicate upon it; and waiting the iſſue, I ſhall continue by my aſſurances to endeavour to inſpire this government with a confidence, either that the treaty in queſtion contains in it nothing improper, or that it will not be ratified in caſe it does.

No. IV.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Paris, Auguſt 17, 1795.

AS I have had no communication with this government upon the ſubject of this treaty, ſince its contents were known, it is of courſe impoſſible for me to ſay what the impreſſion it has

made is. It is as eaſy for you, with the lights you have, to form a correct opinion upon that point in Philadelphia, as for me to do it here. One circumſtance, however, I think proper to bring to your view: ſoon after the Britiſh government had recommenced the ſeizure of our veſſels deſtined for the ports of France, it was notified to the committee by a ſecret agent of this government, who had juſt returned from England, that he had been adviſed there, through a channel to be relied on, that the Engliſh adminiſtration had ſaid, they knew that meaſure would not be offenſive to our government; or, in other words, that it was a caſe provided for between the two governments. I treated the communication with contempt, and was happy to hear that it was conſidered nearly in the ſame light by the committee itſelf.

But ſince the arrival of the treaty, I have underſtood that, in connexion with that report, the attention of many has been drawn with ſome degree of ſolicitude to the contents of the ſecond paragraph of the 18th article, and who ſay, that as that article leaves the law of nations unſettled, and provides payment for ſeizures in caſes of contraband, and of courſe for thoſe which are not contraband, whereby the complaints of our citizens are prevented, and the Britiſh conſtruction by implication countenanced—this republic has a right to complain of it. I mention this objection to you, that you may be aware of it, in caſe it ſhould ever be brought forward on this or your ſide of the water; and that it will be brought forward, I think probable, if thoſe ſeizures are not noticed in ſome very pointed manner. It is painful for me to give you a detail of this kind; but being an intereſting fact, I do not ſee with what propriety it can be withheld.

No. V.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Paris, Feb. 16, 1796.

I THINK it my duty to inform you, and without delay, of a communication made me yeſterday by the miniſter of foreign affairs, of a very intereſting nature. I called to repreſent to him the diſtreſs of ſeveral of my countrymen, occaſioned by the proteſt at Hamburgh of bills given them for ſupplies rendered the government; and to requeſt his aid with the directoire to obtain them relief. This application was intended to harmonize with one, that was making informally by our conſul general with the directoire, and which was

arranged in a manner to preſent the demands of the claimants before that body, in a forcible manner, and at the ſame time without wounding its feelings. But before I entered on this ſubject, my attention was called to another more important, and upon which he ſeemed pleaſed with the opportunity of addreſſing me. He obſerved, that the directoire had at length made up its mind how to act in regard to our treaty with England:—that it conſidered the alliance between us as ceaſing to exiſt from the moment the treaty was ratified; and had or ſhould appoint an envoy extraordinary to attend and repreſent the ſame to our government; that the perſon in view was known and eſteemed in our country, and who would be ſpecially commiſſioned on this buſineſs, and whoſe commiſſion would expire with it: that Mr. Adet had aſked and obtained his recall, but did not ſay whether any other miniſter would be appointed in his ſtead, for the preſent; though, as connected with Adet's reſignation, it is reported that Maret, lately returned from captivity in Auſtria, is to ſucceed him. The miniſter added ſome general obſervations on the treaty, tending to ſhow, that it was conſidered as throwing us into the ſcale of the coaleſced powers; obſerving, that he ſhould hand me an official note on this ſubject, being ordered ſo to do by the directoire. As no ſpecific objection was ſtated, I could make no ſpecific reply. I expreſſed to him, however, my aſtoniſhment and concern at the meaſure ſpoken of, and inculcated in the ſhort time I remained with him (for he was upon the point of going out) the propriety of candour in the diſcuſſion of the treaty, in its ſeveral parts, and the benefit of temper in all tranſactions with us, ſince we were certainly their beſt friends. To this he made no anſwer, and whereupon I left him.

No. VI.

From the Miniſter of Foreign Affairs to the Miniſter Plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

Paris, 21ſt Ventoſe, 4th Year of the Republic,
(March 11th, 1796.)

I ADDRESS to you, Citizen, a copy of a ſummary expoſition of the complaints of the French republic againſt the United States of America. I often and very ſincerely wiſh, that your government, better enlightened upon its true intereſts, will be diſpoſed to give us complete ſatisfaction.

(Signed) CH. DE LA CROIX.

A ſummary Expoſition of the Complaints of the French Government againſt the Government of the United States.

First COMPLAINT. The inexecution of treaties.

1. The courts of juſtice in the United States have taken, and continue daily to take, cognizance of prizes, which our privateers conduct into their ports, notwithſtanding the expreſs clauſe of the treaty, which prohibits it. Our miniſters have propoſed different arrangements to put bounds to this uſurpation: the federal government had itſelf propoſed meaſures in this reſpect: the firſt propoſitions were not accepted, and the laſt meaſures have fallen into diſuſe. The diſguſts, the delays and the loſſes which reſult to our marine, from a like ſtate of things, are palpable; they almoſt deprive the republic of the advantage it ought to derive from this article of the treaty.

2. The admiſſion of Engliſh veſſels of war into the ports of the United States, againſt the expreſs ſtipulation of the 17th article of the treaty; that is to ſay, when they have made prizes upon the republic, or its citizens. The weakneſs with which the federal government yielded this point in the beginning, tended to increaſe the pretenſions of Great Britain; ſo that, at preſent, the ports of the United States have become a ſtation for the ſquadron of admiral Murray; which for two years paſt has ſtationed there, to make excurſions thence upon the American commerce, and deſtroy our property. This diviſion carries its audacity even farther, by conducting its prizes into thoſe ports.

3. The conſular convention, which makes a part of our treaties, is equally unexecuted in two of its moſt important clauſes; the firſt, which grants to our conſuls the right of judging excluſively all controverſies which take place between French citizens, has become illuſory, from a defect in the law which gives to our conſuls the means of executing their judgments. The conſequences of this defect tend to annihilate the prerogatives of our conſuls, and by means thereof to injure eſſentially our merchants. The ſecond gives to our conſuls the right of arreſting our marine deſerters. The inexecution of this part of the convention affects, beyond all expreſſion, our maritime ſervice, whilſt our veſſels are ſtationed in the American ports. The judges charged by the law to deliver mandats of arreſt, have lately required the preſentation of the original regiſter of the equipage, in deſpite of the 5th article of the treaty, which admits in the tribunals of the two powers copies certified by the conſuls. Particular local conſiderations oppoſe, in a

thouſand circumſtances, the preſentation of the original regiſter, and, under theſe circumſtances, the ſailors always make their eſcape.

4. The arreſtation in the port of Philadelphia, in the month of Auguſt 1795, of the captain of the corvette Caſſius, for an act committed by him on the high ſeas. This meaſure is contrary to the 19th article of the treaty of commerce, which ſtipulates, "that the commandants of public and private veſſels ſhall not be detained in any manner." It violates, moreover, the right of nations the moſt common, which puts the officers of public veſſels under the ſafeguard of their flag. The United States had ſufficient proof of the reſpect which the republic entertained for them, to have counted upon its juſtice upon this occaſion. The captain has been impriſoned, though the conſul of the republic ſupported the action, and with difficulty has he been releaſed. The corvette, though regularly armed at the Cape by the general Lavaud, has been arreſted (as it appears ſhe ſtill is) under the pretext, that eight months before ſhe ſailed from Philadelphia, ſhe was ſuſpected of having been armed in that port.

Second COMPLAINT. The impunity of the outrage made to the republic, in the perſon of its miniſter, the citizen Fauchet, by the Engliſh veſſel the Africa, in concert with the vice-conſul of that nation.

The arreſtation, in the waters of the United States, of the packet-boat in which the miniſter ſailed; the ſearch made in his trunks, with the avowed object of ſeizing his perſon and his papers, merited an example. This inſult was committed on the 1ſt of Auguſt 1795, and after which this veſſel (the Africa) blocked up the reſt of that month, at Newport, the frigate Meduſa of the republic; nor was that veſſel ordered to depart till after this frigate had ſailed, and which order was given for a new outrage committed againſt the United States by a menacing letter; and for a participation in which laſt inſult, the exequatur of the Engliſh conſul was withdrawn.

Third COMPLAINT. The treaty concluded in November 1794, between the United States and Great Britain. It would be eaſy to prove, that the United States, in that treaty, have ſacrificed, *knowingly* and *evidently*, their connexion with the republic; and the rights, the moſt eſſential and leaſt conteſted, of neutrality.

1. The United States have not only departed from the

principles that were conſecrated by the armed neutrality during the war of their independence; but they have alſo given to England, to the injury of their firſt allies, a mark the moſt ſtriking of a *condeſcenſion* without limits, in abandoning the rule, which the rights of nations, their treaties with all other powers, and even the treaties of England with moſt of the maritime powers, have given to contraband. To ſacrifice excluſively to this power, the objects which are neceſſary for the equipment and conſtruction of veſſels—is not this to depart evidently from the principles of neutrality?

2. But they have even gone further. They have conſented to extend the denomination of contraband even to proviſions. Inſtead of reſtricting it, as all treaties have done, to the caſe of an effective blockade of a port, as forming the only exception to the complete freedom of this article, they have tacitly acknowledged the pretenſions of England to extend the blockade to our colonies, and even to France, by the force of a proclamation alone. This abandonment of the independence of their commerce is incompatible with their neutrality, as Mr. Jefferſon has acknowledged by his letter of the 7th September, to the miniſter plenipotentiary of the United States at London, upon the ſubject of the order of the 8th June 1793. After this confeſſion; after, above all, the tyrannical edicts of the king of Great Britain, whereby the commerce, as well as the national honour, of the United States have ſuffered ſo much; there was reaſon to hope a different reſult from the negotiation of Mr. Jay. It is evident, by the clauſe which limits the continuance of this deſertion of neutrality to the term of this war, that Mr. Jay did not heſitate to ſacrifice our colonies to Great Britain during the continuance of theſe hoſtilities, by which their lot will be decided. It is ſubmitted to Mr. Monroe to judge, in what point theſe conceſſions accord with the obligation by which the United States have contracted to defend our colonial poſſeſſions, and with the duties, not leſs ſacred, which the great and ineſtimable benefits they derive from their commerce with thoſe iſlands, bind them to obſerve.

(Signed) CH. DE LA CROIX.

Paris, 19th Ventoſe, 4th Year of the Republic.

No. VII.

From the Miniſter of Foreign Affairs to the Miniſter Plenipotentiary of the United States of America.

Paris, 19 Meſſidor, 4th Year of the Republic, (July 7th, 1796.)

Citizen Miniſter,

THE hope of ſeeing depart daily the new miniſter whom the executive directory propoſed to ſend to the United States, prevented my ſooner anſwering your letter of the 25th Ventoſe (15th of March) laſt. You call my attention in your note of the 9th of this month (27th of June), to the arguments which that letter contains relative to our complaints againſt the treaty concluded between the United States and Great Britain. Time, citizen miniſter, has ſufficiently ripened the points that were then in diſcuſſion; and, far from being enfeebled, our complaints againſt that treaty have acquired ſince, in our eſtimation, a new force. I will content myſelf, then, without entering into details, to announce to you, that the opinion of the directory has never varied upon that point. It has ſeen in this act, concluded in the midſt of hoſtilities, a breach of the friendſhip which unites the United States and this republic; and in the ſtipulations which reſpect the neutrality of the flag, an abandonment of the tacit engagement which ſubſiſted between the two nations upon this point ſince their treaty of commerce of 1778. The abandonment of the principles conſecrated by this treaty, has ſtruck us with greater force, from the conſideration that all other treaties which the United States have made, contain them, as from the further one, that theſe principles are ſince ſo generally acknowledged, that they now form the public law of all civilized nations.

After this, citizen miniſter, the executive directory thinks itſelf founded, in regarding the ſtipulations of the treaty of 1778, which concern the neutrality of the flag, as altered and ſuſpended in their moſt eſſential parts by this act, and that it would fail in its duty, if it did not modify a ſtate of things which would never have been conſented to, but upon the condition of the moſt ſtrict reciprocity.

(Signed) CH. DE LA CROIX.

No. VIII.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Pickering to Mr. Monroe.

June 13th, 1796.

BUT the principal matter which now demands attention is what concerns the late treaty between the United States and Great Britain.

Of the views of the government of the United States on this ſubject you have long ſince been poſſeſſed, as well before as ſubſequent to its ratification. Theſe views were communicated to you for the ſole purpoſe of furniſhing you with the means of removing objections and diſpelling jealouſies. By your own repreſentations, both objections and jealouſies exiſted. It has, therefore, been a matter of no ſmall ſurpriſe to the preſident, that during ſo long a period you contented yourſelf merely with having thoſe means in your poſſeſſion, without applying them to the object for which they were tranſmitted.

As early as October laſt you predicted, that if Mr. Jay's treaty ſhould be ratified, it would excite great diſcontent in France. Early in November you mentioned the arrival of Mr. Fauchet, extremely diſſatisfied with the treaty; adding, that he was well received, and would therefore be attended to. On the 6th of December you acknowledge the receipt of my letter of September 12th, written ſubſequently to the ratification of the treaty, to repeat and further explain the principles and views of the government concerning it. Mr. Adet's objections to the treaty, and their refutation, accompanied my letter. And with ſuch means in your hands—means amply ſufficient to vindicate the conduct of the United States—not leſs regret than ſurpriſe is excited, that no attempt was made to apply them to the highly important uſe for which they were ſent. Although you anticipated diſcontents—although the ſymptoms of diſcontent appeared—although theſe ſymptoms, unattended to and unallayed, might increaſe to an inflammation—and Mr. Fauchet's arrival, with all his diſſatisfaction and prejudices about him, would aſſuredly add to the irritation—yet you were ſilent and inactive, until, on the 15th of February, you were alarmed by the project of the directory, *accidentally* communicated to you by the miniſter for foreign affairs, of ſending to this country an envoy extraordinary, to repreſent to our government their deciſion concerning the treaty with Great Britain; "that they conſidered the treaty of alliance between us as ceaſing to exiſt, from the moment the treaty was rati-

fied." Your letter of the 20th of the ſame month deſcribes your ſecond interview with the miniſter on the project of ſending an envoy extraordinary; and the reaſons you urged to diſſuade them from it were certainly very cogent. Your letter of the 10th of March informs us that the project was laid aſide; and your letter of the 25th of March, that you had had an audience of the directory on the ſubject; and that they had agreed to ſuſpend their propoſed extraordinary miſſion, until the points in queſtion ſhould be diſcuſſed between you and the miniſter for foreign affairs. The reſult of this audience appears ſatisfactory; and from the good effect produced by the partial explanations then given, may be calculated the happy conſequences of the full communications which might have been made, and which for ſo long a time you had poſſeſſed the means of making, in vindication of the meaſures of the government you repreſent. That theſe were not made—that they had not been made, even ſo late as the 25th of March, is again to be extremely regretted; becauſe the juſtice, the honour, and the faith of our country were queſtioned, and conſequently their moſt important intereſts were at ſtake.

It is painful to dwell on this ſubject.—You have here the ſenſations of the preſident in relation to the line of conduct you have purſued. He truſts the explanations you propoſed have now been given—that they have been full and ſatisfactory to the French government: it is unneceſſary to add, that if by any poſſibility they ſhould not have been given, the preſident expects they will no longer be withheld. If perſonal interviews are difficult to be obtained, a written communication may at any time be made; and the latter is evidently the moſt eligible mode; it is the mode which the preſident expreſſly deſires may be adopted; and that a complete copy of the communication may be tranſmitted to this office.

I have the honour to be, &c.

TIMOTHY PICKERING.

No. IX.

From Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Paris, Sept. 10th, 1796.

I HAVE been juſt favoured with yours of the 13th of June; the only one received from the department of ſtate

ſince that of the 7th of January laſt, a note from Mr. Taylor of the 13th of May excepted.

You charge me in this letter with a neglect of duty, in omitting, as you ſtate, to diſſipate, by a timely and ſuitable application of the lights in my poſſeſſion, the diſcontent of this government, on account of our late treaty with England; and you ſupport this charge by a reference to certain paſſages in my own correſpondence, which ſtate, that this diſcontent broke out in February laſt, four months after I had received a letter from yourſelf and Mr. Randolph, upon the ſubject of that treaty; and whence you infer, and on account of the delay or interval which took place between the one and the other event, that I was inattentive to that important concern of my country, and urge the previous and ſtrong ſymptoms of diſcontent which I witneſſed and communicated, as an additional proof of my neglect.

Permit me to remark, that this charge is not more unjuſt and unexpected, than the teſtimony by which you ſupport it is inapplicable and inconcluſive: indeed it were eaſy to ſhow, that the circumſtances on which you rely, if they prove any thing, prove directly the reverſe of what you deduce from them.

If ſuch diſcontent exiſted, and the formal declaration of it, or commencement of meaſures in conſequence of it, was delayed (and the greater the diſcontent, and the longer the delay, the ſtronger the argument), and any inference applicable to me was drawn from that circumſtance, I ſhould ſuppoſe it would be precifely the oppoſite one from that which you draw. Where a diſcontent exiſts, it is natural and uſual for the party feeling it, to endeavour to remove it, or expreſs its ſenſe of it; but the purſuit of an oppoſite conduct for a great length of time, and eſpecially a time of revolution, and when a different and more peremptory one was obſerved to all the other powers, is no proof, without other documents, of negligence in me.

But why did this diſcontent not break out before theſe letters were received? You ſaw by my communications, as early as December 1794, and which were frequently repeated afterwards, that it exiſted, was felt upon our affairs here, and was likely to produce the moſt ſerious ill conſequences, if the cauſe continued to exiſt. If theſe accounts were correct, why did this government take no ſteps under its firſt impreſſions, and particularly in Auguſt 1795, when Paris was ſtarving, and our veſſels deſtined for the ports of France were ſeized and carried into England? Was not this a criſis difficult for me to ſuſtain here; when the eyes of France

were fixed upon me, as the repreſentative of the nation upon whoſe friendſhip they had counted; as the man who had juſt before been the organ of declarations the moſt friendly? Why leave us afterwards, and until the laſt ſtage, to our unbiaſſed deliberations upon that ſubject, and without an effort to impede their free courſe? Do difficulties like theſe, with the reſult which followed, give cauſe to ſuſpect that I was idle or negligent at my poſt? that I was at any time a calm or indifferent ſpectator of a ſtorm which was known to be riſing, and which threatened injury to my country? or that I withheld any light which came to my aid, and which might be uſeful in diſſipating it?

I do not wiſh to be underſtood as aſſuming to myſelf the merit of this delay; becauſe I know, thinking and feeling as the government did on this ſubject, that the ſtrong bias of affection which this nation entertained for us, was the true cauſe of it. But I well know that I have done every thing in my power, and from the moment of my arrival to the preſent time, to promote harmony between the two republics, and to prevent this from taking any ſtep which might poſſibly diſturb it, and which I have done as well from a ſincere attachment to both, as from a perſuaſion, let the merit of the points in diſcuſſion be what they might, that a continual, temperate, and friendly conduct towards us was the wiſeſt policy which this government could adopt, and would produce the beſt effect upon that union, which it is, I preſume, equally its wiſh and its intereſt to preſerve, and of courſe leave to its councils leſs cauſe hereafter for ſelf-reproach. It is from the ſincerity of theſe motives, and the knowledge this government has of it, that I have inceſſantly made efforts to preſerve that harmony, and been heard in friendly communication, and often in remonſtrance, upon the topics connected with it, in a manner I could not otherwiſe have expected.

But you urge, that as I knew this diſcontent exiſted, I ought to have encountered and removed it. I do not diſtinctly comprehend the extent of this poſition, or what it was your wiſh, under exiſting circumſtances, I ſhould have done. Till the 15th of February, no complaint was made to me by this government againſt that treaty; nor did I know before that period that any would be; for, from the moment of its organization, till then, the utmoſt reſerve was obſerved to me by it on that ſubject. The intimations which I witneſſed were written before the eſtabliſhment of the preſent government, and drawn of courſe from circumſtances which preceded it. Of the probable views, therefore, of the pre-

ſent government in that reſpect, I ſpoke only by conjecture. Was it then your wiſh, that becauſe I ſuſpected this government would be or was diſcontented with that treaty, that I ſhould ſtep forward, invite the diſcuſſion, and provoke the attack? Would it have been politic or ſafe for me to do it; and eſpecially upon a ſubject ſo delicate and important as that was? And had I done it, ſhould I not have been juſtly cenſured for my raſhneſs and indiſcretion? And might not even different motives have been aſſigned for my conduct? To me, I own, it always appeared moſt ſuitable, as well as moſt wiſe, to ſtand on the defenſive, and to anſwer objections only when they were made; upon the fair and reaſonable preſumption, till they were made, that none would be; and upon the principle, if none were made, that our object was obtained; and if there were, that then there would be ſufficient time to anſwer them, and in a regular and official manner. By this, however, I do not wiſh to be underſtood, as having declined at any time informal friendly communications on this or other ſubjects, when ſuitable occaſions occurred; for the contrary was the caſe, as is already obſerved.

What the circumſtances were upon which I founded my opinion of the probable ill conſequences of that treaty, in caſe it were ratified, were in general communicated, as they occurred. There was, however, one other, and which was particularly impreſſive at the time, omitted then, but which I now think proper to add, becauſe it was that upon which I founded the intimation given you, in my letter of the 20th of October, on that head. Calling one day, upon the ſubject of our Algerine affairs, informally, upon Jean de Brie, who had, in the committee of public ſafety, the American branch under his care, I found him engaged upon that treaty, with a copy of it before him, and other papers on the ſame ſubject. I began with the object of my viſit, and from which he ſoon digreſſed upon the other topic, and with great aſperity; adding, that he was preparing a letter for me on that ſubject, to be ſubmitted to the committee. I anſwered his charges in the manner which appeared to me moſt ſuitable, and finally aſked him, if he had received the correſpondence which took place on that ſubject between Mr. Adet and Mr. Randolph; and to which he replied, that he had not. I then informed him I had that correſpondence, which was an intereſting one; and requeſted he would permit me to give him a copy of it; and further, that he would delay his report to the committee, until after he had peruſed and fully weighed it, which he promiſed; and, in conſequence, I immediately afterwards gave him a copy of that

correſpondence. This incident took place juſt before the movement of Vendemiaire, by which the execution of the project *contemplated* was probably prevented. I omitted this before, becauſe I hoped it would never be revived; and becauſe I did not wiſh to give more pain on this ſubject, and eſpecially as I ſoon afterwards found that the treaty was ratified, than could be avoided. And I now mention it, as well to ſhow the ſtrong ground upon which that intimation was given; as to prove that none of the lights furniſhed me, in that reſpect, were withheld.

So much I have thought proper to ſay in reply to your favour of the 13th of June; and now it remains for me to proceed with a detail of the further progreſs of this buſineſs here, ſince my laſt; at leaſt ſo far as I am acquainted with it.

I ſought, immediately after my laſt was written, and obtained, as ſoon as I poſſibly could obtain it, an informal conference with ſome members of the directoire, upon the ſubject of my laſt; beginning, by expreſſing my concern to hear they were ſtill diſſatisfied with us, and propoſed taking ſome ſtep in conſequence thereof; and which I ſincerely regretted, becauſe I had concluded the contrary was the caſe, after the explanation I had given to their ſeveral complaints; and becauſe I thought any meaſure which had an unfriendly aſpect towards us would be equally detrimental to theirs and our intereſt. They ſeverally replied, they were diſſatisfied with us, on account of our treaty with England, and thought that the honour of their country would be ſullied in their hands, if they did not ſay ſo. I endeavoured to lead them into converſation upon the points to which they objected; but ſoon found they were averſe to it, and were of opinion, that too much time had already been beſtowed on that ſubject. One of the members, however, obſerved, that the abandonment of the principle, that *free ſhips made free goods*, in favour of England, was an injury of a very ſerious kind to France, and which could not be paſſed by unnoticed. I told him, that in this nothing was abandoned, ſince, by the law of nations, ſuch was the caſe before; and of courſe that this article only delineated what the exiſting law was, as I had fully proved in my note to the miniſter of foreign affairs; that we were not bound to impoſe the new principle on other nations. He replied, if we could not carry that principle with England, nor protect our flag againſt her outrages, that that was always a reaſon why France ſhould complain; that they never aſked us to go to war, nor intended ſo to do; but that the abandonment of that principle

formally by treaty, at the time and under the circumſtances we did it, in favour of that power, was quite a different thing. Finding that a further preſſure at the time might produce an ill effect, and would certainly not produce a good one, I proceeded next to the other points, and to hint what I had heard of their intention with reſpect to Canada and Louiſiana; and to which it was replied, that in regard to Canada, they had no object for themſelves; and in regard to Louiſiana, none which ought to diſquiet us; that they ſincerely wiſhed us well, and hoped matters might be amicably adjuſted, ſince they were diſpoſed to meet ſuitable propoſitions to that effect with pleaſure; adding, in the cloſe, that the miniſter of foreign affairs was inſtructed to communicate to me the arrêté they had paſſed; but in a manner to impreſs me with a belief it was done rather for the purpoſe of enabling me to tranſmit it to you, than addreſs them at preſent further on the ſubject.

INSTRUCTIONS.

Sir, *Philadelphia, June 10th, 1794.*

YOU have been nominated as the ſucceſſor of Mr. Gouverneur Morris, in the office of miniſter plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the republic of France, from a confidence, that, while you keep ſteadily in view the neceſſity of rendering yourſelf acceptable to that government, you will maintain the ſelf-reſpect due to our own. In doing the one and the other of theſe things, your own prudence and underſtanding muſt be the guides; after firſt poſſeſſing yourſelf of the real ſentiments of the executive relative to the French nation.

The preſident has been an early and decided friend of the French revolution; and whatever reaſon there may have been, under our ignorance of facts and policy, to ſuſpend an opinion upon ſome of its important tranſactions; yet is he immutable in his wiſhes for its accompliſhment; incapable of aſſenting to the right of any foreign prince to meddle with its interior arrangements; and perſuaded that ſucceſs will attend their efforts; and particularly, that union among themſelves is an impregnable barrier againſt external aſſaults.

How the French government, when it ſhall be no longer attacked by foreign arms, will ultimately ſettle, is a point not yet reduced to any abſolutely certain expectation. The gradation of public opinion from the beginning of the new order of things to this day, and the fluctuation and mutual deſtruction of parties, forbid a miniſter of a foreign country to attach himſelf to any as ſuch, and dictate to him not to incline to any ſet of men, further than they appear to go with the ſenſe of the nation.

When the executive proviſory council recalled Mr. Genet, they expreſſed a determination to render it a matter of eclat, as you have ſeen; and at the ſame time diſavowed all his offenſive acts. Nothing having been forwarded to us, relative to Mr. Morris, which requires a diſavowal, you will, if you ſhould be interrogated as to any particular feeling prevailing with the preſident upon the occaſion, refer to the letter from the ſecretary of ſtate to Mr. Fauchet, as explanatory of the preſident's promptneſs to comply with their demand.

From Mr. Genet and Fauchet we have uniformly learned that France did not deſire us to depart from neutrality; and it would have been unwiſe to have aſked us to do otherwiſe: for our ports are open to her prizes, while they are ſhut to thoſe of Great Britain; and ſupplies of grain could not be forwarded to France with ſo much certainty, were we at war, as they can even now, notwithſtanding the Britiſh inſtructions; and as they may be, if the demands to be made upon Great Britain ſhould ſucceed. We have, therefore, purſued neutrality with faithfulneſs; we have paid more of our debt to France than was abſolutely due, as the ſecretary of the treaſury aſſerts; and we ſhould have paid more, if the ſtate of our affairs did not require us to be prepared with funds for the poſſible event of war. We mean to continue the ſame line of conduct in future; and to remove all jealouſy with reſpect to Mr. Jay's miſſion to London, you may ſay, that he is poſitively forbidden to weaken the engagements between this country and France. *It is not improbable, that you will be obliged to encounter, on this head, ſuſpicions of various kinds. But you may declare the motives of that miſſion to be, to obtain immediate compenſation for our plundered property, and reſtitution of the poſts.* You may intimate, by way of argument, but without aſcribing it to the government, *that, if war ſhould be neceſſary, the affections of the people of the United States towards it, would be better ſecured by a manifeſtation, that every ſtep had been taken to avoid it; and that the Britiſh nation would be divided, when they found that*

we had been forced into it. This may be briefly touched upon as the path of prudence with reſpect to ourſelves; and alſo with reſpect to France, ſince we are unable to give her aids of men or money. To this matter you cannot be too attentive; and you will be amply juſtified in repelling with firmneſs, any imputation of the moſt diſtant intention to ſacrifice our connexion with France to any connexion with England. You may back your aſſertions by a late determination of the preſident to have it ſignified abroad, that he is averſe to admit into his public room, which is free to all the world beſides, any Frenchmen who are obnoxious to the French republic; although, perhaps, it may again happen ſometimes, as many go thither whoſe names and characters are utterly unknown.

It is very probable that our country will become the aſylum for moſt of the French who expatriate themſelves from their native land. Our laws have never yet made a diſtinction of perſons, nor is ſuch a diſtinction very eaſy. Hence ſome of thoſe who are perhaps attainted in France, have thrown themſelves upon the protection of the United States. This will not, as it ſurely ought not to be miſinterpreted into any *eſtrangement from the French cauſe.* You will *explain this, whenſoever it ſhall be neceſſary.*

If we may judge from what has been at different times uttered by Mr. Fauchet, he will repreſent the exiſtence of two parties irreconcileable to each other: one republican, and friendly to the French revolution; the other monarchical, ariſtocratic, Britannic, and anti-Gallican; that a majority of the houſe of repreſentatives, the people, and the preſident, are in the firſt claſs; and a majority of the ſenate in the ſecond. If this intelligence ſhould be uſed, in order to inſpire a diſtruſt of our good will to France, you will induſtriouſly obviate ſuch an effect:—and if a fair occaſion ſhould preſent itſelf, you may hint, that the moſt effectual means of obtaining from the United States what is deſired by France, will be by a plain and candid application to the government, and not by thoſe inſidious operations on the people, which Genet endeavoured to carry on.

The information which we poſſeſs of France, before and in the early ſtages of the revolution, muſt be conſiderably changed at this day. You will, therefore, tranſmit to us, as ſoon as poſſible, an account of the navy, the agriculture, and the commerce of France. It is deſirable too to know, upon what footing religion really ſtands. Theſe, however, are general objects. But we are particularly concerned to underſtand the true ſtate of the different ſects of politics. Are there any of the old friends to the ancient regime re-

maining? Are any new friends created by the courſe of things? Are the Briſſotines extinguiſhed? Are the Dantoniſts overwhelmed? Is Robeſpierre's party firmly fixed? Is he capable, from talents and perſonal fortitude, to direct the ſtorm? Is his character free from imputation, as to money? Is he friendly to the United States? How is the executive power adminiſtered now? What new acceſſion of authority may have lately accrued to the committee of public ſafety? What relation do the twelve commiſſions of adminiſtration, which have been lately eſtabliſhed, bear to that committee? What is the true cauſe of the various changes, which have lately taken place, by one party riſing upon the ruins of another? What aſſurance can be had that any party can ſo long maintain itſelf, as to promiſe ſtability to the government? Are the people ſincerely affectionate to their preſent government; or are they reſtrained by the terror of the revolutionary tribunal, or by the danger of having their country diſmembered by the coaleſced princes? What ſpecies of executive will probably be at laſt adopted? What characters bid fair to take the helm of affairs, after the great deſtruction and baniſhment of able men? Theſe, and many other queſtions of the ſame nature, ought to be ſolved, to enable us to ſee things in a true light. For, without doubting the ſolidity of the French cauſe, we ought not to be unprepared for any event. If, therefore, any very momentous turn ſhould ariſe in French affairs, upon which the conduct of our government may depend, you need not heſitate at the expenſe of an advice-boat, if no other ſatisfactory opportunity ſhould occur. But it is the wiſh of the preſident, that at the end of every week you commit to a letter the tranſactions of it, and embrace every proper conveyance, by duplicates, and, in great caſes, even by triplicates.

Should you be interrogated about the treaty of commerce, you may reply, that it has never been propoſed to us by Mr. Fauchet. As to any thing elſe concerning it, you will expreſs yourſelf not to be inſtructed; it being a ſubject to be negotiated with the government here.

In like manner, if a treaty of alliance, or if the execution of the guarantee of the French iſlands by force of arms, ſhould be propounded, you will refer the republic of France to this ſide of the water. In ſhort, it is expected, with a ſure reliance on your diſcretion, that you will not commit the United States, by any ſpecific declarations, except where you are particularly inſtructed, and except too in giving teſtimony of our attachment to their cauſe.

There is reaſon to believe that the embargo, when it was

firſt laid, excited ſome uneaſy ſenſations in the breaſt of the French miniſter. For it ſo happened, that at the moment before its operation, pretty conſiderable ſhipments of flour were made to the Britiſh Weſt Indies, and a ſnow, called La Camille, laden with flour for France, was arreſted near New Caſtle, on the Delaware, after ſhe had quitted the port of Philadelphia. But you know enough of the hiſtory of this buſineſs, to declare, that the embargo was levelled againſt Great Britain, and was made general, merely becauſe, if it had it been partial againſt her, it would have amounted to a cauſe of war; and alſo, that it was not continued, merely becauſe it was reputed to be injurious to France. My letters to Mr. Fauchet will explain the caſe of La Camille, and all his complaints about the embargo.

Should our embargo be brought up, the way will be eaſy for our complaint againſt the embargo of Bourdeaux. At any rate, you will remonſtrate againſt it, and urge ſatisfaction for the ſufferers. You will receive all the papers which have come into the department of ſtate, relative to thoſe matters; and you will beſides open a correſpondence with the captains and perſons intereſted at Bourdeaux, in order to obtain more accurate information.

But you will go farther, and inſiſt upon compenſation for the captures and ſpoliations of our property, and injuries to the perſons of our citizens by French cruiſers. Mr. Fauchet has been applied to, and promiſes to co-operate for the obtaining of ſatisfaction.

The dilatorineſs with which buſineſs is tranſacted in France will, if not curtailed in the adjuſtment of theſe caſes, produce infinite miſchief to our merchants. This muſt be firmly repreſented to the French republic; and you may find a ſeaſon for intimating how unfortunate it would be if ſo reſpectable a body as that of our merchants, ſhould relax in their zeal for the French cauſe, from irritation at their loſſes. The papers on this head are a ſtatement of French caſes, Mr. Fauchet's letters to me, and the documents themſelves.

You know the extreme diſtreſs in which the inhabitants of St. Domingo came hither after the diſaſters of the Cape. Private charity, and eſpecialy at Baltimore, moſt liberally contributed to their ſupport. The congreſs at length advanced 15,000 dollars, with a view of reimburſement from France. This ſubject has been broken to Mr. Fauchet here, and he appears to have been rouſed at the idea of ſupporting by French money French ariſtocrats and democrats indiſcriminately. Both he and his nation ought to be ſatisfied, that

in the cauſe of humanity, oppreſſed by poverty, political opinions have nothing to do. Add to this, that none but the really indigent receive a farthing. It was the duty of the French republic to relieve their coloniſts labouring under a penury ſo produced; and as it would have been too late to wait for their approbation before the payments were decreed, it will not be deemed an offenſive diſpoſal of French money, that we now make a claim for repayment. If Mr. Fauchet has power upon the ſubject, an attempt will be made for a ſettlement with him here; but that being very doubtful, will forward the retribution by diſcuſſing it in Europe.

You will be alſo charged with the demands of ſeveral American citizens for bills of exchange drawn in the French Weſt Indies on France. The report of a committee of them, Mr. Fauchet's letter, and the vouchers, which you will carry, leave no doubt of your ſucceſs. But if there ſhould be any difficulty, do not fail to communicate it to the ſecretary of ſtate inſtantaneouſly. The ſooner, therefore, the affair is entered upon the better.

It is important, that no public character of the United States ſhould be in France, which is not acceptable. You will inquire into the conſuls; and inform how they are approved, and whether they be deſerving. *Although the preſident will avoid, as much as poſſible, to appoint any obnoxious perſon conſul, it may happen otherwiſe, and muſt be conſidered as accidental.* Mr. Alexander Duvernat goes for Paris in the quality of vice-conſul, and Mr. Fauchet ſaid that he had nothing to object to him.

Conſulates are eſtabliſhed in every port of France, where they are conceived uſeful. But perhaps you may find it adviſable to mark out ſome other places for ſuch offices.

It is recommended, that no buſineſs of conſequence be carried on verbally, or in writing, but in your own language.

The miniſter of each nation has a right to uſe his national tongue, and few men can confide in their exactneſs when they do buſineſs in a foreign one. But great care is neceſſary in the choice of interpreters, when they are to be reſorted to.

It is a practice of great utility to note down every converſation of conſequence which you hold, immediately after retirement; and the executive will expect to receive copies of what ſhall be thus written.

A communication with our other miniſters in Europe, under proper caution, may be advantageous.

Let nothing depend upon verbal communication which can be carried on in writing.

To conclude.—You go, Sir, to France, to ſtrengthen our friendſhip with that country; and you are well acquainted with the line of freedom and eaſe to which you may advance, without betraying the dignity of the United States. You will ſhow our confidence in the French republic, without betraying the moſt remote mark of undue complaiſance. *You will let it be ſeen, that in caſe of war with any nation on earth, we ſhall conſider France as our firſt and natural ally.* You may dwell *upon the ſenſe which we entertain of paſt ſervices*, and for the more recent interpoſition in our behalf with the dey of Algiers. Among the great events with which the world is now teeming, there may be an opening for *France to become inſtrumental in ſecuring to us the free navigation of the Miſſiſippi.* Spain may, perhaps, *negotiate a peace, ſeparate from Great Britain, with France.* If ſhe does, *the Miſſiſippi may be acquired through this channel*, eſpecially if you contrive to have our mediation in any manner ſolicited.

With every wiſh for your welfare, and an honourable iſſue to your miniſtry,

I am, Sir, &c.

(Signed) EDMUND RANDOLPH.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Paris, Auguſt 25, 1794.

AT the ſame time, therefore, that I preſented my credentials, I laid before the convention the declarations of the ſenate and houſe of repreſentatives, as conveyed by the preſident through the ſecretary of ſtate, with an aſſurance that I was authorized to declare, that the preſident was actuated by ſimilar ſentiments. The communication was received in a manner very intereſting, and which furniſhed, at the ſame time, the ſtrongeſt proof of the affection entertained by the French nation for the United States of America. Every department has ſince ſhown the ſtrongeſt diſpoſition to prove its attachment to their ally, by embracing every opportunity which the ſlighteſt incident has offered. A few ſtores, brought for the accommodation of my family, in the ſhip in which I ſailed, were arreſted at Havre, becauſe no declaration was rendered of them by the captain. This was caſually heard by the committee of public ſafety, and, without any intimation from me, by their order reſtored. But being deſirous more formally to teſtify their regard, the commiſſary of foreign affairs announced to me yeſterday, that he was inſtructed, in the

name of the republic, to appropriate a houſe for my uſe, as miniſter of the United States, of ſuch accommodations, and in ſuch part of the city, as I would deſignate. The encloſed, No. 4, is a copy of his letter, and of my reply. Theſe latter acts, it is true, may be deemed in ſome meaſure acts of ceremony. So far, however, as they furniſh any indication of the diſpoſition of this country towards our own, it is a favourable one.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Paris, Nov. 7, 1794.

BY this time I had obtained from Mr. Skipwith a comprehenſive ſtatement of the embarraſſments attending our trade here; as well thoſe which proceeded from the cruiſers of the republic, and applied to what was deſtined or cleared out for foreign countries, as thoſe which proceeded from the commercial ſyſtem of France, and applied to the direct commerce between the two republics. As his report to me ſpecified not only each particular cauſe of complaint, but likewiſe furniſhed facts to ſupport them, I thought it beſt to make that report the baſis of this my ſecond communication on that head. I accordingly laid it before the committee, with ſuch comments as appeared to me ſuitable: and I now tranſmit to you a copy of it, that you may be appriſed how fully the ſubject is before them. I was aſſured that it exhibited a picture which ſhocked them; for theſe evils, progreſſing with the courſe of their own affairs, were long accumulating, and had probably attained a height, of which they had no conception.

As I had reaſon to ſuſpect that the chief oppoſition proceeded from thoſe who conducted the public trade, and who were attached to that mode from motives not the moſt patriotic, I thought it proper to examine the queſtion—whether it were beſt for the republic to encourage the competition of individuals in neutral countries for the ſupply of its markets, or depend on agencies employed in, or ſent to thoſe countries, for that purpoſe. This ſubject had been incidentally touched in my firſt note; but I thought ſome benefit might be derived from a more thorough developement of it. With this view I ſent in, at the ſame time, the paper intitled, "Supplemental Obſervations on the American Commerce."

I felt extremely embarraſſed how to touch again their infringement of the treaty of commerce; whether to call on

them to execute it, or leave that queſtion on the ground on which I had firſt placed it. You deſired me in your laſt, to conteſt with them the principle; but yet this did not amount to an inſtruction, nor even convey your idea, that it would be adviſable to *demand* of them the execution of thoſe articles. Upon full conſideration, therefore, I concluded that it was the moſt ſafe and ſound policy to leave this point where it was before, and in which I was the more confirmed by ſome circumſtances that were afterwards diſcloſed.

The day after this laſt communication was preſented, I received a letter from the committee, aſſuring me that the ſubject engroſſed their entire attention, and that an anſwer ſhould be given me as ſoon as poſſible; and in a few days after this, I was favoured with another, inviting me to a conference at twelve the next day. I attended, and found only the three members of the diplomatic branch of the committee preſent, Merlin de Douay, Thuriot, and Treilhard. Merlin commenced, by obſerving, that I had adviſed and preſſed them to execute the 23d and 24th articles of the treaty of amity and commerce; that they were perſuaded their compliance would be uſeful to us, but very detrimental to them; it would likewiſe be diſtreſſing for Frenchmen to ſee Britiſh goods protected by our flag, whilſt it gave no protection to theirs; and, after making other comments, he finally came to this point: "Do you inſiſt upon our executing the treaty?" I replied, I had nothing new to add to what I had already ſaid on that head. Treilhard ſeemed ſurpriſed at the reply, and expreſſed a wiſh that I would declare myſelf frankly on the ſubject. I told him I was ſurpriſed at his remark, ſince I had not only declared myſelf frankly, but liberally. We then paſſed from the point of demand, to a more general diſcuſſion of the policy in France to execute the treaty; and in which I urged, that if ſhe conſidered her own intereſt only, ſhe ought not to heſitate, ſince it gave her the command of neutral bottoms, and under the protection of their own flag, to ſupply her wants; with other conſiderations, which had been before preſſed in my notes that were before them. I was, however, brought back twice again to the queſtion, "Do you inſiſt upon, or demand it?" I found that a poſitive and formal declaration on this point was the ſole object of the interview; and as I perceived that ſomething was intended to be founded on it, either now or hereafter, if given in the affirmative, I was the more reſolved to avoid it, and to adhere to the ground I had already taken. I therefore repeated my declaration, and in the moſt explicit terms, that I was not inſtructed by the preſident to inſiſt on it, nor did

I inſiſt on it; that their compliance would certainly be highly beneficial to my country, but that in my obſervations I had conſidered the propoſition merely in relation to France, and wiſhed them to do the ſame, ſince I was ſatisfied that the true intereſt of France dictated the meaſure. They all expreſſed an attachment to us, ſpoke much of the difficulty of their ſituation, and of the peculiar delicacy in adopting, in the preſent ſtate of the public mind, any meaſure which might be conſtrued as eventually favouring England: and thus the conference ended.

In revolving the ſubject over ſince, I have been doubtful whether the ſolicitude ſhown to draw from me a deciſive anſwer to the queſtion—"Whether I inſiſted, or demanded of them to execute the articles of the treaty," was merely intended as the baſis of their own act, complying with it, and a juſtification for themſelves in ſo doing, or as a ground to call on us hereafter, in the proſecution of the war againſt England, to fulfil the guarantee. I was, at the moment of the diſcuſſion in the committee, of the latter opinion, but I muſt confeſs, upon a more general view of all circumſtances that have paſſed under my obſervation ſince my arrival, that I am at preſent inclined to be of the former. I rather think, as there is an oppoſition to the meaſure, and it would commence an important change in their ſyſtem, and might alſo be conſtrued into a partiality for England (a nation by no means in favour here), that the dread of denunciation, in the courſe of events, ſuggeſted it. Be this as it may, I am perfectly ſatisfied it would be impolitic to demand it; ſince the refuſal would weaken the connexion between the two countries, and the compliance, upon that motive, might perhaps not only produce the ſame effect, but likewiſe excite a diſpoſition to preſs us on other points, upon which it were better to avoid any diſcuſſion.

Extract of a Letter from Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Paris, Nov. 20, 1794.

WHEN I mentioned in the committee the danger which menaced us, of a war with Britain and Spain, and aſked, what reliance we might have on France in ſuch an event? I was anſwered, that they ſhould conſider ours as their own cauſe. No other arrangement can well be made, than that of lending money to France, if in our power; it being underſtood, that ſhe will ſecure, at the time of her own peace,

the complete recognition of our rights from Britain and Spain, and which ſhe may eaſily do in my judgment, and without prolonging the war a moment on that account.

On the other hand, if the United States ever mean to aſſert thoſe rights, the preſent is, of all others, the moſt ſuitable moment. The fortune of France has riſen to the utmoſt height of ſplendour; whilſt that of her enemies has declined to the loweſt ſtate of depreſſion. Her armies are every where triumphant, whilſt theirs are every where routed and broken. Spain makes no head againſt her; but is trying, as already ſhown, to ſteal a peace in obſcurity: and Britain is, perhaps, in nearly as bad a ſituation. Maeſtricht has lately ſurrendered; whereby eight thouſand troops were yielded, with about three hundred pieces of cannon, two hundred and fifty-ſeven of which were braſs; with other warlike ſtores, and in great abundance. Nimeghen was likewiſe taken a few days afterwards, with conſiderable amount in ſtores; and it is ſaid that commotions are taking place in five of the provinces, who have formally reſolved to diſmiſs the ſtadtholder, reform the government by the republican ſtandard, and ally with France. This muſt be felt in England, and will probably excite diſturbance there. In any event it will produce ſuch effect, that if America ſtrikes the blow her own intereſt dictates, and which every other conſideration prompts, it muſt be deciſive, and if not ruinous to the fortunes of that proud and inſolent nation, will certainly ſecure us the objects we have in view.

From Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Sir, *Paris, Dec. 2d,* 1794.

I HAVE at length obtained an anſwer from the committee of public ſafety, to the ſeveral propoſitions heretofore preſented before it, in an arrêté of the 18th ultimo; and which I now tranſmit to you. By this arrêté the commiſſion of marine is ordered to adjuſt the amount due to ſuch of our citizens as were injured by the embargo of Bourdeaux, and likewiſe to ſuch others as have claims for ſupplies rendered to the government of St. Domingo. By it alſo many embarraſſments which impeded the direct trade between the two countries are removed; the arbitrary rule of contraband, which authorized the ſeizure of our veſſels laden with provi-

ſions deſtined for other countries, is done away; and the ſtipulation of the treaty of commerce, which gives free paſſage under our flag to the ſubjects of any of the powers at war with the republic, is likewiſe enforced. In ſhort, every thing has been conceded that was deſired, except the execution of that part of the treaty which gave freedom to goods in ſhips that were ſo.

I have, in conſequence, notified to the commiſſion of marine, that I had empowered Mr. Skipwith to take charge of theſe claims, and attend their adjuſtment on the part of our citizens, and I ſhall continue to give every aid in my power to obtain for them the juſtice to which they are entitled. In reſpect to the liquidation, unleſs, indeed, ſome difficulty ſhould ariſe, as to the mode of payment, whether in aſſignats or ſpecie, I preſume all difficulty is at an end. But in regard to the payment, I think it probable, unleſs aſſignats are taken, and which are now depreciated, further delay will be deſired, owing to the great expenditures of the government at this very important criſis of its affairs. Upon this, however, I ſhall be able to give you more correct information in my next.

If the treaty could have been carried into effect by general agreement, I ſhould have deemed it a fortunate thing, becauſe it would have ſecured our commerce hereafter from the poſſibility of vexation, and upon any pretext whatever, by the French cruiſers; and becauſe it would have ranged the French republic, at an important period of its affairs, on the ſide of a principle founded in benevolence, and neceſſary to the freedom of the high ſeas *. But as connected with other conſiderations more immediately applicable to ourſelves, and eſpecially if the hope of forcing it upon other nations, as a law, is abandoned, I have deemed it of but little conſequence. It certainly precludes the probability of our being called on hereafter to fulfil any ſtipulation whatever, and will, of courſe, gain us greater credit for any ſervices we may render them, in caſe it ſhould ſuit us to render them any. I am likewiſe perſuaded, from the reſponſibility the arrêté impoſes, and the increaſing partiality pervading all France towards us, and which is felt by the Americans, and obſerved by the ſubjects of other neutral powers, that the execution will not vary much from the import of the treaty itſelf; for I cannot think that many of our veſſels will here-

* Little was it ſuſpected, at this time, that we ſhould be ranged on the ſide of England to ſupport the oppoſite principle.

after be brought in upon the ſuſpicion of having enemy's goods on board.

I informed you ſome time ſince, that I was perſuaded, if the ſubject was before the convention, it would readily be granted; and in this I have not only been ſince confirmed, but in the further belief that a majority of the ſeveral committees was favourable to the object. The dread, however, of denunciation in the courſe of events, deterred them from adopting it. It was oppoſed, as was likewiſe every other change, by a party who would not fail to take advantage of it, ſhould a favourable opportunity occur. The ſordid ſpoilers of the public wealth never forgive thoſe who detect and expoſe to view their iniquities. And this was the moſt vulnerable point upon which recrimination could hereafter act: for, as it is contemplated, when the other powers are withdrawn, to proſecute the war againſt England, with the collected force of the republic, and this might be conſtrued into a partiality for that nation, it was deemed too hazardous a meaſure, in reſpect to the perſonal ſafety of the members, to be encountered. In this deciſion, too, it is probable they were the more confirmed, by the neceſſity of cultivating Denmark and Sweden at the preſent moment, from whence great reſources are drawn in ſupport of the war; whoſe councils are wielded by Bernſtorf, a man believed to be well diſpoſed to a reform in the exiſting governments of Europe*, and whoſe fleets are combined with no friendly diſpoſition towards England. They would moſt probably have preſſed to be put on the ſame footing, and the preſſure could not eaſily have been reſiſted, after the example was given. As a proof, however, of the diſpoſition of the committee upon the ſubject generally, I herewith tranſmit to you a copy of a report drawn upon my notes by Merlin de Douay, to whom they were referred, and which was informally given me by its diplomatic members.

I apprized you in my laſt, of the 20th inſtant, of Mr. Gardoqui's attempt to obtain permiſſion to attend certain baths within the republic; oſtenſibly upon account of his ill health, but in my judgment to commence a negotiation for peace (a fineſſe too often practiſed by a certain grade of politicians), and at the ſame time leſſen any weight the United States might have upon that ſubject, in reſpect to their own affairs, by inſpiring a diſtruſt in me in the outſet. I likewiſe ſtated to you in what manner I had acted upon

* This, however, is not certain.

that occaſion, laying his original letters before
tee, with my free and candid comments upon th
the further diſcuſſion which took place between t
tee and myſelf in regard to Spain, and to which a
of a different kind gave birth; in which I expoſed,
the nature of the caſe would admit of, the real ſitu
the United States with reſpect to Spain and Britain, n
with war by both; ſhowing how France would be affected by
that event, and of courſe the part ſhe ſhould take in our affairs at the preſent moment. To that communication I have now nothing new to add, having ſince heard neither from Mr. Gardoqui on the ſubject of his propoſition, nor the committee upon that, or the one which afterwards occurred. I omitted, however, at that time, to tranſmit to you a copy of my letter accompanying Mr. Gardoqui's to the committee, and which I now encloſe, for the purpoſe of preſenting that buſineſs more fully before you.

I am convinced that this expoſition of our ſituation with Britain and Spain, and to which the incident of Mr. Gardoqui furniſhed the firſt opening, has been uſeful: for before that expoſition, I had reaſon to believe that it was not only unknown, but that a very erroneous opinion was entertained by many in the committee upon that ſubject. I thought I had felt the effect of that opinion, created, no doubt, in the manner you ſuggeſt; but as it was not communicated in a way to enable me to take official notice of it, I was embarraſſed how to act, or what meaſure to adopt in regard to it. For a while, as it was circulated only in private, I thought it beſt to counteract it, by making the neceſſary explanation only to thoſe who mentioned it to me. Finally, as I knew the campaign was progreſſing towards a cloſe, and that the winter was the ſeaſon for negotiation, and more eſpecially as I feared its commencement with either of thoſe powers, with ſuch improper opinion of our ſituation with each, becauſe I well knew they would improve it with great dexterity to their advantage, I deemed it my duty to make an extraordinary effort to remove it. With this view, I appointed a rendezvous with the diplomatic members of the committee, and which took place accordingly. I was reſolved, however, not to meet the imputation as a charge ſuppoſed to exiſt, or which I was bound to anſwer, in caſe it did. A denial of a charge might beget a ſuſpicion where there was none. I took different ground, by informing the committee, that the war in which they were engaged, like all other wars, muſt have a termination: that *moſt* were concluded by the friendly mediation of third powers: that I was well convinced the

United States would be happy to render the French republic any ſervice in their power, in that reſpect, to bring the preſent war to a happy cloſe: that it was not their intereſt to interfere, even by mediation, nor, in my judgment, would they, otherwiſe than at the inſtance and by the requeſt of the French republic, in the hope of promoting thereby the ſucceſs of their revolution. I obſerved further, that I wanted no anſwer to this, and had only given the information, that they might retain it in memory for the purpoſe of availing themſelves of it hereafter, in caſe it ſhould be found expedient. It was received reſpectfully, but calmly. By one of the members it was obſerved, "That having beaten their enemies completely, it belonged to thoſe enemies to determine whether they wiſhed peace or not; and if they did, they would, no doubt, be able to find a way whereby to make it known to the republic." By another, I was aſked, "Whether Mr. Jay was ſtill in London, and whether he intended to come over to Paris, as had been publiſhed in an Engliſh paper?" This was the very ſuſpicion I wiſhed to combat and remove; though, indeed, I did not expect it would have been avowed in ſo abrupt a manner. I replied, I could not tell whether he had returned or not; but that it was impoſſible the paragraph in the Engliſh paper ſhould be true, as he was ſent to England upon an eſpecial buſineſs only; to demand reparation for injuries, and to which his authority was ſtrictly limited. I then repeated what I had before ſaid of the friendly diſpoſition of the United States towards the French republic, in all caſes, and of the pleaſure with which they would, in my judgment, ſerve it upon the preſent one, if in their power: that I was perſuaded they would liſten to no propoſition upon the ſubject of mediation from any other power; for, as it was a buſineſs which could not poſſibly benefit them, they would, of courſe, embark in it only upon account of their ally. I likewiſe added, that I knew nothing of the diſpoſition of any power upon the ſubject of peace; but preſumed, the ſucceſs of their armies had diſpoſed them all well towards it; and thus I left them to reflect at leiſure upon what I had ſaid; in the belief, however, that the communication muſt produce a good effect. As this took place prior to the affair of Mr. Gardoqui, and which was more particularly detailed in my laſt, I have thought proper to communicate it to you, that you may be poſſeſſed of every the minuteſt circumſtance relative to our affairs upon this very important theatre.

The day after my remarks upon the ſubject of a loan were handed in, I was favoured with your's of the 25th of Sep-

tember, and which I beg leave now to acknowledge.* Finding that my idea of our ſituation with Britain and Spain was correct, I was extremely happy that I had given that repreſentation of it. The motive for ſtrong union here, on our part, is the greater, and nothing tends ſo effectually to promote that object as the belief that we are not cordial with England. In conſequence, I waited on the committee again, and told them I had received a diſpatch from you ſince our laſt conference, and that our dilemma with thoſe two powers was even more critical than I had before intimated. Facts of this kind* go further in removing doubts than any aſſurances I could otherwiſe give them. Theſe diſcuſſions have enabled me to examine attentively whether it was their real wiſh that we ſhould embark with them in the war, and I can aſſure you, that whatever it may have been at any previous ſtage, upon which I can give no opinion, that at preſent, I am perſuaded they would rather we would not; from an idea it might diminiſh their ſupplies from America. But ſuch is their diſpoſition towards us, that I am inclined to think if the point depended on them, they would leave us to act in that reſpect according to our own wiſhes. And I am likewiſe perſuaded, if we do embark in the war, that they will ſee us through it; and have ſome hope if we do not, and eſpecially if we aid them in the article of money, that they will ſupport, as far as they will be able, our demands upon Spain and England.

I intimated in my laſt, that we could not have aſked from fortune a more ſeaſonable opportunity for poſſeſſing ourſelves of thoſe rights which have been long uſurped by Britain and Spain, and that if it was the ſenſe of America ever to poſſeſs them, it ſhould not be pretermitted. Britain is certainly not in a condition to embark in a war againſt us, though we ſhould diſpoſſeſs her of Canada: ſhe would of courſe be leſs apt to do it, if we only placed her troops beyond the lakes. Her own land force was ſcarcely felt in the preſent war againſt France: nor has ſhe been otherwiſe regarded than on account of her fleet and pecuniary reſources, by which ſhe ſubſidiſed Pruſſia and other powers. But *that* force, ſmall as it was, is greatly diminiſhed, and the combination in which ſhe has been aſſociated appears, not only to be completely foiled, but, in a great meaſure, broken. The proſpect now before her is, that Pruſſia, Auſtria, and all the other powers, will extricate themſelves from the war upon the beſt terms they can, and leave her ſingly to ſupport it againſt France; and that the latter

* Meaning Wayne's movement on the frontier.

will be aided by Spain, unleſs a particular combination againſt us ſhould prevent it; and likewiſe by Denmark and Sweden, if not directly, yet in a manner to produce a ſerious effect. The preponderance of her fleet, and the wanton and licentious uſe made of it, have excited the diſguſt of all nations, who would be pleaſed to ſee it reduced, and the preſent is conſidered as a favourable time to reduce it. She likewiſe knows, or confidently believes, that it is the intention of France to proſecute the war againſt her, for the purpoſe of breaking her maritime ſtrength, and ridding the ocean from ſuch a tyrant. At home too ſhe cannot be free from diſquietude. The total failure of her operations in this quarter (what they are in the Weſt Indies is better known to you) has excited ſome uneaſineſs in the public mind, and proportionally leſſened the weight of the court. This was lately ſhown in a proſecution againſt a Mr. Hardy, and in which a verdict was given for the defendant. And ſhould the French take Holland (which nothing but an inundation already commenced can prevent, if even that can), this ſenſation will of courſe be increaſed. Thus circumſtanced, what have we to fear from her? Will ſhe, in her decline, bring upon herſelf another enemy, who can wound her ſo vitally? for let her merchants and politicians boaſt as they will of her reſources, yet it is well known, if the American demand was cut off, upon which ſhe thrives ſo much, that it would greatly diminiſh her revenue and impair her ſtrength. How is ſhe enabled to ſupport her engagements and carry on her operations, but by commerce? and leſſened as this already is by the war, how could ſhe ſuſtain ſuch a ſtroke at the preſent criſis? From her friendſhip we have nothing to hope: the order of the 6th November was war, in *fact*, and that has ſince been modified according to circumſtances. Be aſſured ſhe is infinitely leſs diſpoſed for ſuch an event at the preſent than at any preceding period. On the contrary, if we only took poſſeſſion of what we are entitled to, ſhe will readily join with us in reprehending the conduct of her own officers for having tranſcended their orders*. With reſpect to

* My opinion was, that we ſhould take a ſtrong poſition in reſpect to England, and which would not only have put us at eaſe permanently with France, avoiding, in conſequence, all the variance and miſunderſtanding which have ſince taken place with that republic; but, by obtaining from her the aid of her fortunes againſt England, have commanded from the latter power, and without any danger of war, our own terms. Nor would ſhe in ſuch an event have inquired too ſtrictly into the propriety of our repaying *in kind* to France the obligation we owed her, by guaranteeing for her four or five millions of dollars, to be laid out here in the purchaſe of proviſions.

Spain, I have nothing new to add, ſince my laſt, except that in two days' ſucceſſive actions, two complete victories were obtained over her troops by thoſe of this republic; unleſs, indeed, ſome ingenious ſophiſt, jealous of the honour of Spain, ſhould contend, that as they were completely routed on the firſt, and maintained only a ſtraggling battle on the ſecond, it ought to be called but one. Certain it is, that in the two days' conflict ſeveral thouſands were ſlain, and upwards of two thouſand taken priſoners, with their camp on each day; and on one, tents for fifty thouſand men.

From Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Sir, *Paris, January 13th,* 1795.

I HAVE the pleaſure to inform you, that, upon the report of the united committees of public ſafety, legiſlation, commerce, and finances, a decree has paſſed the convention ſince my laſt, whereby it is reſolved to carry into ſtrict execution the treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and this republic. I beg leave to congratulate you upon this event, and particularly the unanimity with which it paſſed the convention; ſince it demonſtrates the good diſpoſition of that body, and of the nation generally towards us. I was always ſatisfied, as heretofore intimated, that if I could have brought the ſubject, in the firſt inſtance, before the convention, I ſhould have ſucceeded immediately in the object in view: but as the committee was the department organized for ſuch buſineſs, this was impoſſible, without commencing a ſpecies of warfare upon it, and which was equally improper, as it might tend to increaſe their own diſſenſions, and embark me afloat upon the fortune of thoſe diſſenſions. Happily, by purſuing the object patiently with the committee, removing doubts, and obviating objections, aided by occaſional changes of the members, this has not only been avoided, but I have the additional pleaſure to aſſure you, that it was finally accompliſhed, without the leaſt difficulty, and without exciting the animoſity of any one.

After my late communications to the committee of public ſafety, in which were expoſed freely the object of Mr. Jay's miſſion to England, and the real ſituation of the United States with Britain and Spain, I had reaſon to believe that all apprehenſion on thoſe points was done away, and that the utmoſt cordiality had now likewiſe taken place in that body towards us. I conſidered the report above recited, and upon which the de-

cree was founded, as the unequivocal proof of that change of ſentiment, and flattered myſelf, that in every reſpect we had now the beſt proſpect of the moſt perfect and permanent harmony between the two republics. I am very ſorry, however, to add, that latterly this proſpect has been ſomewhat clouded by accounts from England, that Mr. Jay had not only adjuſted the points in controverſy, but concluded a treaty of commerce with that government: ſome of thoſe accounts ſtate, that he had alſo concluded a treaty of alliance, offenſive and defenſive. As I knew the baneful effect which theſe reports would produce, I deemed it my duty, by repeating what I had ſaid before of his powers, to uſe my utmoſt endeavours, informally, to diſcredit them. This, however, did not arreſt the progreſs of the report, nor remove the diſquietude it had created: for I was, finally, applied to directly by the committee, in a letter, which ſtated what had been heard, and requeſted information of what I knew in regard to it. As I had juſt before received one from Mr. Jay, announcing that he had concluded a treaty, and which contained a declaration that our previous treaties ſhould not be affected by it, I thought fit to make this letter the baſis of my reply. And as it is neceſſary that you ſhould be apprized of whatever has paſſed here on this ſubject, I now tranſmit to you copies of theſe ſeveral papers, and which compriſe a full ſtatement thereof, up to the preſent time.

I cannot admit, for a moment, that Mr. Jay has exceeded his powers, or that any thing has been done which will give juſt cauſe of complaint to this republic. I lament, however, that he has not thought himſelf at liberty to give me correct information on that ſubject; for until it is known that their intereſt has not been wounded, the report will certainly keep alive ſuſpicion, and which always weakens the bonds of friendſhip. I truſt, therefore, you will deem it expedient to adviſe me on this head as ſoon as poſſible.

I apprized you, in my two laſt letters, of an informal communication between the diplomatic members of the committee and myſelf, upon an interrogatory of theirs, whether it would be poſſible for France to obtain aid from, or within the United States, for the purchaſe of ſupplies; and of my effort upon that occaſion to intereſt this government in ſupport of our claims with Britain and Spain; and to which I was ſtimulated by intelligence that Mr. Jay's negotiation had failed; and that we were on the point of war, or actually engaged in it, with Britain, as likewiſe by the knowledge that Spain was covertly ſeeking a ſeparate peace. I was ſatisfied, that if France would embark in our cauſe, in the preſent ſtate of things, and which I found her well diſpoſed to do, and without the proſpect of

much aid in return, that the object in each inſtance would be ſecured; I therefore thought it eligible in that ſtate of things, and with that view, to leave the door open for a communication on the ſubject with you; but as ſoon as I underſtood that Mr. Jay had adjuſted the points in controverſy with that nation, the object, on my part, was at an end. I was aware, that if the adjuſtment was approved, we could render no ſuch ſervice: indeed, I doubted whether in peace the government poſſeſſed the power to render it; I called, therefore, immediately upon thoſe members with whom the previous communication had been, and ſuggeſted the ſame to them: they had anticipated the idea, and were prepared to anſwer it by a peremptory aſſurance, that it was not their wiſh to create embarraſſment in this or any other reſpect; on the contrary, that regard ſhould be ſhown in all caſes to our actual ſituation; and with reſpect to the point in queſtion, that the miniſter about to depart ſhould be inſtructed not even to mention it if you forbade it. So that this buſineſs ſtands upon a footing, as, indeed, it always did, whereby, under a particular ſtate of things, ſome benefit may be derived from it, and no detriment under any.

The operations of this government continue to progreſs in the ſame courſe they have done for ſome time paſt. During the time of Robeſpierre, a period of the adminiſtration which is emphatically called the reign of terror, much havoc was made, not only on the rights of humanity, but great confuſion was likewiſe introduced, in other reſpects, in the affairs of the government. It has been the ſyſtematic effort of the adminiſtration to repair this waſte, and heal the bleeding wounds of the country, and in this, great progreſs has been made. By the ſame report which propoſed the execution of the violated articles of the treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, it was likewiſe propoſed to open wide the door of commerce to every citizen (excluding them from navigation only), and which was adopted: ſo that, at preſent, any perſon bringing productions into the ports of this republic, may ſell them to whom he pleaſes, and generally with aſtoniſhing profit. The agents of the republic ſtand upon the ground of other perſons: they are preferred only by outbidding them. In my judgment, no region of the world preſents ſuch an opening to the enterpriſes of our countrymen, as this does. The reſtraints upon their own navigation operate, in a degree, as a bounty to ours; and the government and citizens of France ſeem equally pleaſed to ſee ours preferred to that of any other nation. The reſtraints, likewiſe, which are impoſed in other countries, on account of the war, upon a commerce with the French citizens, produce, in other reſpects, the ſame effect. It is the intereſt of the lat-

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ter to employ our countrymen in ordinary mercantile tranſactions, and eſpecially with foreign nations; whereby they get into their hands a great proportion of the whole trade of the republic. The profits which thoſe on this theatre have already made, and continue to make, ſurpaſs what you have any idea of. I ſincerely wiſh that this was more generally known, that more might be induced to embark in it, not only for the purpoſe of diffuſing more generally the immediate emoluments, but for the more important one of gaining an intereſt in the commerce of this republic, which may be of laſting advantage to the United States. Before the revolution, the Engliſh poſſeſſed this advantage, as they did in moſt other countries; but now that intereſt is annihilated; and if the Americans ſtep in, aided as they will be by the preference of the government and people in their favour, they may occupy the ground, and retain it for ever afterwards.

From Mr. Monroe to the Secretary of State.

Sir, *Paris, June 26th,* 1795.

SINCE my laſt, it is reduced to a certainty, that the Britiſh government has revived its order of the 6th November 1793, and commenced, on this ſide the Atlantic, the ſame ſyſtem of warfare and pillage upon our commerce that was practiſed on it by that government at that very calamitous era. Between thirty and forty ſail deſtined for the ports of this republic, charged with proviſions, have been already taken from their deſtination, and carried into thoſe of that iſland; and, as the period has arrived when the invitation which the diſtreſſes of this country gave to our merchants *here* and at *home*, to embark their fortunes in this ſupply, is likely to produce its effect, it is more than probable that other veſſels, and to a great amount, will ſhare the like fate. Among thoſe of our merchants who are here, this meaſure has created a kind of panic; for they think they ſee in its conſequences little leſs than the ruin of their trade; and under which impreſſion many are about to abandon it for the preſent, and ſend their veſſels home in ballaſt.

What effect this meaſure will produce upon this government, under exiſting circumſtances, I cannot pretend to determine. Formerly it adopted the ſame meaſure for tne purpoſe of counteracting its enemy; but the impolicy of that precedure was afterwards diſcuſſed and demonſtrated, and the meaſure itſelf, in conſequence, abandoned. At preſent the diſtreſs of the country is great, and the government will, no doubt, be mortified to find that, whilſt our flag gives no protection to *its* goods, nor even to *our* goods, deſtined for the ports of this republic, the

whole of which become the ſpoil of its enemy; that it does protect not only *our* goods deſtined for the Engliſh ports, but likewiſe Britiſh goods deſtined equally for thoſe, and the ports of other countries. The meaſure has obviouſly excited a kind of ferment in their councils, but which, I preſume, will be directed againſt their enemies only. Be aſſured I ſhall do every thing in my power to give it that direction, and to enforce thoſe arguments which were uſed upon the former occaſion; but, ſhould they fail in producing the deſired effect, and a leſs amicable policy be adopted, which, however, I think will not be the caſe, I ſhall deem it my duty immediately to adviſe you of it, by a veſſel (in caſe none other offers) to be diſpatched for the purpoſe.

It will obviouſly attract your attention, that this meaſure was ſo timed by the Britiſh cabinet, that it might have no influence in the deciſion of the ſenate upon the treaty of Mr. Jay, nor can the motive for ſuch an accommodation be leſs doubtful; for, in caſe it be rejected, they will deem the ſtroke a lucky one; ſince, thereby, they will ſay, they had fortunately gained ſo much time; and if it be adopted, they will probably preſume, that ſo much time will be conſumed in convening the congreſs, ſhould that meaſure be deemed expedient, that the courſe of events here may render it impoſſible for our efforts to produce a favourable effect; and which conſideration, they will likewiſe infer, will be an argument againſt convening the congreſs.

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